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The thesis unveils how judges decide sentences in Cyprus and how they 
employ mercy to contour their judgments by determining at the same time whether 
these decisions are reached within or on the basis of a consistent legitimising 
framework founded in or derived from moral legal theory. The study professes a 
degree of originality in that it deals with the academically unexplored ground of the 
Cypriot sentencing reality and investigates the role of mercy not only as a 
component (or not) element of justice but, additionally, as a purposive ingredient of 
judicial discretion in the determination of sentence. It emphasises positive rather 
than normative analysis. It concentrates on how Cypriot judges sentence, and not 
on how they should or ought to sentence, by depicting and explaining the judges’ 
method of reaching their sentencing decisions in substance and in form (or their 
punishtecture as it will be characterised), including the demonstration on their part 
of mercy to certain defendants at the sentencing stage (or mercying as it will 
similarly be referred to).  Following a discussion of relevant conceptual and 
empirical literature the thesis present and analyses a substantial body of data 
generated from a series of tête-à-tête semi-structured interviews conducted by the 
researcher with the majority of the Cypriot judiciary between 2007 and 2008. The 
research yields the judges’ views on the nature of the sentencing process and the 
conceptions, design, structuring, and utterance of their resultant judgments within 
the criminal justice context in which they find themselves acting. It presents what 
they have said about the choice of punishment and mercy and reconstructs what 
they may be taken to have meant by saying it; their aims and purposes in 
sentencing; the constraints under which they operate; the way they exercise their 
penal choices; and the use (or dismissal) of mercy as an etiological foundation of 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
The dissertation at hand will unveil how judges decide sentences in the 
Republic of Cyprus, and how they employ mercy to contour their sentencing 
judgments as well as determine, in parallel, whether these judgments are reached 
within or on the basis of a consistent legitimising framework founded in or derived 
from moral legal theory.  
In full awareness that no study can ask all the questions and provide all the 
answers, the thesis will set out to depict and explain the Cypriot judges’ views on 
sentencing and the relationship between those views and their actual conduct, in 
terms of the confluence of two sets of influence on practice.  The first of these is the 
architecture of judicial sentencing (or punishtecture,1as it will be hereinafter 
referred to), that is, the judges’ method of reaching, formulating, and justifying 
their sentencing decisions in substance and in form. The second, considered as that 
aspect of punishtecture that frames real decisions in certain kinds of hard cases, 
concerns their considerations and ponderings in deciding to utilise and exercise 
mercy in determining the punishment of a defendant at the sentencing stage for the 
crime he has committed (or mercying,2as it will be referred to here).  On the 
premise that the practice of mercying arises within and is constrained by the 
framework - the punishtecture - that envelops it, the study will examine the judges’ 
views on the nature of the sentencing process, and the conceptions, design, 
                                                
1The term punishtecture is coined on the basis of a loose etymological analogy to the Latin term 
‘architectura,’ and the Greek word ‘arkitekton,’ an architect, or more precisely ‘master builder,’ 
from the combination of arki (‘chief’) and tekton (‘builder’). In this context, the architect of 
sentencing, or master builder, is the sentencing judge: See, S Tulloch (ed), The Oxford Dictionary 
and Thesaurus (OUP, Oxford 1993) 69-70. 
2The term mercying (to mercy) is invented by reference to the word ‘mercy’, which derives from 
the Medieval Latin word ‘merces’ (reward, compassionate action), influenced by the Latin term 
‘miserere’ (to have pity): See, Tulloch, The Oxford Dictionary and Thesaurus (n 1) 955. 
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structuring, and utterance of their resultant judgments within the criminal justice 
context in which they find themselves acting. It presents what they have said about 
the choice of punishment and mercy, and reconstructs what they may be taken to 
have meant by saying it.  With these concepts in mind, and viewing punishtecture 
as a construct formed from a structured process of thought combining the 
application of law and legal sentencing principles on the one hand and the Cypriot 
cultural realities as perceived by the judges on the other hand, the study will reflect 
upon a number of aspects of the judges’ orientations towards passing sentence.  
These include the general justifying aims and purposes in sentencing, the 
constraints under which the judges operate, the way they make their penal 
selections and the use (or dismissal) of mercy as an etiological foundation (express, 
implied, disguised, or hidden) of sentencing rationales and mercying.  These will be 
pursued through a presentation and qualitative analysis of information obtained 
from a series of tête-à-tête semi-structured interviews conducted by the researcher 
for the purposes of the dissertation with the majority of the Cypriot judiciary 
between 2007 and 2008.  
The study has a certain originality in that it differs significantly from 
similar projects undertaken and published thus far, in two key respects: Firstly, it 
deals with the academically unexplored ground of the Cypriot sentencing reality. 
Secondly, it investigates, at the judicial level, the role of mercy not only as a 
component (or not) element of justice but, additionally, as a purposive ingredient 
of judicial discretion in the determination of sentence.  
The thesis emphasises positive rather than normative analysis. It 
concentrates on how Cypriot judges sentence, and not on how they should or ought 
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to sentence.3The endeavour is to describe their actual sentencing decision process, 
and not to conclude whether or not these decisions are optimal according to some 
normative theory of decision-making.4This is not to suggest, however, that there 
will be no espousal of normative inquiry at any particular level, as questions of 
what ought to be have, or can have, relevance and meaning quite apart from the 
question of what is. 
 Judging is both a practice much theorised about, and a practice that is itself 
filled with theory or theory talk. Judging or doing judging is one thing, while 
giving accounts of theories of judging is another. As practices, they are 
independent, even though the successful performance of the first will often involve 
engaging in the second.5Indeed, much of the interest in studies about judges 
appears to lie in the comparison between actual and ideal behaviour, with the 
content of the normative standard sometimes being uncontroversial and its 
application straightforward, while in others (like in the instant case, as it will 
henceforth become evident), controversial or hard to delimit, and its application 
unclear.6From this perspective, it will be argued that although judicial decision-
making in the field of sentencing (with or without the adoption of mercy) cannot 
and should not be value-free, criminal judges need not make judgments concerning 
                                                
3For a normative analysis of judicial decision-making see, for example, R Wasserstrom, The 
Judicial Decision: Toward a Theory of Legal Justification (Stanford University Press, Stanford, 
California 1961). 
4For which one could refer to the extensive work of R Aldisert, The Judicial Process: Text, 
Materials, and Cases (2nd edn West Publishing Co, St Paul, Minnesota 1996). 
5S Fish, Doing What Comes Naturally: Change, Rhetoric, and the Practice of Theory in Literary 
and Legal Studies (Duke University Press, Durham 1989) 384. 
6L Baum, ‘Motivation and Judicial Behavior: Expanding the Scope of Inquiry’ in D Klein and G 
Mitchell (eds),The Psychology of Judicial Decision Making (American Psychology-Law Society, 
OUP, Oxford 2010) 3. 
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the moral value and moral justifiability of punishment as a precondition of 
effectively and legitimately exercising their sentencing functions.  
 In reality, there have been very few attempts thus far to test whether or not 
judges, irrespective of jurisdictional origin, base their decision processes on penal 
principles.7The study will therefore be concerned with the association between the 
theoretical justifications, and goals of legal punishment, and the actual practice of 
punishment per se. The reality of a diversity of academic and philosophical 
approaches towards the justification, functions and goals of punishment is in itself 
no assurance that the practice of legal punishment in Cyprus is morally justified. 
Conceivably, moral theory of punishment always serves as an expedient pond of 
rationalisations, to be drawn from eclectically.8For this reason, one must be able to 
demonstrate the significance of such justifications for the practice of punishment 
and to examine whether the fundamental concepts derived from moral legal theory 
have any meaning to Cypriot sentencing judges. If there is indeed a legitimising 
(moral) view, or framework, underlying sentencing in Cyprus, that should, in some 
way, be reflected in the minds of its judges. On this premise, the examination of the 
judges’ approach to sentencing is important in demonstrating how, if at all, abstract 
theoretical concepts become translated into practice.9  
The array of perspectives which will be examined in the thesis, will 
principally be those of retributivism, utilitarianism, and hybridism; these theories, 
particularly the first two, have been in the academic mainstream for decades, 
                                                
7C Tata, ‘Sentencing as Craftwork and the Binary Epistemologies of the Discretionary Decision 
Process’ (2007) 16 Soc & Legal Stud 425, 433. 
8J Keijser, Punishment and Purpose: From Moral Theory to Punishment in Action (Thela Thesis, 
Amsterdam 2000) 3. 
9Keijser, Punishment and Purpose (n 8) 3. 
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constituting the main theoretical core of an ongoing public (and not merely 
academic) debate on punishment justification and sentencing practice, as well as the 
focus of a plethora of pertinent and constantly growing bibliography.10The decision 
to concentrate on these theories, as opposed to others, was based on the fairly 
reasonable assumption, as made at the planning stages of the study, that these were 
known to the majority of the judges who were to participate in the research, given 
that some sporadic mention of them had been made in the sentencing case law of 
the Supreme Court of Cyprus (hereinafter ‘the Supreme Court’), and other relevant 
Cypriot publications.  
 
1.1 The Justification for Making the Cyprus Judiciary the Subject Matter of 
the Thesis  
Cyprus is an island with an area of 9,251 square kilometres, situated at the 
Northeastern corner of the Mediterranean Sea, approximately 69 kilometres from 
Turkey, 122 kilometres from Syria, and 408 kilometres from Egypt. Following a 
military invasion in 1974, Turkey has been illegally occupying 36.43% of the 
northern part of the island ever since.11Cyprus is the third largest island in the 
region, after Sicily and Sardinia, but larger than Corsica or Crete, and nearly half 
the size of Fiji (or Wales), seven times smaller than Scotland, and relatively larger 
than countries like Puerto Rico and Trinidad and Tobago.12It became an 
independent Republic in 1960 and a full member of the European Union on the 1st 
                                                
10See, more recently, G Mackenzie and N Stobbs, Principles of Sentencing (The Federation Press, 
Sydney 2010); G Johnstone and T Ward, Law and Crime (Key Approaches to Criminology, Sage 
Publications, London 2010); M Maguire and D W Okada (eds), Critical Issues in Crime and 
Justice: Thought, Policy, and Practice (Sage Publications, London 2010); N Walker, Crime and 
Punishment in Britain (2nd edn Aldine, London 2010). 
11For more on this aspect, see Chapter 3.2.1.  
12The Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook 2010, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/index.html> accessed 1st March 2010. 
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of May 2004. It has a population of approximately 1 million (of which four-fifths 
are members of the Orthodox Church and one-fifth are Ottoman Turks). Its 
population is almost double to that of the city of Edinburgh and roughly equal to 
that of the cities of Glasgow and Aberdeen combined.13Being a former British 
colony, it has adopted and retained not only a multifarious variety of British 
influences (including, even, driving on the left-hand side of the road), but the 
common law system of precedent as well, still drawing on the judicial decisions of 
the English judiciary14and, to a far lesser extent, on North-American judicial 
decisions.15Given this background, all Anglo-American and other similar 
commonwealth legal and academic references presented in the thesis, have a 
corresponding relevance and applicability on the issues for which they are cited 
and quoted.  
No country or jurisdiction is wholly typical for the purposes of sentencing 
analysis of any type, and Cyprus is not so atypical as to be unique, and thus unfit, 
for becoming the focus of a work on sentencing like the one at hand, with its 
conclusions capable of being promulgated for purposes of referential application to 
(or avoidance of in) other criminal law jurisdictions.  Cyprus forms no exception 
to the problems that bane the practice of legal punishment in other countries, 
whether they be of a legalistic or normative character or a concoction of the two.  
These problems have essentially a universal dimension, as sentencing systems, no 
                                                
13See, General Register Office for Scotland 2010, http://www.gro-
scotland.gov.uk/census/schoolhm/map/edinmye.html>accessed 1st March 2010. 
14B H McPherson, The Reception of English Law Abroad (Supreme Court of Queensland Library, 
Brisbane 2007) 331-332. 
15W Wiegand, ‘The Reception of American Law in Europe’ (1991) 39 Am J Comp L 229. There is, 
though, a notable difference between the Anglo-American legal system and the Cypriot one, as 
pertains to the inapplicability in the latter, of the jury system, as opposed to the former.  
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matter where they are situated geographically, or on what jurisdictional influences 
they function, are comparatively and relatively similar.  They are run by people for 
people, with largely the same human strengths and weaknesses, this being, in 
actual fact, a presumption that one could safely and reasonably make based on 
common sense and observation.16Penal and criminal justice systems today, are 
constant sources of inspiration to each other, just as international policy-making 
and collaboration builds cross-national movements and concerns with common 
key elements.17This tendency for internationalisation - one of the most significant 
themes of the 1990s in the development of criminal law18- could be said to be 
resulting from the fact that crime has ceased from being largely local in origin and 
effect, having been rooted on an international scale.19 
Admittedly, Cyprus has not participated to any notable extent in the 
international discussion on punishment justification preoccupying scholars for 
decades in much of the common law world.20In truth, apart from some periodic 
and synoptic mentions in a handful of judgments by the Supreme Court, and a few 
basic analyses in several academic writings of mostly general sentencing and 
penological interest, there has not been much other pertinent Cypriot scholarly or 
                                                
16Without the need for presenting, for example, corroborative evidence for the truth of the 
statement, such as Paul McCartney’s lyrics in ‘Ebony and Ivory’ (performed with Stevie Wonder): 
‘…we all know that people are the same wherever we go.  There is good and bad in everyone…’ 
(The song, was produced by George Marvin, and was featured in McCartney’s album Tug of War, 
released on March 1982 by Parlophone/EMI), or Jacob Ofalis’s stories about the places he went 
and people he met all over the world, revealing his discoveries the essential unity of human nature 
(See, S Orfali, Everywhere You Go, People are the Same (Robin Publishing Berkeley, California 
1995). 
17See, R Cotterrell, ‘Seeking Similarity, Appreciating Difference: Comparative Law and 
Communities’ in A Harding and E Orucu (eds), Comparative Law in the 21st Century (W G Hart 
Legal Workshop, Kluwer Academic Publishers, London 2002) 43. 
18See, P Alldridge, Relocating Criminal Law (Applied Legal Philosophy, Ashgate Publishers, 
Dartmouth 2000) 137. 
19See, Liangsiriprasert v United States Government [1990] 2 All E R 866, 878. 
20See for example, R Henham, ‘The Philosophical Foundations of International Sentencing’ (2003) 
1 JICJ 64.  
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judicial21wisdom to draw from in such a context.22It is worth mentioning that the 
first time the Supreme Court had ever referred to an English sentencing judicial 
precedent since 1960, was in 1971 in the case of Kakathymis v The 
Republic,23citing DPP v Ottewell,24in relation to the penological treatment of 
persistent offenders. In that same year, there was also a first time judicial 
reference25to an English author on sentencing, namely David Thomas, and his 
book Principles of Sentencing,26in relation to the distinction, for sentencing 
purposes, between a peddler and a consumer of narcotic drugs. Additional similar 
references have since then been infrequent. Markedly enough, as derived from a 
systematic analysis of the published Cypriot case law on sentencing in its entirety 
between 1960 and 2008,27the Supreme Court referred to English judicial 
                                                
21Together with David Thomas’s book Principles of Sentencing (2nd edn Heinemann, London 
1979), the book by George M Pikis, Sentencing in Cyprus (Proodos Press, Nicosia, Cyprus, 1978), 
has been the main reference book on sentencing since its publication. There has been a new edition 
of the book in 2008, by the same author and publishers, titled Sentencing in Cyprus: Sentencing 
Revisited. A book by A Kapardis, C Solomonides, and E Stephanou, Sentencing in Cyprus: 
Penological Aspects, Principles and Case Law (Ant N Sakkoulas Publishers, Athens 2003), 
presents a synoptic exposition of sentencing in Cyprus.  
22See, for example, the list of various books and articles published in Cyprus by advocates and 
judges on a variety of legal matters, including sentencing, in A C Emilianides, Bibliography of 
Cyprus Law (Power Publishing, Nicosia 2005). The book, nonetheless, is incomplete, as numerous 
books and articles published diachronically on various legal issues on Cyprus law have not been 
included. The book in Greek by G Giorgis, The Practice of the Cyprus Courts in the Determination 
of Sentence in Comparison to the Greek Practice (Ant N Sakkoulas Publishers, Athens 1986), 
offers a comparative study on Greek and Cypriot sentencing, though of limited use to the Cypriot 
practitioner, due to the differences between the legal systems of Cyprus and Greece, with the latter, 
ascribing to the continental system of law. An excellent and synoptic overview of sentencing in 
Cyprus is presented by A Kapardis, in his contributory chapter ‘A Review of Sentencing in Cyprus’ 
in M S Michel and A M Tamis (eds), Cyprus in the Modern World (La Trobe University Press, 
Melbourne 2005) 85, as well as in his book Sentencing: Some Key Issues (La Trobe University 
Press, Melbourne 1995). 
23[1971] 2 CLR 309. The abbreviation ‘CLR’ is herein used to refer to the Cyprus Law Reports. 
24[1968] 3 All E R 153, HL. 
25This was done in the case of Abdullah v The Republic [1971] 2 CLR 323.  
26Thomas, Principles of Sentencing (n 21). 
27For the purposes of the thesis, the researcher proceeded to an in depth analysis and codification of 
pertinent issues to the thesis of the total of 891 sentencing judgments of the Supreme Court 
reported in the CLR between 1960 (the year Cyprus became an independent Republic) and 2008, 
the year in which the judicial interviews were completed (in any event, at the time of completing 
this thesis, the 2009 appeals had not yet been published), relating to criminal appeals against 
 19 
precedent, statutory provisions and academic work in only 11.7%% of the total 
judgments on appeal against sentence reported for that period (i.e. in 104 out of 
891 appeals), whereas it referred to similar US precedent in 0.34% (i.e. in 3 out of 
891 appeals). Nevertheless, this picture of the Cyprus sentencing scene does not 
affect the viability of the present research, as any insight into the methodology of 
judicial thinking in sentencing always contributes, though in variable degrees, to 
the venture of enhancing the understanding of sentencing judges, that is, the real 
moulders of the practice of criminal punishment and mercying. 
 
1.2 The Perturbed Field of Punishment Practice 
For years, there have been doubts and criticisms worldwide regarding the 
rules and quality of the practice of legal punishment,28emitting as a result an aura 
of discontent to the typical observer, and Cyprus has been no exception in this 
regard.29 
One would not profess originality if he had asserted that, quite often, 
sentencing practice becomes murky in the shadows of the criminal law institutions, 
                                                                                                                                  
sentence, issued by the Cypriot Assize and District Courts. No other such analysis exists in relation 
Cypriot case law covering the said period. The analysis is presented in Chapter 3.6. Mention of the 
results of the analysis occurs, as needed, throughout the thesis.  
28A Ashworth, ‘Towards European Sentencing Standards’ (1994) 2 Euro J Crim Pol & Res 7; J 
Clark, J Austin, and A Henry, Three Strikes and You’re Out: A Review of State Legislation 
(National Institute of Justice, Washington DC, 1997); C Kelk, L Koffman, and J Silvis, 
‘Sentencing, Practice, Policy and Discretion’ in C Harding, P Fennell, N, Jörg and B Swart (eds), 
Criminal Justice in Europe: A Comparative Study (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1995); R S Frase, 
‘Sentencing Principles in Theory and Practice’ in M Tonry (ed), Crime and Justice: A Review of 
Research (Vol 22 University of Chicago Press, Chicago 1997); M C Bassiouni, and Z Motala (eds), 
The Protection of Human Rights in African Criminal Proceedings (Kluwer, Dordrecht 1995); L 
Kukri, ‘International Standards for Sentencing and Punishment’ in M Tonry and R S Frase (eds), 
Sentencing and Sanctions in Western Countries (OUP, Oxford  2001); C Tata and N Hutton (eds), 
Sentencing and Society: International Perspectives (Ashgate Publishers, Aldershot 2002). 
29A Kapardis, ‘Key Issues in Sentencing Criminal Defendants in Cyprus’ (2nd International 
Conference on Sentencing and Society, Glasgow, Scotland 27-29 June 2002).  
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no matter how much that practice strives to retain its jural idealism.30This idealism 
may seem irrelevant to some judges (and additionally, lawyers, prosecutors, 
concerned citizens and others), who due to their pressing preoccupations inside the 
system of sentencing practice, have little, if any, opportunity to reflect. Instead, 
faced with the harsh realities of case overloads,31increasing crime rates,32fear of 
crime,33moral panics,34and overcrowded prisons,35they ask for instant 
implementation of practical solutions. They have no time or reason to theorise or 
philosophise about these problems, as that, they feel, will practically lead nowhere. 
They demand immediate and tangible results in the quest against crime (primarily 
from the under-staffed and overworked judicial system), and insist on offender 
intolerance and unmerciful treatment;36and all these, amidst a general accord 
between academics (primarily), that contemporary penal policy and practice is 
                                                
30M Tunick, Punishment: Theory and Practice (University of California Press, Berkeley 1992) 25.  
31See, S Snacken and K Verfaillie, ‘Media, “Public Opinion” and (Criminological) Research’ in H 
Eisendrath and J P Van Bendegem (eds), It Takes Two to Do Science: The Puzzling Interactions 
Between Science and Society (ASP-VUB Press, Nederland 2010) 164. 
32J V Roberts, L J Stalans, D Indermaur, and M Hough, Penal Populism and Public Opinion: 
Lessons from Five Countries (Studies in Crime and Public Policy OUP, New York 2002) 21. 
33See, for example an interesting analysis of crime fear as a system of social control, in M Felson 
and R V Clark, ‘Routine Precautions, Criminology, and Crime Prevention’ in H Barlow and S H 
Decker (eds), Criminology and Public Policy: Putting Theory to Work (Temple University Press, 
Pennsylvania 2010) 106. 
34See, in general, E Goode and N B Yehuda, Moral Panics: The Social Construction of Deviance 
(2nd edn Blackwell Publishing, Oxford 2009) 2. 
35For the impact of prison overcrowding, in sentencing policy and administration, see K E Bloch, 
‘Changing the Topography of Sentencing’ (2010) 7 Hastings Race & Poverty L J 185. 
36Professor David Marshall prefacing David Fraser’s book A Land Fit for Criminals (Book Guild 
Publishing, Sussex 2007), writes on the point, on page xi, that ‘Social scientists, civil servants and 
Ministers of the Crown have conspired for decades to deceive the public about the state of law and 
order. They have consistently underestimated the level and severity of crime. They have insisted on 
the efficacy of methods of crime prevention and control, which patently do not work. They have 
stubbornly persisted with utopian theories of crime, criminality and punishment, which fail entirely 
to take account of human nature and social reality…Modern criminology constitutes a tissue of 
pseudo-liberal prejudice and counter-productive phoney knowledge. Contemporary penal policy 
comprises a vast body of misconceived and nonsensical doctrine which has the effect of 
exculpating criminals, punishing victims and escalating social collapse.’  
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complex, inconsistent, and capricious.37In fact, the difficulty in reaching a 
consensus on a single punishment theory or a set of sentencing rationales in some 
countries, including Cyprus,38has influenced scholars in expressing the stance that, 
in democracies where there is a division among its members about theories of 
punishment, legislators realise, that ambiguity but not honesty is the best 
policy.39Ashworth made analogous observations in commenting on the failure of 
(the then applicable) Criminal Justice Act 1991 to provide for a rational and 
coherent objective in sentencing. He indicated that the manifest need to analyse 
sentencing from the point of view of philosophy and principle often gives away in 
practice to stronger political and pragmatic pressures.40Along similar lines, Duff 
and Garland caution that the sturdy absence of a common theoretical pedestal on 
sentencing and punishment confuses rather than clarifies matters.41Some even 
suggest that the source of the predicament is the lack of judicial understanding of 
                                                
37L Zedner, ‘Dangers of Dystopias in Penal Theory’ (2002) 22 OJLS 341. 
38Council of Europe Recommendation No R (92) 17 of the Committee of Ministers to Member 
States Concerning Consistency in Sentencing in ‘Consistency in Sentencing: Recommendation to 
Member States and Explanatory Memorandum’ (1993) 4 Crim L F 355, 364. The recommendation 
does not prefer or suggest any particular sentencing rationale: See, M Killias, ‘Sentencing Reform: 
From Rhetorics to Reducing Sentencing Disparity’ (1994) 2(1) Euro J Crim Policy & Research 19-
28. 
39N Walker, Why Punish? (OUP, Oxford, 1991) 84. 
40A Ashworth, Sentencing and Criminal Justice (Law in Context, 2nd edn, Butterworths, London 
1995) 88. 
41R A Duff and D Garland (eds), in their A Reader on Punishment  (Oxford Readings in Socio-
Legal Studies, OUP, Oxford 1994) 19, assert that: ‘…how far should we even hope, or aim, for a 
penal system which is structured by just one coherent normative theory of punishment? Should we 
not rather recognise that punishment is inevitably a locus both of conflicting principles, and of 
conflicts between principles and more pragmatic considerations? Von Hirsch argues, for instance, 
that the principle of proportionality should be the primary guide to sentencing; legislators, policy-
makers, and sentencers should strive to ensure that each offender receives a sentence whose 
severity is proportionate to the seriousness of the crime, in order that the punishment can express 
the appropriate degree of censure. Critics have objected, first, that we cannot in practice hope to 
achieve a proper proportionality between crime and punishment; second, that there are other 
principles such as that of parsimony in punishment which may conflict with the demands of 
proportionality; and third that an undue emphasis on strict proportionality stands in the way of 
making effective use of the wide range of intermediate sanctions (such as intensive probation or 
supervision, substantial fines, and community service, which fall between imprisonment and 
traditional probation) which are finding favour amongst penal policy-makers.’ 
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the pertinent theories surrounding the issue of sanctions,42or the irrationality of the 
judges themselves,43supposing, clearly, that the judges definitely know of the 
philosophical parameters on the matter, as drawn mostly by the academic world, 
and are therefore expected to employ them in their sentencing decision-making; 
and that the viability and effectiveness of the practice is directly correlated to the 
ability of the sentencing judges to assimilate and apply properly and effectively the 
appropriate justificatory theory (whatever that might end up to be, depending on 
one’s view), thus, giving as a direct consequence, meaning and essence to the 
sentencing practice. Others maintain detached from normative acrobatics, that the 
judicial rationale supporting sentencing decisions is usually superficial and 
mechanistic, concentrating on broad factors taken into account rather than a 
detailed explanation of how judges balance them in arriving at the chosen 
penalty.44The present study will attempt to show to what extent this holds true in 
Cyprus sentencing. 
 The failure to endorse an underlying rationale for sentencing has also led 
to its description as a complex and ill-structured task, partly moral and partly 
instrumental, without clear criteria for correct solutions,45as a ‘kind of cafeteria 
                                                
42Walker, Why Punish? (n 39) vii, asserts pertinently that: ‘I have known magistrates who confused 
retribution with deterrence, and judges of appeal who confused it with denunciation. Reports of 
committees hurry past the fundamental issues because the drafters want to avoid dissension. 
Writers of textbooks on criminal law dispose of them in a few smooth paragraphs, knowing that 
they are skating on thin ice, with deep waters underneath the deep waters are where moral 
philosophers lurk, preying like sharks on each other and on practitioners who are careless enough 
to put their feet through the ice.’ 
43P Robinson, ‘One Perspective on Sentencing Reform in the United States’ (1997) 8 Crim L F 1-
41. 
44A Ashworth, E Genders, G Mansfield, J Peay, and E Player, Sentencing in the Crown Court: 
Report of an Exploratory Study, Occasional Paper No 10 (Oxford Centre for Criminological 
Research, Oxford 1984) 127. 
45S M A Bostock-Lloyd, Law and Practice: Applications of Psychology to Legal Decision Making 
and Legal Skills (OUP, Oxford 1989) 80. 
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system’46prone to unjustified disparities,47and a prescription for sentencing 
anarchy,48as well as a source of ‘political’ friction and disagreement between the 
judiciary and the executive.49As the study will show, a prominently contributing 
factor to such a perceived state of affairs has been the non-application, in a 
coherent and unifying way, of consistent sentencing principles and aims. As a 
result, due to the supposed numerous competing principles, there appears to occur 
a degree of relative vagueness on the identification and consistency of the 
enterprise, with such a situation however, also being present in other common law 
jurisdictions as well, such as England,50 Canada,51 New Zealand,52 Australia53and 
Tasmania.54  
In Cyprus, with two exceptions, which will be dealt with directly below, 
the Supreme Court, has in general been reluctant to articulate and prioritise the 




                                                
46A Ashworth, Sentencing and Criminal Justice (n 40) 331. This description has been omitted from 
the later editions. 
47A K Bottomley, Decisions in the Penal Process (Martin Robertson, London 1973) 132.  
48A Ashworth, ‘Criminal Justice and Deserved Sentences’ [1989] Crim L R 340, 350.  
49J A G Griffith, The Politics of the Judiciary (5th edn Fontana Press, London 1997) 51-52. 
50Cunningham [1993] 14 Cr App R (S) 444. For the English approach see, D A Thomas, ‘Theories 
of Punishment in the Court of Criminal Appeal’ (1964) 27 MLR 546-567. For an analytical 
exposition of Victorian (unsuccessful) attempts to resolve major criminal sentencing issues 
consistently recurring throughout that period, such as uniform and proportional sanctions, see, L 
Radzinowicz and R Hood, ‘Judicial Discretion and Sentencing Standards: Victorian Attempts to 
Solve a Perennial Problem’  (1979) 127 U Pa L Rev 1288-1349. 
51R v Smith [1988] 40 DLR (4th) 435. For a wider view on the Canadian approach, see, J V Decore, 
‘Criminal Sentencing: The Role of the Canadian Courts of Appeal and the Concept of Uniformity’ 
(1964) 6 CLQ 324-380. 
52Radich [1954] NZLR 86. 
53Walden v Hensler [1987] 163 Commonwealth Law Reports 561(High Court of Australia).  
54K Warner, Sentencing in Tasmania (2nd edn The Federation Press, New South Wales 2002) 62-
121. 
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In Tryfona v The Republic,55it was said that: 
  
Admittedly, one of the purposes of a sentence is to help the offender to become a 
good citizen, and return him to the community as such. However, alongside with 
the offender, the judge must consider the interests of the community. And another 
purpose of a sentence is to protect the community against offenders; to protect the 
law-abiding citizen against the aggressor who has no respect for the law; to protect 
the hundreds or thousands of people who wish to live in peace and safety under the 
rule of law, against the few, who persistently disturb peace and good order in the 
community, in illegal pursuit or personal advantage. And this is just as important a 
purpose as the reforming of the offender. 
 
In Tattari v The Republic,56the Court held that:  
 
A sentence of imprisonment must, as a rule, be justified on the accepted 
foundation for such a sentence. Public security, retribution, deterrence and 
rehabilitation of the offender, must all be fully considered together with all other 
relevant circumstances in each particular case. As it has been aptly said, the 
sentence must fit the crime as well as the criminal. This, as many other rules in 
life, is easy to state but very difficult to apply…The question of sentence is being 
constantly considered with all due care and anxiety, in case after case, in the trial 
Courts and in the Supreme Court, in the light of developments in the philosophies 
and practices in sentencing, in other countries; and of the progress in the trend of 
present-day schools of thought in penology and criminology. 
 
 
In the aforementioned cases, the Supreme Court referred to deterrence, 
prevention, social protection, and rehabilitation, without explaining, in spite of 
this, how these aims could be reconciled when they conflict with one another. As 
will be analysed in the thesis, one reason for this attitude could be that the judges 
do not appreciate the theoretical dimensions of their approach, let alone that any 
such dimensions are indeed perceived as existing by them.  
 
1.3 The Feasibility of Research on Judicial Sentencing Decision - Making  
The research into judicial sentencing and mercy is meagre compared to the 
surfeit of analogous academic writings on penal theory. This is owing to a range of 
                                                
55[1961] CLR 246, 247. 
56[1970] 2 CLR 6, 11. 
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reasons, relating mainly to the difficulty of research access and reluctance (actual 
or apparent) on the part of judges to reflect on their perceptions and experiences to 
researchers, let alone participate openly and befittingly in the public debate on 
sentencing in general. This state of affairs has created a sort of a romanticised 
mysticism on what speculatively takes place behind the judicial scene in relation to 
sentencing and mercying, and has become the subject matter of analogous 
bibliography,57and even of a television series.58Therefore, judges are, in truth, 
reticent in talking about any form of judging, especially talking frankly about it. 
Even when scholars are able to after protracted and delicate negotiation, gain 
access to them for purposes of research, they are sometimes viewed with 
suspiciousness and reservation, or still, as parts of a vigorous effort to prevent the 
full publication of the findings.59Even though only a judge can impose a criminal 
sentence, few of them have written books on sentencing, and when they did they 
dealt largely with the mechanics of the process. Rarely does one find a judge 
writing about this task. In fact, it would not by any standard be unreasonable to 
state that, for a group of professional decision-makers who have to make important 
and complex decisions every day of their professional lives, it is astonishing that 
judges have written so little about the moment of decision and the process through 
which their minds go to reach and resolve the challenge of that moment.60Some try 
to explain this by saying that ‘the experience of law makers and law enforcement 
                                                
57See for example, J Toobin, The Nine: Inside the Secret World of the Supreme Court (Doubleday, 
New York 2007), and B Schwartz, Decision: How the Supreme Court Decides Cases (OUP, New 
York 1996). 
58See, Judge John Deed. A Riley (dir), G F Newman (writ), Martin Shaw (star) (Series 1-6 BBC, 
DVD 2006-2009).  
59C Tata, ‘Accountability for Sentencing Decision Process – Towards a New Understanding’ in C 
Tata and N Hutton (eds), Sentencing and Society (n 28) 411. 
60An exception to this is the former Australian High Court of Justice, judge M Kirby, and his article 
‘Judging: Reflections on the Moment of Decision’ (1999) 18 Aust Bar Rev 1.  
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officials is subject to serious limitations as a source of knowledge.’61But even if a 
judge does write about judging in a more informative manner, he risks 
unpopularity for giving away trade secrets or for criticising his colleagues,62hence 
undermining the judicial institution in the eyes of society.63As a result, this 
caginess makes the scholarly study of judicial behaviour challenging and 
indispensable.64The Cypriot judiciary (or at least part of it) forms no exception to 
this insulation and conservatism on the (additional) guise that such studies might 
also enfeeble judicial independence. Indeed, in 2005, the researcher, in attempting 
to obtain the permission of the Supreme Court to proceed with the present study 
(being a professional member of the Cypriot Judiciary), faced the objection of the 
then President of the Supreme Court, His Honour Justice Artemides, who 
expressed his great concern on the rightness and propriety of the venture, by 
saying that (the quote with his consent): 
I do not think that what you are about to do is a great idea. I think that it might not 
be so appropriate given that you are a judge. It is not proper for the outside world 
let alone the academics to know how a judge thinks or does not think in Cyprus. 
They can read our decisions if they wish, at least those that are written in English. 
To what extent they would be interested in Scotland to find out about us I do not 
know but I would suspect that they would most probably not even know where we 
are on the map. I hope that what you are about to do will not hurt the reputation of 
the Bench and you will not be classified as a Trojan horse. You know how some of 
your fellow judges might think. The only forum in which it is permissible for 
judges to express their thoughts and opinions on such matters is through their 
judicial decisions. I personally do not wish to become part of this. However I will 
place your request for approval before the Full Bench of the Supreme Court. 
 
                                                
61G J Hawkins and F E Zimring, Deterrence: The Legal Threat in Crime Control (University of 
Chicago Press, Chicago 1973) 24. 
62D Pannick, Judges (OUP, Oxford 1987) 172. 
63K Malleson, The New Judiciary: The Effects of Expansion and Activism (Ashgate Publishers, 
Aldershot 1999) 198. 
64R Posner, How Judges Think (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts 2008) 2. 
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To his credit (if nothing else, an indication of fairness and objectivity on 
his part), Artemides, P, did place the request before the Full Bench of the Supreme 
Court for consideration, with that, finally being approved a few days later, hence 
the present thesis.  
 
1.3.1 Earlier Research on Judicial Sentencing Decision-Making 
There have been various attempts to study judicial decision-making in the 
field of sentencing, at different levels of analysis and subject matter orientation.  
A study undertaken by Wandall between 2002 and 2004, used quantitative 
and qualitative methods from other studies, carried out in Denmark, to address the 
formal and informal norms and ideologies used to generate decisions to imprison 
by Danish judges. It focused on the operations of court participants, investigating 
how judicial decision-making is organised.65  
Another study conducted by Mackenzie between 1998 and 1999, focused 
on the contents of interviews of 31 judges of the Queensland Supreme and District 
Courts, and examined how the judges arrived to their sentencing decisions by 
exercising their discretion.66This study has provided valuable feedback and 
guidance in the organisation and structuring of the present thesis.  
A study by Keijser between 1996 and 1998, examined the attitudes towards 
retributivism, utilitarianism, and restorative justice of almost half of the practicing 
criminal law judges of the Netherlands (168 in all), by using questionnaires.67This 
                                                
65R H Wandall, Decisions to Imprison: Court Decision-Making Inside and Outside the Law 
(Advances in Criminology, Ashgate Publishing, Aldershot 2008).  
66G Mackenzie, How Judges Sentence (The Federation Press, Sydney 2005). 
67Keijser, Punishment and Purpose (n 8).  
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study, too, provided precious groundwork that aided in building some of the 
themes in the present research.  
Lovegrove undertook an extended quantitative study of Victorian judges. 
The goals of the study were to present a decision strategy, defined as a body of 
principle consisting of working rules, and to develop to this regard ‘a prototypical 
numerical guideline,’ aiming at producing a decision structure or framework in the 
form of a comprehensive sentencing guideline, comprising written policy 
statements and a numerical decision aid, for the application of that principle to the 
sentencing of the multiple offenders.68  
The Crown Court study - as it has come to be called - conducted between 
1980 and 1981 (and published in 1984), in the United Kingdom by a research team 
led by Ashworth, involved a pilot study of sentencing in the Crown Court in 
England, based on interviews with 25 judges, court observations, and analysis of 
96 cases. The aims of the project were to reflect the realities of Crown Court 
sentencing and the system within which it took place, and to explore the reasons 
why judges approached sentencing as they did.69After the study was completed 
and a short report presented, permission to proceed further was withheld by the 
Lord Chief Justice on the grounds that many of the points raised therein were 
allegedly well known to judges, with further research on these issues to be of no 
assistance to the judiciary.70As a result, the study remained uncompleted, thereby 
illustrating, once more, the difficulties encountered by this type of research, as 
previously mentioned.  
                                                
68A Lovegrove, The Framework of Judicial Sentencing: A Study in Legal Decision Making (CUP,  
Sydney 1997) 1-2. 
69Ashworth and others, Sentencing in the Crown Court (n 44) 5.    
70Ashworth and others, Sentencing in the Crown Court (n 44) 64. 
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Henham conducted a similar research on magistrates’ in the United 
Kingdom in a study commencing in 1981.71The stated aim of the research was to 
examine the role of sentencing decisions by the Court of Appeal in magistrates’ 
sentencing behaviour.72Again, although this study related mainly to magistrates’ 
sentencing, its methodology has proven valuable for the planning and development 
of the present study.   
Kapardis conducted a psychological study of sentencing of lay magistrates 
between 1978 and 1983, examining their characteristics, attitudes, and penal 
philosophies. He studied the variations in their sentencing decisions and their 
severity, by evaluating the impact of a number of both legal and extra-legal factors 
on magistrates’ sentencing.73 
In the late 1970s and early 80s, McCormick and Green studied the 
Canadian judicial system by investigating judicial appointments and backgrounds, 
judges’ attitudes to sentencing and their role in decision-making.74The study 
analysed interviews with judges in the Provinces of Alberta and Ontario, as well as 
biographical data, and provided telling insights into judicial attitudes that influence 
the decision-making process. 
A judicial survey conducted in 1978 as part of the Australian Law Reform 
Commission (ALRC) with reference to sentencing, analysed the views of 350 
                                                
71R Henham, Sentencing Principles and Magistrates’ Sentencing Behaviour (Avebury, Aldershot 
1990). See also, previous publications of this study by the same author: ‘The Influence of 
Sentencing Principles on Magistrates’ Sentencing Practices' (1986) 25 Howard J Crim Just 190, 
and ‘The Importance of Background Variables in Sentencing Behaviour' (1988) 15(2) Crim Just & 
Behaviour 255. 
72Henham, Sentencing Principles and Magistrates’ Sentencing Behaviour (n 71) 1. 
73A Kapardis, Sentencing by English Magistrates as a Human Process (Asselia Publishers, Nicosia 
1985). 
74P McCormick and I Greene, Judges and Judging (James Lorimer and Company, Toronto 1990). 
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judges and magistrates in Australia, ascertained by way of a questionnaire. The 
survey asked 50 questions and covered issues such as the need for sentencing 
reform, the need for greater uniformity in sentencing, jurisdiction, the pre-trial 
process, the trial process, imprisonment, prison conditions and parole, non-
custodial alternatives, compensation for victims of crime, corporal punishment, the 
death penalty, sentencing federal offenders, and perceived severity of sentencing. 
There was also a determination of the personal profiles of the judges participating 
in the survey.75  
One of the earliest studies of judicial methodology in sentencing was that 
by Hogarth, in Canada, published in 1971, which was concerned with the 
formulation of generalisations on observed regularities in behaviour. The study 
was based on the answers of judges on three principal questions pertaining to the 
denotation of sentencing to each of them, any common patterns, and the meaning 
of sentencing to the researcher as a student of the process.76These questions are 
similar to those posed by the current study, and even though criminological 
fashions and sentencing practices have changed, fundamental questions of 
disparity remain. The present study will not however deal with the issue of 
disparity and its existence in the Cyprus sentencing system (except in the form of 
offering a basis for the development of general observations relating to its nature, 
role, and consequences within the system of sentencing practice), as such an 
endeavour falls outside the objectives of the thesis, although its conclusions could 
conceivably be utilised for such an enterprise by a separate research on the point. 
                                                
75P Cashman, Sentencing Reform: A National Survey of Judges and Magistrates: Preliminary 
Report (Law Foundation of New South Wales 1979) 305-309.  
76J Hogarth, Sentencing as a Human Process (University of Toronto Press, Toronto 1971). 
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Judicial education has been a theme of some other studies, such as that by 
Armytage in New South Wales, who examined, amongst other things, judicial 
competence, and the need for judicial education, judicial selection, and 
professional development of judges.77  
The above studies confirmed the usefulness of research in the field of 
judicial decision-making and appositely informed the public debate and assisted in 
the development of sentencing policy in common law jurisdictions. 
 
1.4 The Chapter Taxonomy of the Thesis 
The pattern of the thing precedes the thing;78that is why the taxonomisation 
of the thesis is due at this stage by schematising the framework of the things to 
follow, hoping to aid to their better conceptualisation and understanding. 
 The current first chapter presents the introduction to the thesis. It sets out 
the essence of the dissertation and explains the rationale behind it. Due to the 
nature of its content and the purpose it sets to accomplish it is one of the shortest 
chapters in the study, along with Chapters 2, 9 and 10. The second chapter 
analyses the methodology, research design, and mode of judicial participation in 
the study, the interview process, and the method used to evaluate the information 
obtained. The third chapter offers a reasonably detailed examination of the 
formation and development of the Cyprus legal and criminal justice systems, to the 
extent relative to the study, aiming towards easing the comprehension and 
processing of its judges’ punishment culture and attitudes. The fourth chapter 
                                                
77L Armytage, Educating Judges: Towards a New Model of Continuing Judicial Learning (Kluwer 
Law International, The Hague 1996).  
78E Pifer (ed), Vladimir Nabokov’s Lolita: A Casebook (Casebooks in Criticism, OUP, New York 
2002) 201. 
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considers the issues of the different approaches to the justification and goals of 
punishment, judicial discretion, and separation of powers. The fifth chapter 
deliberates on the moral value of philosophies and theories of punishment, paying 
due attention to the main issues and controversies that shape the theoretical debate. 
The sixth chapter deals with an analysis of mercy and mercying within the area of 
punishment theory and its relation to justice and criminal sentencing. The seventh 
chapter analyses in detail the role of Cypriot judges in the process of sentencing 
and punishtecture with reference to a glut of information emanating from the 
interview statements. It is the longest chapter in the thesis. Similarly, the eighth 
chapter (which is the second longest chapter in the dissertation) examines 
punishtecture and sentencing decision-making by analysing the judges’ 
perceptions and practices on the various sentencing aims and purposes, yet again 
drawing on the interviews’ rich primary material. The ninth chapter deals with 
mercy, mercying, and the sentencing decision. Its comparatively shorter length to 
most of the other chapters is attributed to the more limited quantitative and 
qualitative judicial response to its subject matter. Finally, the tenth chapter offers a 
summary of the study and draws conclusions on the major themes that emerge. 
 
1.5 Conclusions 
The present chapter outlined the fundamental nature and scopes of the 
dissertation and explained the underlying principle behind it. It described how the 
thesis will set out to depict and explain the Cypriot judges’ architecture of 
sentencing (punishtecture), that is, their method of reaching, formulating, and 
justifying their sentencing decisions in substance and in form, and similarly, as 
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part of their punishtecture, their considerations and ponderings in deciding to 
utilise and exercise mercy in deciding on the punishment of a defendant at the 
sentencing stage for the crime he has committed (mercying). It also identified the 
study’s major parameters of concern, to be dealt with both descriptively and 
prescriptively, on the basis of the information attained from the judicial interviews, 
explaining at the same time the thinking behind the choosing of the Cypriot 
sentencing reality (and its judges) as its theme, and the resonance of the research, 
with reference to other previous studies on judicial sentencing decision-making, 
some of which attempted, through interviewing, to evaluate and comprehend the 
functioning of the judicial nous in punishment practice. By implication, these 
studies have advanced realistic reasons on why such a systematic research must 
persist. The rarity of extra-judicial comments on sentencing and mercying as well 
as the relative absence of clear and consistent rationales in the decisions of the 
judges on their sentencing methodology, can offer cherished insights not only into 
judicial opinions, impressions, and philosophies, but also into the literature and 
practice of legal punishment and mercy, and their surrounding legitimising 
framework.  
The next chapter will deal with the methodology of the study and the 
research methods utilised in that regard, as well as with the philosophy behind it, 
the selected interview topics, the manner in which the interviews were carried out, 
and the way in which the ensuing information was analysed and interpreted, on the 




CHAPTER 2: METHODOLOGY 
 
 
The present chapter will describe the methodology of the study and the 
interview research method adopted (as well as the idea behind it), the interview 
thematology, the mode in which the interviews were carried out and the way the 
ensuing information was analysed and interpreted.  
 
2.1 The Judicial Participation 
For reasons already stated in Chapter 1, pertaining to the researcher’s 
judicial status, prior to undertaking the study, as required, there was an application 
submitted to, and approval obtained from, the Supreme Court. Following the 
granting of the permission, the researcher sent letters (together with an information 
package that included assurances of anonymity and confidentiality of the data 
collected), to all the Supreme Court judges and the District Court judges, 
requesting an interview for the purposes of the study. The letter additionally 
included a copy of the interview questionnaire. Of the 79 Cypriot judges at the 
time (66 District Court Judges and 13 Supreme Court judges), 54 of them 
(including 7 Supreme Court judges) gladly agreed to participate, and did so. The 
majority of the remaining 25 judges (as some failed to reply at all), courteously 
declined to take any part, as they thought it inappropriate and potentially damaging 
to the Bench because, in their view, the research could publicly expose details that 
‘no one has any business in knowing, not even other fellow judges,’ in the words 




2.2 The Research Design 
2.2.1 Qualitative Research Methodology 
The research approach, involved in-depth face to face interviews with the 
participant judges (hereinafter referred to as the ‘judges’), using open questions to 
amass statements of their preferences and opinions, explore their experiences, 
motivations and reasoning and, on the whole, determine their views on numerous 
issues relevant to the study. The interviews were semi-structured in the sense that 
their general construction was set up by the researcher by deciding in advance the 
ground to be covered and the main questions to be asked, leaving the judges 
interviewed to answer at some length in their own words, and with the interviewer 
responding using prompts, probes and follow-up questions to get them to clarify or 
expand on their answers.79This methodology was not the only one available. For 
instance, observational studies were an option. Nonetheless, due to the limited 
scope of the project, judicial interviewing was preferred. Observational studies are 
rare in any case and the benefits in gaining more knowledge about judicial 
attitudes and perceptions toward sentencing, considerable. 
 The shaping of the research design proceeded along the following 
assumptions:  
• That the judges would have limited time to participate in the study due to court 
and other commitments; 
• That because of this anticipated limited time, a long and detailed questionnaire 
would not be appropriate because it may not have been completed in the 
interview time; 
• That there might be some reluctance on the part of the judges to participate; 
                                                
79E Drever, Using Semi-Structured Interviews in Small-Scale Research: A Teacher’s Guide (The 
Scottish Council of Research in Education, Edinburgh 1995) 1,10. 
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• That somewhat less than 50% and probably only 30% of the available pool of 
judges would participate; 
• That the judges may not be willing to answer a structured questionnaire; 
• That the judges would have fairly firm views on many of the interview topics 
and an opportunity should be given to them to express these views; and 
• That, while it might not be difficult to get the judges to express their views, it 
might be difficult to direct the interview through using more than a small 
number of questions.  
 
2.3   The Research Method (In-Depth Interviews) 
2.3.1 Open or Closed Questions 
The use of a small number of general questions allowed substantial leeway 
on the part of the judges to discuss topics as they wished, instead of having 
answers suggested to them through the imposition of closed questions.80  
The acknowledged disadvantage of this open-ended approach is that 
interview subjects may each give different responses to the question, which reflect 
their understanding of both the question and experience with that particular issue. 
This, in turn, can make statistical and meaningful comparisons between answers 
difficult. Even though this phenomenon did occur in the study, albeit to a limited 
extent, there was never an intention of statistical analysis in any event.   
An additional drawback of the interview methodology using open 
questions is the quantity, and sometimes disparity, of the raw interview data 
collected, and resultant difficulties in the analysis and consequent writing up of the 
responses. To deal with the difficulty, the researcher kept an interview schedule. 
This was used to read out the main questions, mark off the points covered, as well 
as the prompts and probes, and make extended notes, something that helped going 
                                                
80W Foddy, Constructing Questions for Interviews and Questionnaires (CUP, Cambridge 1993).   
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through the interviews without drying up, missing out questions, going off at a 
tangent, and leading or confusing the interviewees. Furthermore, it guaranteed 
consistency of treatment across the interviews, which allowed an easier 
comparison of the interview comments, where that was deemed necessary.  
In those instances where the judges were let to decide the order in which 
they talked about topics, an effort was made to retain the standard prompting-and-
probing routine for all topics they brought up, as had happened in the case where 
the questions were imposed and answered according to the sequence in the 
questionnaire. By doing this, the researcher had in mind that the purpose of 
prompts and probes was to help the judges say what they wanted to say. The 
prompts were directed towards what they knew, but had not yet mentioned. They 
encouraged the judges to talk and jog their memory without, however, putting 
words into their mouths or pressurising them to come up with something. The 
probes were directed at what the judges had already said, asking them to clarify 
and explain, but not as a rule to justify or defend their position.81 
In any event, open questions yielded the required information, providing 
seemingly valuable and rare insights into sentencing judicial attitudes, perceptions 
and methodology, often not easily (if at all) deduced from sentencing decisions.  
 
2.3 2 The Questions 
Bearing in mind that the order of the questions could affect what the judges 
had in mind when answering each one, and influence what they said, there was 
particular care and thinking exercised behind the sequence in which these 
                                                
81Drever, Using Semi-Structured Interviews in Small-Scale Research (n 79) 23-24.  
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questions were presented. The list of questions had to be as concise as possible to 
reduce the danger of not asking them in each interview. 
The questions were as follows: 
1. How do you see the sentencing process in Cyprus? 
2.  How do you approach the task of sentencing? 
3. What are the purposes, if any, of judicial sentencing in Cyprus? 
4. What influences you, if anything, when implementing the purposes of 
sentencing? 
5. How do you make a decision, if at all, on which of these purposes, if any, to 
apply in a particular case? 
6. What role, if any, do theories of punishment play in your sentencing decisions? 
7. Is there is a predominant sentencing aim/rationale in Cyprus? 
8. Should there be a predominant sentencing aim/rationale in Cyprus? 
9. Does judicial discretion play a role in sentencing decisions, and if so how 
important do you see this as being? 
10. Does mercy have a role to play in sentencing, and if it does, when should it be 
granted? 
11. Upon what grounds would you grant mercy? 
12. How would you define a ‘just sentence’?’ 
13. Have you ever studied penology or read about the various theories and 
philosophies of punishment and sentencing?   
14. Do you think that there should be established a specialised and permanent 
criminal law bench, both in the District Court and the Supreme Court of Cyprus? 
15. Is there anything else you want to say about these topics that has not been 
asked? 
 
The questions were developed on the basis of a review of the relevant 
literature and identification of the concerning issues as well as from looking at 
other similar exercises.82It was clear to the judges that the questions referred to the 
project. 
The questions were intended to be broad and formless in nature so that the 
judges would be given a chance to articulate unreservedly on the issues they 
wished. The first question (Question 1) was broader in nature so as to set the right 
tone for the interview and elicit general comments about sentencing from the 
                                                
82As presented and summarized in Chapter 1.3.1 of the thesis.  
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judges’ point of view and make them feel more comfortable, by allowing them to 
articulate their thoughts freely.  
Because of the semi-structured nature of the interviews, the intention was 
that not all of the available questions would necessarily be asked in every 
interview, in the sense of follow-up questions, which may have already been 
answered, and for this likelihood, there was an explicit mentioning in both of the 
covering letters as well as orally, immediately before the commencement of the 
interviews. 
 
2.3.3 The Interview Process 
All of the judges treated the interview earnestly. Most of them had strong 
views on the topics discussed, and tended to speak at length about each of them. 
This largely vindicated the decision to keep the question list relatively brief.  
The reason for providing the judges with a copy of the questions in 
advance was to make them fully informed in making the decision to participate 
and to assuage any fears they may have had as to the subject matter of the study 
and the actual interviews. This choice arose after consultation with one Supreme 
Court judge and one District Court Judge, who were involved on a preliminary 
basis, as a reference group, in assisting with the assessment and development of 
the questions.  
Although handing-out the questions ahead of time is generally an 
uncommon practice for interview-based qualitative research, in the present case 
the expected benefits in participation rates, as it was thought at the time, would 
outweigh any potential disadvantages in addition to the fact that the latter were 
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judges, asked to give their considered official view on the matters 
discussed.83Comments made by some judges during the interviews tended to 
support the earlier view, that participation rates would have been significantly 
reduced and the interviews more difficult to conduct had the questions not been 
supplied beforehand. 
Even though the judges had already had the questionnaires ahead of time, 
every interview began with a preamble that reminded them of what they had 
agreed to, and what the interview was about, with particular emphasis on the 
prospect of using verbatim, parts or the whole of their comments in the form of 
quotations in the thesis, always anonymously. This allowed the clearing up of any 
misunderstandings.  
One disadvantage of providing the judges with the questionnaire well 
before the interviews was the possibility of the judges exchanging views and 
deliberating on the questions and the purposes of the study. Obviously, this could 
have negatively affected the sincerity of their answers. Nonetheless, it is 
comforting to know that none of the judges mentioned or implied any previous 
discussion of the questions with other participants or non-participant colleagues 
nor any indication of collusion was at all noticeable during the interviews. One 
could not have dismissed the danger of discussion between the interviewees had 
the researcher not given them the questionnaires in advance, and proceeded instead 
to interview them separately and over a period of a year (as it actually happened). 
The possibility of discussion of the questionnaires among those judges who would 
have already been interviewed and those whose interviews were to follow would 
                                                
83Drever, Using Semi-Structured Interviews in Small-Scale Research (n 79) 41. 
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still have existed, unless the researcher had the capability of conducting the 
interviews simultaneously with all of them. No such capability existed or was 
feasible due to the study’s constraints. Non-judicial research assistants could have 
been used, although that could have negatively affected other parameters of the 
research such as for example their ability to effectively assess the demeanour of 
the interviewees. It would have also diminished the degree of trust (if any) 
between the judges and the assistants, as well as deprive them of the ‘insider’ 
capacity enjoyed only by the researcher as a colleague of the interviewees, with all 
the possible repercussions to the study as discussed in Chapter 2.4 below. 
Interview experts emphasise the dangers of unintentionally leading 
interviewees towards a particular answer. The mere fact that they were called for 
an interview on the selected subject matter might have been considered by some of 
them to be suggestive of the fact that the researcher regarded it of importance, and 
hence led them to attempt to appear knowledgeable and interested in the fields 
covered by the research. In truth, interviewees sometimes try to express views that 
they think the interviewer wants to hear. It is for these reasons that the preamble 
deliberately avoided emphasising the importance of the research topic in favour of 
stressing the researcher’s interest in their views.84 
Each of the 54 participating judges was ascribed a different reference 
number from 1 to 54, so that their respective comments and quotations would be 
accurately identified.  
A small number of interviews proceeded in a rather ordered manner, with 
the judges virtually dictating answers to the questions, and almost taking charge of 
                                                
84Drever, Using Semi-Structured Interviews in Small-Scale Research (n 79) 30.  
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the interview. Five judges thought it better to supply their answers in a typewritten 
form just before the commencement of the interview, in order to expedite things 
and ensure accuracy in the presentation of their reflections, as they said.85  
In most instances, the interview proceeded by asking the first question, and 
then allowing the answers and the discussion to flow from there. Because of their 
semi-structured nature, some of the remarks were spontaneous and not in response 
to a particular question. 
In all cases, the interview was informal, with the judges feeling at ease to 
answer the questions as they saw proper. Interview times ranged from 45 minutes 
(only one interview was this short) to two and a half hours, with the timing and 
pace dictated by the circumstances of each interview. The average interview was 
one and a half hours in length. 
Because judges were being interviewed, a decision was taken not to tape-
record them. This apophasis resulted from discussions with the reference group 
since there was a real possibility that some judges would either refuse participation 
or feel constrained during the interviews, something that could have negatively 
affected the whole project.  
A decision was also made to handwrite the interview transcript, which 
could then be corrected by the interviewees, if they so wished. Justification of the 
decision not to tape came ex post facto during many of the interviews when judges 
frequently mentioned cases before them, or personal or other matters, that would 
have served to identify them in the final transcript. Taking notes of the interview 
meant that these matters were not recorded (and did not have to be excised from 
                                                
85Judges 2, 8, 11, 23 and 53. 
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the transcripts), and confidentiality of the subjects could be maintained at all times. 
The interview procedure consisted of thorough and detailed handwritten notes in 
Greek, kept during each interview, which were then dictated immediately 
afterwards (so that the importance of some of the researcher’s more cryptic 
jottings would not elapse) to form a transcript, also in the Greek language. The 
translation of the comments from Greek to English, strived to retain the 
informality of the comments to the greatest possible extent.  
The judges proceeded on the prior agreed basis that if there were no 
explicit request on their part, it would be assumed that they did not have any 
comments or corrections to make on the content of the interview transcript. Of the 
54 judges, 7 judges responded with minor corrections or additions to the 
transcript.86In two instances, the judges returned a corrected version, which they 
had dictated, based on the original transcript.87   
All italicised quotations in the thesis indicate a translation from the Greek 
language. Some quotations from cases decided by the Supreme Court and 
published in the English language, are quoted as originally reported in the Cyprus 
Law Reports, in a non-italicised form.88 
 
2.3.4 The Thematic Analysis of the Interviews 
Even though many of the interview responses were extensive, the choice at 
the time of the analysis was that there was going to be a presentation of the 
quotations from the interviews in the text of the chapters (where appropriate), as 
                                                
86Judges 21, 28, 32, 40, 41, 50 and 54. 
87Judges 7 and 13. 
88The CLR were published in the English language up until 1989.  
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the material is rare and there is a need to maintain context in its usage. The 
potential disadvantage with this approach is that some of the quotations are 
lengthy and potentially detract from the overall qualitative analysis. Despite these 
possible drawbacks - to using unmodified extracts from selected interview 
statements - there were outweighing benefits, in that the portrayal of the judges’ 
thinking would be natural and unpretentious, and provide the opportunity to the 
reader to get a grasp of their utterances and feelings in a more direct way. There 
are explicit excerpts in the thesis of at least one quotation from every participating 
judge. Certain judges are quoted more often than others either because their 
comments entailed a particular interest on the subject matter under analysis or 
because, in the opinion of the researcher, their observations reflected the broader 
balance of comments expressed by other judges on the specific issue, however in a 
more graphic and encompassing manner.  
The same reasons governed the decision to quote rather than summarise 
parts of selected judgments of the Supreme Court presented in the thesis. The 
average foreign researcher or reader might not be familiar with the decisions of 
this Court, so it was thought imperative to present extracts of the applicable 
rationales in order to make them more comprehensible and contextual.  
 
2.4 A Few (Supplementary) Cautions 
Owing to the nature of the interviews, there are some cautions on the 
interpretation and use of the material, further to those already touched upon above.  
The fact that there were not many comments expressed by the judges on a 
particular issue was not taken to imply that other judges might have held an 
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opposite view, or even no view at all. A quantitative analysis of the responses was 
therefore not generally possible in most instances, and a comparative analysis 
likewise not always feasible. This was not one of the purposes of the thesis in any 
case. 
The judges’ comments seemed quite casual and loquacious at times. One 
must bear in mind that these remarks are not court judgments (though their 
substance could be used as denoting an equivalent judicial position), tempered by 
the constraints of formal legal writing, but the product of informal interviews 
where the judges were free to speak their own mind anonymously, as they did. For 
this reason, the contents of the interview statements of only a few judges, or even 
that of a single judge, will be treated as sufficient for the purpose of reaching a 
more general conclusion in the thesis in relation to the subject matter dealt with by 
the comment or remark. The reason for this is that these particular answers will be 
deemed as representing a viable and sufficient basis for such a course, on the 
premise that they form in a loose sense a species of quasi-judicial ratios, 
expressive of the stance relating to the matters covered by the interview, in the 
same way they are articulated in sentencing judgments. However, these answers 
should not be deemed as representing the views of the entire Cypriot judiciary (or 
that part of it which has participated in the research). Instead, they should be 
evaluated as merely indicative of the existence of particular judicial views within 
the judiciary on the matter concerned, as uttered at the time.  
Not least in mind was the important limitation of questionnaires and 
interviews, in that they may report what people say and not necessarily what they 
do or truthfully think about the topic in question. Associated to this was the 
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possibility that by asking the judges to introspect on their sentencing practice, it 
might have affected their answers due to insincerity or fear despite their having 
been assured of anonymity. Introspective utterances as sources of information 
about other minds are intrinsically susceptible to delusion on the part of the subject 
(here the judges).89This applies to almost every aspect of human behaviour related 
to the expression of ideas, emotions, feelings, and other similar conscious mental 
processes.90Nonetheless, because judges are so accustomed to articulating their 
sentencing decisions authoritatively and (by presumption) sincerely and candidly, 
asking them to introspect on their decision making processes should not be 
considered a methodological weakness. In the particular case, the researcher had 
the opportunity to see and hear the judges, and was also able to evaluate their 
demeanour and frankness. None was pretentious. But even this view is nothing but 
a subjective one and conceivably not necessarily correct. Related to this, and 
having recognised that what the judges have said during the interviews required 
them to be surrounded with whatever intellectual context could make best sense of 
the ensuing remarks, one could not have been too quick about dismissing any 
feature of that context as tedious or irrelevant. Any impatience with what might 
have been thought of as irrelevance or triviality might have deprived the researcher 
of just the understandings he sought. Indeed, when one says of a given belief that it 
is true or correct, what he means is that one finds it rationally acceptable. This is 
not to claim that there is nothing more to truth or correctness than acceptability. 
                                                
89G Piccinini, ‘Data from Introspective Reports: Upgrading from Commonsense to Science’ in A 
Jack and A Roepstorff (eds), Trusting the Subject? (Vol 1 Imprint Academic, Devon 2003) 145. 
90D J Chalmers, The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory (Philosophy of the 
Mind, OUP, Oxford 2004) 180.    
 
 47 
The aim here is not to offer a definition of truth or correctness, or talk about truth 
and correctness, but merely to deal with what in the current instance, Cypriot 
judges at the time of the interviews may have had good reasons - by their lights - 
for holding true and correct, regardless of whether one believes that what they held 
as true and correct, was in fact so. By analogy to what Quentin Skinner advises in 
his historical hermeneutics, however peculiar the beliefs one explores may seem to 
be, one must begin by trying to make the agents who accepted them (in this case 
the Cypriot judges who participated in the study), appear as rational as possible.91 
This rule, according to Skinner, in effect embodies three precepts, respectively 
adapted to the needs of the present venture and applied during the analysis and 
taxonomy of the interview statements. The first merely states a condition sine qua 
non of the whole enterprise. To this regard the researcher assumed a convention of 
truthfulness and correctness among the judges whose beliefs he sought to explain. 
The first task was to obviously identify what they believed. However, the only 
evidence of their beliefs was the substance of their interview statements, and 
occasionally, some pertinent judicial pronouncements in the case law. It is of 
course likely that some of these comments and dicta may have been pervasively 
marked by hidden codes. However, there was no option but to assume that, in 
general, they could be treated as relatively straightforward expressions of belief 
and correctness. Unless one could assume such a convention of truthfulness, there 
could not have been hoped to make any headway with the project of explaining 
                                                
91Q Skinner, Visions of Politics: Regarding Method (Vol 1 CUP, Cambridge 2002) 27-56. See also, 
I Loader and R Sparks ‘For an Historical Sociology of Crime Policy in England and Wales since 
1968’ in M Matravers (ed), Managing Modernity: Politics and the Culture of Control (Routledge, 
London 2005) 5-32, and J B Thompson (ed), Paul Ricoeur, Hermeneutics & the Human Sciences 
(CUP, Cambridge 1981). 
 48 
what they believed. The second and closely related precept on which the 
researcher acted upon, was to be initially prepared to take whatever was said by 
the judges, however bizarre it might seem, as much as possible at face value. This 
would not only serve to retain the precise character of the explanatory task, but it 
would also enable the avoidance of a familiar but condescending form of 
interpretative charity. It would have prevented, purportedly, the rescuing of the 
rationality of the participating judges by way of suggesting that, whenever they 
said something that could appear as grossly absurd, it would be best to assume that 
the speech act they were performing must have been something other than that of 
stating or affirming a belief. Based on the third precept acted upon, there was 
sought to surround the particular statement of belief, or correctness of interest to 
the study, with an intellectual context that served to lend adequate support to it. 
This committed the researcher to something more than trying to establish that the 
judges may have had good practical reasons for saying what they had said. It also 
committed the researcher to establish that the utterances of the judges were not 
merely the outcome of a rational policy, but was also consistent with their sense of 
epistemic rationality. The primary task was to therefore attempt the recovery of a 
very precise context of presuppositions and other beliefs, a context that could serve 
to exhibit the relative utterance as rational for those particular judges, in the 
circumstances held to be true.  
The fact that the judges knew the researcher as a fellow colleague was 
probably a critical factor in making them comfortable with participating in the 
project. As an insider, one is more likely than others who are outsiders, to avoid 
asking meaningless questions and to be able to probe sensitive areas with greater 
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ease.92Furthermore, being an insider, could act as a form of triangulation, since 
one is able to take a knowledgeable view of misinformation (whether deliberate or 
inadvertent).93The researcher was conscious that the same factors, which appeared 
to strengthen the likelihood of respondents agreeing to talk (namely, their 
knowledge of the researcher as an ‘insider’ [and not Trojan horse]),94might have 
proved disadvantageous if the judges had any qualifications regarding the 
confidentiality of the interviews. That is why the confidentiality of the process was 
particularly stressed, explaining that there was not going to be an identification of 
any of them under any circumstances whatsoever. All of the judges indicated that 
the warning was unnecessary and that for them, the fact that a fellow judge assured 
confidentiality was more than sufficient to ease any hypothetical or objective 
qualifications. None of the judges objected to their identification as District Court 
judges, Assize Court judges, or Supreme Court judges in the thesis, in case such a 
connection appeared to surface from their respective comments. 
The ‘insider’ factor had a further dimension for which the researcher 
exercised particular vigilance. It was possible, and it did in fact occur during the 
interviews, that some judges could have taken for granted that they shared a body 
of common knowledge and experience with the interviewer, and consequently 
avoided mentioning it in their answers or remarks. This led to a reminder to them 
that they should have done so, even if it seemed rather unnecessary and pedantic at 
the time, otherwise it could not appear in the interview record.  
                                                
92P A Adler and P Adler, Membership Roles in Field Research (Sage Publications, London 1987) 
67-84. 
93S Roseneil, ‘Greenham Revisited’ in D Hobbs and T May (eds), Interpreting the Field 
(Clarendon Press, Oxford 1993) 189. 
94See on this, the comments of the ex President of the Supreme Court in Chapter 1.3. 
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Another difficulty, which occurred, was the assumption by some of the 
judges that the researcher did or did not share their views. In such instances, the 
researcher had to remind the judges of the formality of the interview, and of his 
duty to pose the same questions as the ones he posed to everyone else, in the same 
manner, and that they should answer in view of that. The extensive data obtained 
appears to confirm that respondents were willing to share their detailed views with 
an interested insider. 
 Most interviews took place in chambers, but on occasion in the homes of 
the interviewees or elsewhere, always making sure that the overall setting was 
appropriate and free of disturbances and destructions. One took place in a central 
(but quite nonetheless) cafeteria in Nicosia, though not Ashworth’s.95  
 
2.5 Conclusions 
The chapter described the general methodology of the study, the interview 
research method used, as well as the idea behind it, the interview thematology, the 
fashion in which the interviews were carried out, and the way in which the 
resulting information was scrutinised and construed. It was stressed that the 
interviews revealed a wealth of rare information. The chapter also analysed the 
hermeneutical and other cautions underlining the study and its subject matter. 
 Before proceeding with the rest of the thesis, it is deemed essential (as an 
intermezzo), to present an overview of the formation and development of Cyprus’s 
legal system in general and criminal justice system in particular, so that one could 
                                                
95Reference is made here to Ashworth’s description of sentencing as ‘a sort of cafeteria system,’ 
mentioned in Chapter 1.2 (n 46). 
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even more easily grasp the context of punishtecture and mercying, and how judges 
























CHAPTER 3: THE CYPRUS LEGAL AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 
 
It is important to briefly outline in the present chapter the formation and 
development of the Cyprus legal system in general and the criminal justice system 
in particular. This will facilitate the comprehension and processing of the island’s 
judicial punishment culture and attitudes, in the manner dealt with in the chapters 
to follow.  
The chapter will describe the birth of the island’s modern legal and 
criminal justice system, as well as the position of the judiciary, in an otherwise 
politically tumultuous society. There will be a presentation of the organisation of 
the criminal courts and their jurisdictions, a summary of the role and powers of the 
Attorney General and Deputy Attorney General of the Republic, and a description 
of the prison system. It will also offer a quasi-empirical exposé of the criminal 
statistical portrait of Cypriot society, and a panoramic presentation of the 
sentencing rationales and approach, derived from the ratios of the totality of 
sentencing appeals against sentence decided by the Supreme Court between 1960 
and 2008.  
 
3.1 The Historical Origins of the Cypriot Legal System96 
 
 The island of Cyprus, due to its geographical position between three 
continents, namely Europe, Asia and Africa, was naturally destined to suffer the 
vicissitudes of foreign conquests,97with its legal history being resultantly 
                                                
96For a general overview, see, A Kapardis, Society, Crime, and Criminal Justice in Cyprus 1878-
2000 (Vol 1 Ant N Sakkoulas Publishers, Athens 2001).  
97R Holland and D Markides, The British and the Hellenes: Struggles for Mastery in the Eastern 
Mediterranean 1850-1960 (OUP, Oxford 2006) 173-240; R Storrs, Orientations (Ivor Nicholson & 
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interwoven with the legal systems of its conquerors.98The oldest laws known to 
have been in force in Cyprus, are those attributed to Demonassa, a mythical rather 
than historical Queen of Cyprus. Its city kingdoms followed the pattern of the 
Greek City States, and the coming to Cyprus of Solon, the Athenian legislator, has 
left no evidence that he brought his Laws to the Island. Cyprus was part of the 
Roman and Byzantine Empire, and as such, came under Roman law and its 
Byzantine offspring. The Louisianan Kings brought with them the Assizes of 
Jerusalem, translated into the colloquial Greek of the time. However, the most 
relevant legal systems for proper appreciation of the present day administration of 
criminal justice in Cyprus are those of its last conquerors, the Turks and the 
British.99  
 
3.1.1 The Turks 
The Turks invaded Cyprus in 1570, occupying the island in the following 
year. At the time, the Greek element was considerably greater than the Turkish, in 
spite of the massacre of many Christians and the conversion of others to Islam. 
Under the Ottoman rule, the island’s economy and cultural level, reached their 
nadir. In the Ottoman Empire, down to the 19th century, the determination of what 
constituted an offence and its proper punishment, derived from the Sher Law, that 
is, the ‘Law of God.’ For an Empire, which covered such an extensive area and 
was populated by such a variety of ethnic groups, this state of the Law was 
                                                                                                                                  
Watson, London 1937) 533-559. Sir Ronald Henry Amherst Storrs (1881-1955) was the first 
Governor of Cyprus between 1926 and 1932. 
98G Tornaritis, The Legal History of Cyprus (Government Printing Office, Nicosia, Cyprus 1984) 2. 
99The published doctoral thesis of P Evangelides, The Republic of Cyprus and its Constitution with 
Regard to the Constitutional Rights (Difo-Druck GmbH, Bamberg, Germany 1996), has proven 
most valuable in the preparation of paragraphs 3.1.1 and 3.1.2.  
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unsatisfactory. The need for reform was evident, but it was not until 1858, that an 
array of circumstances, including political and diplomatic ones, led to the 
enactment of a comprehensive criminal code, namely the Imperial Ottoman Penal 
Code (‘the Ottoman Penal Code’), the general arrangement of which followed that 
of the French Penal Code. As a legislative work, it was comparatively simple and 
endurably well adapted to the social realities of the country. The Ottoman Courts 
functioning at the same time were the Daavi Courts in each district, composed of a 
Cadi as President and four members, of whom two were Moslems and two 
Christians, all wretchedly paid. At Nicosia, there was a Superior Court termed the 
Medjliss Temyiz Houkouk and Genaiet. It consisted of a Cadi as President and six 
members, of whom three were Moslems and three Christians, and it had 
jurisdiction to try offences punishable with more than three months imprisonment, 
but the Governor could not confirm any sentences over three years. Such sentences 
had to be confirmed by the Governor-General of the vilayet (province) or at 
Constantinople.  
 
3.1.2 The British 
 By the Convention of Defensive Alliance between Great Britain and 
Turkey, signed on the 4th of June 1878 in Constantinople, Turkey consented to 
assign Cyprus to be occupied and administered by Great Britain, for enabling the 
latter to make the necessary provisions towards executing its engagements under 
the Treaty. On the 1st of July 1878, an Annex to this Convention was signed 
between the same contracting parties. This Annex provided for the conditions 
under which Great Britain would occupy Cyprus, and stated that, if Russia restored 
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to Turkey, Kars and other conquests made by it in Armenia during the Crimean 
War, the island would be evacuated by Great Britain and the Convention of the 4th 
of June 1878, put to an end. On the 4th of August 1878, an additional Article was 
signed, according to which the High Contracting Parties agreed that, for the term 
of the occupation and no longer, full powers were granted to Great Britain for 
making laws and conventions for the government of the island and for regulating 
its commercial and consular relations and affairs. Great Britain agreed also to pay 
yearly to Turkey 92,000 pounds.100  
The state of the administration in general, and the dispensation of justice in 
particular, at the time the British took over, was not an enviable one.101The legal 
system consisted of the Ottoman Law in force on the 13th of July 1878 (the definite 
date of the British occupation of the island), the English Law, consisting of 
common law, the rules of equity, the acts of general application of the British 
Parliament, and the Cyprus statute law, as enacted by its legislature. Ottoman law 
was applicable in all cases where the defendants, or the accused, were Ottoman 
subjects, and English law was applicable in all other cases in which the defendants 
or the accused were not Ottoman subjects; litigants, however, could agree to have 
their case governed entirely either by Ottoman or English law.  
Great Britain annexed Cyprus on the 5th of November 1914, after the 
declaration of World War I, and Turkey’s siding with the Axis Powers. In 1923, 
                                                
100C Spyridakis, A Brief History of Cyprus (Zavallis Press, Nicosia, Cyprus 1974) 167. 
101As noted in C Saville, Cyprus (HMSO, London 1878) 33, a report made in 1867 concerning the 
condition of the Christians in Cyprus claimed that: ‘It seems that in Cyprus it is not so much the 
laws themselves but rather the administration of the laws, which needs reform. The Ottoman 
Government is noted for publishing innumerable firmans, laws and ordinances which leave but little 
room for improvement as regards either completeness or natural equity; and it has been either the 
disregard or the mal-administration of these laws which has done so much injury in the country.’ 
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the Treaty of Lausanne ended the war between Greece and Turkey of the previous 
year. Though Turkey undertook by the said Treaty to give up all its claims to 
Cyprus, the island remaining under British rule, was given, two years later on the 
10th of March 1925, the status of a crown colony. This terminated whatever 
vestiges of sovereignty the Sultan had over the island. The distinction in the legal 
system between Ottoman and non-Ottoman subjects was henceforth abolished, and 
it consisted at this time of the statute laws of Cyprus, certain Ottoman laws which 
continued to be in force having not been replaced by Cyprus legislation, the 
English common law, and the rules of equity in force in Britain on the date of 
annexation, save as amended by any statute law of Cyprus, and the acts of the 
British Parliament of general application. The still subsisting (until today, and as 
amended) Criminal Code, Cap 154, finally replaced the Ottoman Penal Code in 
1928.102The first steps taken by the British when they assumed the administration 
of the island were the reorganization of the Courts. They set up a High Court, 
which in the case of foreigners applied English Law. The Daavi Courts continued 
functioning for another two years with jurisdiction over the Ottoman subjects, but 
as a step towards stimulating its members to a careful examination of the merits of 
the case, an Englishman was in most cases in attendance, although without legal 
status. In 1882, the first major reorganization of the Courts took place by an Order 
in Council of that year. There was an establishment of a Supreme Court together 
with District Courts and Assize Courts, which were composed of English and 
Cypriot professional judges. The Order retained the representative element of 
judges belonging to each of the two communities in the trial of criminal cases. 
                                                
102See, Anastassiades v The Republic [1977] 2 CLR 97, 158. 
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This was the position until 1935. The Courts of Justice Law of 1935 introduced a 
modern system of Courts of Justice, where the communal origin of the judge had no 
significance whatsoever. Under this Law, there was a Supreme Court and District 
Courts, composed of a President, District Judges and Magistrates, each one having 
jurisdiction to try criminal cases of different severity, summarily and singly. Assizes 
were also set up in each district, three times a year, composed of three judges, the 
presiding one being a judge of the Supreme Court. Assizes had jurisdiction to try all 
indictable offences. Conducive to the good administration of criminal justice were 
the establishment by the British of a modern Police Force, prisons based on 
western concepts, and the introduction of the basic principles of English criminal 
procedure. In August 1960, Cyprus became independent on the basis of an agreement 
reached, on basic points, between the Prime Ministers of Greece and Turkey, in 
Zurich. The London Conference followed the Zurich meeting, and a Joint 
Commission was established with the duty of completing a draft Constitution for the 
independent Republic of Cyprus. This draft eventually became the Constitution of the 
Cyprus Republic, the whole functioning of which was, in essence, based on the 
existence of only two communities, the Greek-Cypriot community and the Turkish-
Cypriot community. It was a compromise solution and as such, it unavoidably 
contained the seeds of many new problems between the two communities.103The 
communal basis of Court jurisdiction was introduced and the requirement of a 
neutral President of the High Court of Justice (and later Supreme Court) became 
constitutionally imperative. Cyprus became a member of the United Nations on the 
                                                
103For pertinent analyses, see, D Hotham, The Turks (John Murray Publishers, London 1972) 110-
121, and C Hitchens, Cyprus (Quartet Books, London 1984) 29-50. 
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20th of September 1960,104and on the 24th of May 1961, a member of the Council 
of Europe,105signing the European Convention on Human Rights and its First 
Protocol on 16 December 1960, and the ratifications that followed on the 6th of 
October 1962,106by Law 39 of 1962. Since the ratification, Cyprus has been 
participating in the European Court of Human Rights and the European 
Commission of Human Rights. A few months earlier, that is, in February 1961, 
Cyprus became a member of the British Commonwealth. In 1963, as a result of 
heightened and tense intercommunal-armed conflict between the Greek and Turkish-
Cypriots, the latter withdrew from any participation in the island’s administration. 
This led to the enactment of the Administration of Justice (Miscellaneous Provisions) 
Law of (Necessity) 1964 (Law 33 of 1964), whereby the communal element of the 
various Courts was abolished. On the 20th of July 1974, following a coup initiated 
by the Greek military junta aiming towards overthrowing the then President of 
Cyprus Archbishop Makarios, Turkey militarily invaded Cyprus in violation of 
international law and occupied 36.43% of its territory situated in the northern part 
of the island, which it still retains illegally until today.107The Turkish Army 
conducted a policy of ethnic cleansing, consisting of wholesale attacks and 
massacres of the Greek population in the territories that came under Turkish 
                                                
104Cyprus was admitted to UN membership and, therewith, ipso facto, also party to the Statute of 
the International Court of Justice, on the 20th of September 1960, by UN Resolution No 1489 (XV). 
105C Spyridakis commends on the accession of Cyprus to the Council of Europe as follows: ‘Her 
membership in the Council of Europe is of particular importance, for this acknowledges that, while 
geographically Cyprus belongs to Asia, it is otherwise part of European civilisation…’ See, 
Spyridakis, A Brief History of Cyprus (n 100) 183. 
106The links with the European Convention on Human Rights go back, however, to the period of 
the colonial regime. When the said Convention was signed in Rome in 1950, it provided the 
possibility to the member states of extending the applicability of the Convention to all the 
‘territories for whose international relations it is responsible.’ Great Britain made such a 
declaration, according to the said conventional provision, to various territories, including the then 
colony of Cyprus. 
107See, The Case of Cyprus v Turkey, Application No 25781/94, dated 10.5.01. 
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military occupation in an attempt to terrorize the Greek population into evacuating 
these areas, displacing more than 200,000 Greek-Cypriots, and killing thousands 
of others.108Nonetheless, despite the resulting plight and catastrophic 
consequences of the invasion, the country had to continue functioning as an 
independent state, and so it did. The administration of justice has since then been 
progressing in the non-occupied part without the participation of the Turkish-
Cypriots. Gradually, and following the usual path of societal and judicial 
evolution,109punishment in Cyprus was rationalised in a system oriented more 
firmly to predictability, certainty, formal justice, and the rule of law. With the 
accession of The Republic of Cyprus to the European Union in 2004, the 
Constitution was amended so that European law has supremacy over the 
Constitution and national legislation. 
 
3.2 The Modern Organisation of the Criminal Courts of Justice in Cyprus 
Constitutionally, the judicial power in Cyprus vests in the Supreme Court 
and its subordinate courts, whereas the House of Representatives exercises the 
legislative power, and the President of the Republic the executive power. The 
courts exercising criminal jurisdiction are the District Court, the Assize Court, and 




                                                
108See, the 1st and 2nd Reports of the European Commission of Human Rights on Turkey's 
Intervention in Cyprus and Aftermath (20 July 1974-18 May 1976, and 19 May 1976-10 February 
1983, respectively). 
109N Lacey, ‘Historicising Contrasts in Tolerance’, in T Newborn, The Politics of Crime Control: 
Essays in Honour of David Downes (Clarendon Studies in Criminology, OUP, Oxford 2009) 197. 
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3.2.1 The District Court 
 The District Court (there is one in each of the five districts)110is the Court 
exercising original jurisdiction in general. In 2008, it was comprised of 66 first 
instance professional judges, that is, 36 District Court Judges, 17 Senior District 
Judges, and 13 Presidents of District Court. First Instance judges are loosely 
referred to as ‘District Court Judges’, and that is how they will be referred to 
hereafter. The Supreme Court appoints all District Court judges amongst 
successful practitioners of some years standing (currently of at least 6 years 
standing in legal practice), with demonstrated professional ability and ethos. 
Promotion is supposed to be on merit, despite the fact that the general impression 
among the judicial and legal community is that, unfortunately (at least for the 
majority of them), the most decisive factor is seniority. The age of retirement is 63. 
In their criminal functions, District Court Judges try summarily offences that carry 
a maximum sentence of 5 years imprisonment and /or a fine up to €85.430111With 
the consent of the Attorney General of the Republic signified in writing, they have 
jurisdiction to try any offence punishable with more than 5 years imprisonment, as 
well as any other case remitted to the District Court from the Assize Court, with 
the order of the Attorney General. In both cases, the District Court judge has no 
extra powers of sentencing. As a rule, District Court judges try all criminal cases 
in the District Courts, such as road traffic cases, private criminal cases, and serious 
criminal cases, the latter been usually referred to as proper criminal 
                                                
110These are the Districts of Nicosia, Limassol, Larnaca, Famagusta, and Paphos. 
111As from 1.1.2008 the Euro became legal tender in Cyprus replacing the Cyprus Pound at the 
irrevocable fixed rate of 1 Euro = CYP 0.585274. The amount of the maximum fine stated above is 
the result of the conversion into Euros (rounded down to the nearest Euro) of the previously 
provided maximum fine in Cypriot Pounds (£50,000), on the basis of the conversion and rounding 
provisions of section 9 of the Adoption of the Euro Law 33/07. 
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cases.112Occasionally, Senior District Court Judges undertake proper criminal 
cases whereas Presidents of District Courts deal exclusively with civil jurisdiction 
cases, and never with criminal cases, unless of course appointed as Presidents in 
any of the Assize Courts.  
 
3.2.2 The Assize Court 
The Assize Court has unlimited jurisdiction to hear and determine at first 
instance any criminal case. In practice, only criminal cases punished by law with 
more than 5 years imprisonment are brought before the Assize Court. Each Assize 
Court is composed of three judges (a President of the District Court and two 
District Court Judges or a President of the District Court, a Senior District Court 
Judge and a District Court Judge or a President of the District Court and two 
Senior District Court Judges). Unless the majority of the Court considers the 
defendant guilty, he is acquitted. In deciding the sentence to be imposed, if there is 
an equality of votes, the President of the District Court has an additional casting 
vote. As a rule, the Supreme Court appoints District Court Judges to serve in the 
Assize Court, on rotation. At present, there are four Assize Courts in session in the 
Republic, based respectively in Nicosia, Limassol, Larnaca and Paphos. The 
Assize Court of Larnaca also covers jurisdictionally the non-occupied part of the 
District of Famagusta. 
 
 
                                                
112These, in general, are considered to be all offences punishable with more than one year’s 
imprisonment, and do not include road traffic offences. 
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3.2.3 The Supreme Court  
The Supreme Court is comprised of 13 professional judges, one of whom 
serves as President with equal authority and standing to the rest. They retire at 68. 
The Supreme Court is the product of an amalgamation between the Supreme 
Constitutional Court of Cyprus and the High Court of Cyprus (as established by 
the Constitution) by force of Law 33 of 1964, following the intercommunal events 
of 1963.  
The power to appoint judges of the Supreme Court and its President vests 
exclusively in the President of the Republic. Nonetheless, as a result of a 
longstanding constitutional tradition evolved in the interests of the separateness 
and independence of the Judiciary, the President of the Republic, invariably, seeks 
the recommendations of the Supreme Court as to who should be appointed, which 
as a rule he follows with very few exceptions.  
The Supreme Court is the final appellate court in the country. In its 
appellate jurisdiction it deals with all appeals from the lower courts. The court 
sitting for a criminal appeal is composed of at least three judges. As it happens 
with all judicial judgments in Cyprus, the Supreme Court judges sign their 
judgments immediately upon pronouncement. These judgments are binding on all 
subordinate courts and the Supreme Court, on matters of legal principle. A 
judgment given on behalf of more than one judge reflects the opinion of the 
totality of them. Sometimes, more than one judgment is given concurring in the 
result. Dissenting judgments are a rare occurrence. 
 The Supreme Court has very wide powers in dealing with appeals against 
conviction, acquittal or sentence, filed by either the prosecution or the defence. By 
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virtue of the provisions of section 145 of the Criminal Procedure Law, Cap 155, 
the Supreme Court may dismiss the appeal or quash the conviction, where on the 
evidence adduced, the conviction is unreasonable or wrong on a question of law, 
or where a substantial injustice has occurred. It can substitute the quashed 
conviction with another offence, or order a retrial. In appeals against sentence, it 
can interfere only on the ground that the sentence is manifestly excessive, 
inadequate, or wrong in law. In dismissing an appeal by the defendant against 
sentence, the Supreme Court has statutory power in accordance with the provisions 
of section 145(3)(b)(i) of the Criminal Procedure Law, Cap 155, to increase the 
sentence imposed. This power, however (as an act of equity towards defendants), 
is by practice very rarely used so that it does not, in general, constitute a hindrance 
to their accessing the Court on appeal.113A rough test on detecting such an 
inadequacy or insufficiency is to see whether the facts of the case bear no 
proportion to the sentence or by the sentence being altogether out of range with 
sentences approved by the Supreme Court in previous occasions. The Supreme 
Court has repeatedly stressed that in reviewing sentence it does not, and should 
not, assume ab initio the task of determining the sentence to be imposed, a course 
that would involve the stepping into the shoes of the trial court;114and that no 
intervention is justified merely by reason of the fact that, had they tried the case, 
they would have imposed a different sentence.115Nonetheless, what derives from a 
review of the cases decided on appeal between 1960-2008 is the impression that 
the Supreme Court interferes quite often with the sentences passed by the trial 
                                                
113See, Christodoulou v The Republic [2007] 2 CLR 229, 232. 
114See, e.g. Eleftheriades v The Republic [1967] 2 CLR 214, 216. 
115See, e.g. Foulias v The Police [1976] 2 CLR 57, 59. 
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courts, as the reversal rate is calculated at the noticeable percentage of 36.7%.116In 
the interest of certainty in this area of sentencing, it is essential that the impression 
be eradicated, by the strict application of the principles relevant to reversing a 
sentence on grounds of excessiveness or inadequacy. 
Sentencing decisions of the Supreme Court are not binding on District 
Court judges unless, of course, they deal with issues of legal principle. 
Nonetheless, a District Court judge wishing, in his discretion, to deviate from the 
generally established range of sentences, must thoroughly explain and justify his 
decision. This indirect control on judicial discretion serves to constrain caprice, 
aiming to limiting unjustified disparities and unfairness in sentencing.  
 
3.2.4 The Office of the Attorney General and the Deputy Attorney General 
of the Republic 
 
The Attorney General and the Deputy Attorney General of the Republic are 
appointed by the President of the Republic from amongst lawyers of high 
professional and moral standard. The Attorney General is the Head and the Deputy 
Attorney General is the Deputy Head of the Law Office of the Republic, which is 
an independent office, not being under any Ministry. The Attorney General and the 
Deputy Attorney General have the right of audience in, and take precedence over 
any other persons appearing before, any Court. They are members of the 
permanent legal service of the Republic, and hold office under the same terms and 
conditions as the Supreme Court judges and are not removed from office except on 
similar grounds and in the same manner applicable to the latter. The Attorney 
                                                
116See, para 3.6, below. 
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General is the legal adviser of the Republic, exercising all such other powers and 
performing all such other functions and duties as conferred or imposed on him by 
the Constitution, or by law. He has power, exercisable at his discretion in the 
public interest, to institute, conduct, take over and continue or discontinue any 
criminal proceedings. Such power may be exercised by him in person or by 
officers subordinate to him acting under and in accordance with his instructions. 
The President of the Republic, on the unanimous recommendation of the Attorney 
General and the Deputy Attorney General, may remit, suspend, or commute any 
sentence passed by a Court in the Republic. All actions filed by the Republic 
against any person, unless otherwise provided by any law, are filed in the name of 
the Attorney General, and actions filed by any person against the Republic, unless 
otherwise provided by any law, are filed against him, as defendant. As regards 
International Courts, such as the European Court of Human Rights, the Attorney 
General acts as agent of the Republic in all cases in which it is a party to the 
proceedings.  
The Deputy Attorney General has such powers and performs such duties as 
normally pertain to his office and, also, subject to the directions of the Attorney 
General, exercises all the powers and performs all the functions and duties vested 
in the latter under the provisions of the Constitution or by law. He acts for the 
Attorney General in his absence, or his temporary incapacity to perform his duties. 
The Attorney General is an ex officio member of the Administrative Board of the 
Cyprus Bar Association and Honorary President of the Cyprus Bar Association, 
President of the Legal Board, of the Advocates Disciplinary Board and of the 
Board of the Advocates’ Pension Fund. 
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3.2.5 The Cyprus Prison System 
In Cyprus, there is only one correctional institution, the Central Prisons in 
Nicosia, which operate under the provisions of the Prison Law 62(I)/96, as 
amended. This legislation incorporates the European Prison Rules and is consonant 
to the standards contained in relevant instruments of the Council of Europe. 
Cyprus has a relatively low prison population rate of 83 in a national population of 
100,000 (well under the median rate of 95 for Southern and Western European 
countries, and the median rate of 127 for Northern European countries), compared 
to a 153/100,000, for England and Wales, 152/100,000 for Scotland, and 
88/100,000 for Northern Ireland (all of them being classified as Northern 
European countries).117The Central Prisons cater for all categories of convicted 
and non-convicted prisoners of both sexes and of all age groups from 14 years and 
over. According to the Prison Regulations, with the exception of lifers, all other 
prisoners who have served part of their sentence, ranging from 3/12 of the term for 
sentences up to 2 years, to ½ of the terms for sentences over 12 years, are sent to 
the Open Prison, which is located within the premises of the Central Prisons. This, 
of course, depends on their overall conduct while serving their sentence, and if 
there are no security, disciplinary or other special reasons making such a measure 
inappropriate. The decision rests with the Prisons’ Classification Committee, 
which also assigns to the prisoners the appropriate work, provides exit permits and 
generally assists the Director of Prisons in the formulation and application of the 
mode of treatment in prison under the regulations. The last step towards 
reintegration into the social environment is the emplacement of inmates from the 
                                                
117R Walsmley, The World Prison Population List (8th edn International Centre for Prison Studies, 
Kings College London-School of Law, London 2009). 
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Open Prison, where there exist conditions of reduced security, to the Guidance 
Centre for out of Prison Employment and Rehabilitation of Prisoners, where 
prisoners serve the remaining of their sentence in conditions of controlled 
freedom. All prisoners have the opportunity to work, as far as possible, in a type of 
work of their choosing. To this direction, fully equipped workshops are operated in 
the prison, where prisoners are encouraged, under the supervision and instructions 
of trainers, to improve the level of their vocational training by working as cooks, 
tailors, carpenters, electricians, bookbinders, barbers, gardeners, mechanics and at 
the prison farm. There is cooperation between the Department of Prisons, the 
Cyprus Productivity Centre, and the Ministry of Education in order to improve 
vocational training. Prisoners are also encouraged to improve their level of 
education and vocational training by attending classes in or outside the prison or 
by correspondence courses. There are psychological and psychiatric services and 
support to all prisoners in need, on a regular basis, with personal meetings, group 
discussions and meetings in the presence of the prisoner’s family. There is also 
provision for a welfare service and support to all prisoners, with regular visits and 
contacts with their families and home leave, in order to facilitate their social 
integration. Recreational activities include sports, theatre, musical performances 
and chess games, among others. The Central Prisons are equipped with a theatre 
hall and grounds for football, volleyball and basketball. A prisoner may file a 
complaint with the Prison Board if he feels that the prison administration has 
overlooked or deliberately ignored him. The Prison Board can also evaluate the 
inmates’ vocational and work programmes. It also holds hearings about disciplined 
inmates in order to determine whether the disciplinary sentence was just. The 
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board has the authority to overrule any punishment imposed by the prison 
Director. In 2009, by virtue of Law 4 of 37(I)/09, which has amended the Prison 
Law 62(I)/96, there has been established a first-ever Parole Board in the country, 
consisting of a former judge as Chairman, a university professor (currently, 
Professor Andreas Kapardis), two psychiatrists and a social worker. The Parole 
Board has been mainly set up to afford the possibility of a second chance to those 
prisoners serving a life sentence who until then, could only be released by a 
presidential pardon. Those eligible to apply are, in general terms, prisoners 
sentenced to more than two years imprisonment who have completed half of their 
imposed sentence. 
 
3.3 A Précis of the Criminal Trial and Sentencing Procedure in Cyprus118  
The three major laws that regulate criminal justice in Cyprus are the 
Criminal Code, Cap 154, the Criminal Procedure Law, Cap 155, and the Evidence 
Law, Cap 9, whilst the Courts of Justice Law 14/60, regulates the structure and 
jurisdiction of the Courts. Hundreds of other criminal statutes and regulations, rule 
nearly every aspect of individual and social interaction. The Criminal Code, Cap 
154, embodies the general principles and main criminal offences of the English 
common law, whereas the Criminal Procedure Law, Cap 155, introduces the 
English criminal procedure laws, with comparable modifications. The Evidence 
Law, Cap 9, introduces the law and rules of evidence to a great extent applicable in 
                                                
118See, in general, A N Loizou and G M Pikis, Criminal Procedure in Cyprus (Proodos Press, 
Nicosia, Cyprus 1975); P Artemis, ‘An Outline of Criminal Law and the Working of the Judicial 
System in Criminal Cases’ (1989) 26 Cyprus L Tribune 4016 – 4021; and, D Kyprianou, The Role 
of the Cyprus Attorney General's Office in Prosecutions: Rhetoric, Ideology and Practice 
(Springer, Berlin 2010). 
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England, subject to the amended adaptation made in that law, or in any other law. 
In interpreting the Criminal Code and the Criminal Procedure Law, and in the 
absence of satisfactory Cypriot precedent, judges refer mostly to English 
precedent, which is, though, only of instructive and not binding effect. Regarding 
sentencing, it was stressed in Nicolaou v The Republic,119that foreign sentencing 
precedents (specific reference was made therein to English precedent), might have 
their own importance, but Cypriot courts need to follow Cypriot sentencing 
precedents due to the differing local social conditions as compared to those in 
England or other countries. Indeed, the distinct historical and cultural 
characteristics of a country may, sometimes, offer the best (or a better) explanation 
of national patterns of punishment at any one time, with more general theories, or 
models, occasionally falling apart when applied to national experiences.120 
Both the defence and the prosecution have the right to appeal against 
decisions of the District Court and the Assize Court, without leave. The Attorney 
General acquired the right for appeal against an acquittal in 1998, by force of Law 
54(I)/98, which amended the relative provisions of the Criminal Procedure Law, 
Cap 155.  
Briefly, following the steps of a criminal case, the prosecution starts with 
the filing of a charge at the Registrar of the appropriate District Court, if the case 
concerns a summary offence. The case is then placed by the Registrar before the 
judge for approval of the charge, and is subsequently fixed for first appearance 
before the court. In the case of an offence triable by the Assize Court, after the 
                                                
119[1992] 2 CLR 51, 57. 
120M Tonry, Thinking about Punishment (Pioneers in Contemporary Criminology, Ashgate 
Publishers, Aldershot 2009) 23.  
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filing of the charge, a District Court Judge may carry out a preliminary inquiry and 
commit the defendant for trial before the Assize Court, on a particular date. 
Depending on the offence and the surrounding circumstances of the case, the judge 
may order that the defendant remains in custody until the hearing of the case or its 
completion. The Attorney General, almost invariably, dispenses with the holding 
of a preliminary inquiry in writing, and provides the defendant with the substance 
of the evidence of each prosecution witness. The prosecution must prove its case 
against the defendant beyond reasonable doubt. Upon conviction, the court 
proceeds to the sentencing stage. If the conviction results from a full hearing, then 
the prosecution refers to facts strictly relevant to the issue of sentencing and not at 
variance with the court’s findings, mentioning, in addition, any subsisting previous 
convictions, which the defendant is called to admit or deny accordingly. If the 
defendant does not admit a previous conviction, the prosecution has the burden of 
proving it. Upon request by the defendant, the consent of the prosecution, and the 
approval of the Court, he may ask that other pending offences or criminal cases are 
placed before the Court to be taken into consideration during sentencing. If the 
Court is minded to impose a sentence of imprisonment, then, as a matter of 
practice, it orders a social investigation report so as to have a fuller picture of the 
defendant’s personal circumstances and other pertinent information. This is 
particularly helpful and perhaps fairer to the defendant, particularly if he is 
unrepresented. The preparation of a social investigation report is imperative when 
the defendant is a minor, a young or elderly person. The value of the social 
investigation report is, regrettably, very often small because it is commonly very 
synoptic and incomplete, mainly because of the fact that the social workers who 
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undertake to prepare it are overworked and overloaded with similar and other 
departmental tasks, and therefore unable to dispense of their duties before the 
Court in a satisfactory manner. The defendant (or his advocate) can admit or refute 
the factual basis presented before the Court as forming the basis of his pending 
sentence. In such cases, the Court can order a ‘Newton’121type sentencing 
hearing122(akin to the identically named procedure in England,123and the proof in 
mitigation procedure in Scotland),124and this applies, similarly, where the 
prosecution denies substantial factual allegations of the defendant during 
mitigation, in which case a reverse ‘Newton’ type of hearing takes place.125During 
the speech in mitigation, the defendant has the opportunity to present before the 
Court any arguments that could feasibly lead to the imposition of the most lenient 
possible sentence under the circumstances. Punishment, upon reasoned 
pronouncement, must take effect immediately, and there is no jurisdiction to pass 
sentence in futuro. In reaching its decision, the Court has usually no statutory 
restrictions or guidance other than the statutory maximum sentence for the offence 
under consideration. The offences of premeditated murder and high treason are 
mandatorily punished with life imprisonment. The death penalty was abolished in 
1983, by virtue of Law 86/83. When the defendant is guilty on several counts, and 
the component parts of the heavier offence give rise to offences of lesser gravity, 
                                                
121See, Newton (1979) 1 Cr App R (S) 252.  
122For the procedure as followed in Cyprus, see, Vryoni v The Police [1986] 2 CLR 102, 105-108. 
See also, Loizou and Pikis, Criminal Procedure in Cyprus (n 118) 86. 
123Hooper, Lord Justice and D Ormerod (eds), Blackstone’s Criminal Practice 2010 (OUP, Oxford 
2009) D19.8. 
124See, A V Sheehan and D J Dickson, Criminal Procedure (Scottish Criminal Law and Practice 
Series, 2nd edn, LexisNexis, Edinburgh 2003) 266.  
125See, for example, Constantinou v The Police [2005] 2 CLR 282, 293. For the position in 
Scotland, and an interesting analysis of pertinent Scottish case law, see, R M White, ‘What 
Happens After a Guilty Plea? A Gap in the Study of Criminal Procedure’ 1997 JR 465. 
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there must be sanctioning only for the heavier offence. One only imposes the 
maximum punishment provided by law, in circumstances of exceptional gravity, 
where all hope for reforming the offender and protecting society has been lost. 
There is no power to impose an extended sentence based on the bad record of 
the offender to protect society from the menace posed by his repeated criminal 
conduct. Previous convictions may justify the withholding of leniency to the 
offender, but cannot lead to a longer sentence than the gravity of the facts of the 
case warrants, for to do so, would be tantamount to punishing the defendant twice 
for past misdeeds. In determining the appropriate sentence126and measuring its 
extent, the court has regard to a wide variety of factors, always judging each case 
according to its own facts and circumstances. While there is no set ranking of 
punishment sanctions in the Criminal Code, Cap 154, non-custodial options are 
largely considered less severe than custodial options, although, as research 
suggests, this may not necessarily be the view of offenders.127 
 
3.4 Law Reporting in Cyprus  
In Cyprus, there is no systematic manner of publication of sentencing 
decisions given by District Court judges, apart from the distribution of these 
judgments to the parties concerned, and without usually becoming readily (if at 
                                                
126See Section 26 of the Criminal Code, Cap 154, which enumerates the principal modes of 
punishment in Cyprus. These are life imprisonment, fine and compensation, binding over to keep 
the peace and be of good behaviour or to come up for judgment, supervision, and community 
service orders. Based on other criminal statutory provisions, a court may discharge a defendant 
either conditionally or absolutely and in the case of young offenders, it may impose a probation 
order or commit the offender to the care of a relative or other fit person, issue various 
disqualification, forfeiture, and demolition orders.  
127See P Wood and H Grasmick, 'Toward the Development of Punishment Equivalencies: Male and 
Female Inmates Rate the Severity of Alternative Sanctions Compared to Prison' (1999) 16 JQ 19, 
reporting on a survey of 415 offenders in the US, and finding that prisoners do not necessarily rate 
non-custodial options as less punitive than imprisonment, and that the reality of perceptions of 
severity is more complex than had previously been assumed.  
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all), available to anybody else, even to the judges. Only occasionally do these 
judgments circulate among judges serving in the same District Court or Assize 
Court, and this only on their initiative, but this constitutes the exception rather than 
the rule. The annual reporting of sentencing decisions is limited only to the 
judgments of the Supreme Court, which are selectively published yearly in the 
Greek language in the second volume of the Cyprus Law Reports, and circulate 
monthly, before publication, to all Cypriot judges through the Chief Registrar of 
the Supreme Court, for purposes of speedier and prompter reference. The 
preparation of these reports in bound volumes usually takes approximately two 
years to complete. These judgments often limit their content to the absolute basic 
facts and legal principles necessary to dispose of the issues on appeal, and almost 
never expand on wider sentencing or penological issues. The Supreme Court does 
not issue guideline sentencing judgments or any other comparative directions to 
judges, as this, it is thought, could be perceived as restricting judicial discretion 
and independence. 
 
3.5 The Criminal Statistical Portrait of the Cypriot Society  
According to the criminal statistics for 2009,128in that year (not being 
statistically dissimilar from preceding years), crime in the island occurred mostly 
in the big urban centres at a percentage of 78% of the total offences committed 
nationwide, with Limassol being in the lead accounting for the 27.7%, and 
followed by Nicosia with 23.7%. Among rural areas, the incidence of crime was 
higher in the non-occupied (by Turkey) part of Famagusta, and Paphos, followed 
                                                
128Cyprus Statistical Service, Criminal Statistics 2009 (Government Printing Office, Nicosia 2009). 
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by Larnaca. As far as serious criminal offences129are concerned, 7,648 of them 
were reported to the police. Of these, 0.43% were classified as no case, with no 
criminal offence having been really committed, 29.3% were undetected, 21.7% 
were cleared up, and 48.5% were still open cases at the end of the year. The 
average time taken between the commission of the offence and disposal of a case 
was 12.9 months, ranging between 6.8 months on average for undetected cases, 
and 20.3, for those tried. The detection rate was estimated at 46.2%, covering 
detected cases and pending cases at the end of the year. The lowest detection rate 
was 16.4%, and concerned cases of malicious damage to property including with 
explosives. Offences against property formed the largest group of offences 
accounting for 63,1%, of serious offences, followed by offences relating to 
forgery, coining, and personation with 17,4%, and offences injurious to the public 
in general with 4,5%. A large proportion of these offences i.e. 31.1%, were 
committed in offices, shops, and factories, 32.2% in residential places, and 10.1% 
in streets and open spaces. The rest concerned recreation places, churches, schools, 
motor vehicles and other places. Offences of violence involving victims, whether 
these were offences against the person in general or sexual offences, were 
examined separately. In 2009, there were 282 cases and 335 victims. Of these, 70 
cases (24.8%) were sexual offences with 73 victims, and 212 cases (75.2%) 
offences against the person involving 262 victims. Of the sexual offences, 50% 
                                                
129According to the Cyprus Statistical Service, for the purposes of the statistical analysis under 
discussion, the term ‘serious offences’ is deemed to cover ‘…all serious offences reported to the 
police…’ and includes most offences against public order, against the administration of lawful 
authority, offences injurious to the public in general, sexual offences, offences against the person, 
offences against property, malicious damage to property, forgery, coining, counterfeiting and other 
similar offences and personation, offences against the security of civil aviation, as well as and other 
miscellaneous offences such as conspiracies, incitements to commit an offence, and offences 
deriving from violations of the narcotic drugs law, the currency law, and the firearms and 
explosives law. 
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were cases of rape, 12.9% were defilements of girls between 13-16 years of age, 
4.3% were unnatural offences, 12.9% were cases of abduction, 15.7% were cases 
of sexual exploitation of children, 2.9% were cases of domestic rape, and 1.4% 
were cases of a domestic defilement of a girl under the age of 13 years. In the 
cases of rape 10% of the victims were Cypriots, 20% were tourists, and another 
20% were foreign residents. Of the offences against the person 5.7% were cases of 
murder, manslaughter, or killing on provocation involving 17 victims, and 5.7% 
were cases of attempted murder involving 19 victims. Of the victims, 67.1% were 
Cypriots and 32.8% foreign nationals (of which 65.1% were residents and 34.9% 
were tourists). A variety of weapons were used in the offences against the person. 
In 82.1% of these cases only physical force was used with no weapon, in 9.0% 
firearms, in 2.4% explosives, in 18.4% sharp instruments, in 1.4% noxious 
substances, in 0.94% verbal threats, and in 3.8% blunt instruments. There were 
507 cases of drugs, of which 1.4% pertained to mere drug use. The types of drugs 
encountered were mainly of flowering tops and leaves of cannabis (61%), cannabis 
resin (9.5%), and cannabis plants cultivation (3.6%). Also reported were cases of 
possession and trafficking of hard drugs (Class A Drugs), such as heroin (21.9%), 
cocaine (9.9%) and ecstasy MDMA (7.3%). A total of 2,007 adults (that is, 
persons over 14 years old), of which 90.8% were males and 9.2% were females, 
were proceeded against for serious offences. Of these, 11.3% were kept in custody 
either before being charged or while awaiting trial for a median time of 6 days, and 
13.5% entered into bail when charged. Of the persons tried, 60.2% were legally 
represented. When called upon to plead, the vast majority (87.5%) pleaded guilty, 
and only 12.5%, pleaded not guilty. The share of women to the serious crime was 
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relatively lower compared to men. Of the total number of women offenders (184), 
69.6% were convicted, accounting for 9.1% of the total convictions for serious 
offences. The median age of offenders convicted was calculated at 30.0 for 
women, and 26.0 for men. The main offences committed by women were offences 
against property and offences of forgery and personation. Of the male offenders, 
30.8% were married and 54.7% were single. As regards women, 35.2% were 
married and 32.8% were single. The percentage of unemployed among offenders 
was far above the corresponding percentage of unemployed persons in the 
economically active population as a whole. Of the economically active offenders, 
34.9% were unemployed. Of the total convictions for serious offences 28.8% were 
committed by males, and 44.5% by females, whereas 30.2% by foreign nationals. 
Of the 27.8% of the persons convicted for offences against property, 26.0% were 
convicted under the Narcotic Drugs Law, whereas 61% of those convicted for 
forgery, coining and personation, were foreign nationals. Of the 1,406 persons 
convicted of serious offences, 73.8% were first time offenders while the remaining 
26.2% had at least one previous conviction, and 37.4% of them at least one 
previous custodial sentence. Some of the recidivists had started their criminal 
careers at a very young age. Of these, 5.7% had been convicted for their first 
offence as juveniles below the age of 16, 48% at the age of 16-20, and 22.0%, at 
the age of 21-24. On the basis of the adults convicted between 1976-2009, it is 
made clear that recidivists do not necessarily concentrate on the same type of 
offences. Of those having a criminal record, 3.5% had previous similar 
convictions, 57.7% had been convicted of different offences, and 38.8% were 
convicted of offences some of which were similar and some different. The total 
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number of juveniles involved in the commission of offences was 21.3% (300), of 
which 97.7% were boys and 2.3% were girls. The majority of offences committed 
were those against property (47.7%), whereas offences against the public order 
accounted for 18.3%, malicious damage to property 18.0%, and offences against 
the person 10.7%. Of the juvenile offenders, 58.0% were 15 years old, 23.7% were 
14 years old, and 13.3% were 13 years old. The remaining 5.0% was in the age 
group of 10-12 years of age.130Of these offenders, 71.7% were living in urban or 
greater urban areas. About 88.3% of the juveniles were living with both their 
parents, 4.3% with one of their parents, usually the mother, and only few had other 
living arrangements. Of the 300 juvenile offenders mentioned, 8.3% were of 
foreign nationality, 17.3% had adult accomplices, 61.3% had juvenile 
accomplices, and 21.0% had no accomplices, whereas 99.7% were proceeded 
against, and 87.7% were convicted; of those, 16.8% admitted having committed 
additional offences, which were taken into consideration by the court in passing 
sentence.131  
According to the unpublished judicial statistics kept by the District Courts 
and the Assize Courts, in 2009 there were 25,322 fresh cases filed, while the 
number of pending cases was 25,711. Since 1996 (the earliest year for which there 
are judicial statistics available for the District Courts and the Assize Courts), the 
total number of criminal cases filed in these courts in 2009 was below the yearly 
average of 34,000, and the same applied for the pending cases compared to the 
                                                
130In considering the statistical information on juveniles, the data after the 24th of February 2006 are 
affected by the fact that the age of criminal responsibility was raised from 10 to 14 years by virtue 
of an amendment of section 14 of the Criminal Code, Cap 154.  
131Criminal statistics must, though, be viewed with caution as they are (usually) at variance with the 
actual incidence of crime: See, A Kapardis, ‘Crime in Cyprus’ (2004) 8 Israel Stud Criminology 
151, 159. 
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yearly average of 15,000. Every year, approximately 40% of all fresh and pending 
criminal cases are disposed of. A total of 58,538 offenders were convicted. Of 
those, 80.6% were males, and 19.4% females. The bulk of offences were motoring 
offences accounting for 46.1% of males convicted, and 52,5% of females, and 
regulatory offences, which accounted for 31.9% of males and 35.2% of females 
convicted. The most common offences, excluding motoring and regulatory 
offences, were offences against property, of which 2.9% of the male offenders and 
1.6% of the female offenders were convicted, and offences against the person of 
which 2.2% of the male offenders and 0.9% of the female offenders were 
convicted. Referring to miscellaneous offences, 14% males and 8.8% females were 
convicted. The most commonly used sentence was the imposition of a fine, which 
occurred in 95.6% of convictions. About 0.7% of the defendants were bound over, 
0.6% were given suspended sentences of imprisonment, and 2% were sentenced to 
imprisonment. Absolute and conditional discharge accounted for 0.9% of 
convictions. Fines were mostly imposed for motoring and regulatory offences 
though they have been used for all groups of offences. Probation orders have been 
mainly used for offences against property. The use of binding over covered all 
groups of offences. Similarly, suspended sentences of imprisonment and 
immediate imprisonment were used over the entire range of offences. There are no 
detailed or complete records kept by the Supreme Court with reference to appeals 
disposed of, or pending, before the year 2000. What can be deduced from the 
available records is that every year there are on average 24 criminal appeals filed, 
and 23 appeals disposed of. The percentage of those appeals filed against 
conviction and/or sentence is not known. Furthermore, in 2009, receptions of 
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convicted prisoners to the Central Prison amounted to 1,279 males and 106 
females. Of these, only 80.7% of males and 6.6% of females were convicted of 
criminal offences by the ordinary criminal courts and military courts. The rest 
were convicted mainly for offences against the military criminal code or were non-
criminal prisoners such as fine defaulters. Most sentences of imprisonment were 
shorter than 6 months giving a median length of sentence of 4.4 months. The 
median length of sentences imposed on penal offenders was 3.1 months. The 
actual time spent in prison was generally less than the sentence imposed, being 
reduced to a large extent by the use of remission. Thus the medium length of stay 
in prison for offenders, computed from the releases, was 1.9 months. The 
corresponding length of stay of penal offenders was 2.2 months. Out of the 1,385 
persons imprisoned, 20.4% had been previously given non-custodial sentences, 
17.0% had at least served previously one sentence of imprisonment, and 62.5% 
had no previous convictions. Of the 240 defendants that had served a previous 
custodial sentence, 80.8% had been convicted during the five years prior to their 
last reception into prison, and 19.2% had been convicted earlier.   
The criminal statistics provided above provide a backdrop against which to 
consider sentencing. What broadly emanates from these statistics (as well as from 
almost half-a-century’s criminal sentencing appeals as presented in Chapter 3.6 
below) is that crime, despite the limitations of official criminal statistics (e.g., the 
dark figure of crime), is one of the major social issues confronting contemporary 
Cypriot society.132  
                                                
132Rai Consultants Public Ltd, Cyprobarometer 2009, 
http//www.rai.com.cy/main/data/Cyprobarometer2009.pdf/ accessed 5 August 2010. 
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3.6 A Panorama of Forty-Eight Years of Criminal Sentencing Appeals 
(1960-2008)  
 
As noted in Chapter 1, the researcher analysed for the purposes of the 
thesis all 891 appeals against sentence decided by the Supreme Court between 
1960-2008, as published in the CLR. The data collected were subjected to a 
conventional quantitative and qualitative evaluation by the researcher. The 
outlining of some of the results directly below, aims towards offering a broad 
impression of the judicial approach on sentencing and mitigation issues as 
comprehended and applied by the highest court in the island.  
Between 1960 and 2008, the Supreme Court decided on 891 appeals 
against sentence, of which 530 (59.5%) were appeals against decisions of the 
District Court and 361(40.5%) of the Assize Court. From these, 23.1% were 
allowed as the sentence imposed at first instance was considered as manifestly 
excessive, 12.3% were allowed on the ground that the first instance sentence was 
considered as manifestly inadequate, 3.3% were allowed because the sentence was 
considered as wrong in principle due to a misdirection in law or fact, or owing to 
an overlook of some material factor and the introduction of extraneous matters in 
the decision, whereas 61.3% were dismissed as the sentence was deemed as 
neither manifestly excessive nor manifestly inadequate. Of the 891 appeals, 54.2% 
concerned violent offences, 15.3% offences against property, 11.1% offences 
against public order and the administration of lawful authority, 14,9% were drug 
related offences, 4.8% were offences against public health and safety, and another 
3.3% were immigration law offences, while 5.8% were related to various road 
traffic violations, and 1.7% to an array of other statutory offences. The defendants 
 81 
filed 89.3% of the appeals while the prosecution 20.5%. From those appeals, 
79.5% concerned pleas of guilty and 20.5% pleas of not guilty.  From the total of 
984 appellants (in some appeals there were more than one appellant) 16.2% were 
aliens, 1.4% Turkish-Cypriots while the rest were Greek-Cypriots. As regards 
gender, 86.7% of the defendants in all the appeals were male and 4.0% female. In 
relation to the age of majority of the defendants, 9.0% were between 20 and 25, 
whereas 3.9% were between 17 and 19, and 0.51% between 12 and 16 years old. 
Another 4.1% were over 50, with 0.30% being over 71 years old.  The remaining 
17.8% were between 26 and 49 years of age. In 15.5% of the total appeals, the 
defendants were not legally represented before the Supreme Court, by their free 
choice.  The majority of the imprisonment sentences, concerned terms ranging 
from 1-2 years.  Of the total number of appeals against sentences of imprisonment 
(742), 3.0% concerned appeals against sentences over 10 years of imprisonment, 
while 0.67% were appeals against life sentences, while another 3.8% concerned 
suspended terms of imprisonment. The rest were appeals against the imposition of 
fines or criminal orders ranging from borstal and supervision to sealing, 
disqualification, and demolition orders. In 12.1% of the imprisonment cases, the 
trial court took into consideration other outstanding criminal offences against the 
defendant, whereas in 14.0% it imposed concurrent terms of imprisonment, and in 
2.2% consecutive terms, while in 1.1% of the cases the court activated suspended 
sentences of imprisonment against the offender.  From an overall of 708 cases 
where the defendant pleaded guilty, 96.6% concerned instances where the plea was 
entered either on the first or the second appearance before the court while in the 
remaining 3.4% of the cases the defendants entered their plea subsequently. The 
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Supreme Court evaluated the guilty plea in all of the cases as a mitigating factor, 
though in correspondingly diverse degrees, while it characterised 61.2% of the 
appeals as serious or very serious on the basis of their surrounding facts and 
circumstances and the statutory maxima provided by law while 5.8% of them were 
considered as extremely serious.  The remaining cases were thought to be of minor 
or relatively serious importance.  In 99.8% of the appeals, the Supreme Court 
made specific or implicit reference to the maximum sentence provided by the 
applicable legislation as a relevant factor in the determination of the seriousness of 
the case and the offence.  In 22.2% of the cases (198 in all) the offender had prior 
convictions for offences committed before the new offence. In 56.1% of these 
cases the number of prior convictions ranged between 1 and 10.  In 0.67% of the 
cases the Supreme Court referred to the long lapse of time from the commission of 
the offence until the trial court’s sentence or the appeal, for reasons attributed to 
the defendant.  Consequently, this factor was not accepted as mitigating. In 3.3% 
of the cases, the Supreme Court found that the delay was attributed to the 
prosecution and thus accepted it as a mitigating circumstance.  In all of the appeals 
the court made specific or implicit reference to the particular circumstances of the 
offence or to other circumstances not relevant to the personal circumstances of the 
defendant as pertinent to the determination of sentence, while in 49.6% of the 
cases (442 in total) it took into account the personal circumstances of the 
defendant. In 3.2% of these cases, the Supreme Court referred to circumstances 
considered as exceptional, and accepted them as mitigating or pertinent to the 
determination of sentence. In 1.7% of the cases, the Supreme Court accepted as a 
mitigating factor the victim’s forgiveness of the defendant’s criminal behaviour, in 
 83 
14.1% his confession to the police, and in 13.6% of the cases his cooperation with 
them.  These mitigating factors were not necessarily mentioned in isolation to the 
other factors, and not all were inevitably referred to in different cases. This applies 
also to all other similar mentions to mitigating, aggravating or other factors 
conceivably relevant to the determination of sentence, or to the theoretical 
background used by the court during its reasoning.  In 1.0% of the cases the court 
accepted as a mitigating factor the disclosure to the police of the defendant’s 
accomplices. In 0.34% of the cases the court accepted the voluntarily surrender of 
the defendant to the police as mitigating.  In 1.3% of the cases the court considered 
the major role of the defendant in the commission or planning of the offence as an 
aggravating factor, whereas in another 1.2% , his secondary role as an aspect 
attenuating the seriousness of the circumstances of the offence. In 0.79% of the  
cases the court accepted as mitigating the fact that an accomplice of the defendant 
was not similarly prosecuted for the same or other similar offence. In 0.79% of the 
cases it accepted as an aggravating factor the fact that the defendant escaped from 
legal custody pending police investigation or trial, and committed other offences. 
In 0.67% of the cases the court credited the defendant as acting under duress in the 
commission of the offence while in 1.3% with the fact that he had suffered an 
injury as a result of his illegal act. In 3.0% of the cases the court acknowledged as 
a mitigating factor the defendant’s addiction, and in 2.5% the fact that he had 
undergone or was undergoing during the criminal process rehabilitation therapy. In 
3.5% of the cases the good character of the defendant was acknowledged as 
mitigating, as happened in 0.56% of the cases with reference to his ignorance of 
the law, and in 0.22%, to his mistake in connection to the tolerability of his illegal 
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action. Intoxication was accepted as mitigating in 1.5% of the cases. The fact that 
the defendant was a prisoner of war having been captured and tortured by the 
Turkish troops during the invasion of 1974 was accepted as mitigating in 0.22% of 
the cases. Similarly, in 1.7% of the cases the court accepted as a significant 
sentencing aspect the social unrest that prevailed in Cyprus as a result of the inter-
communal conflict between Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots during the 
period between 1963 and 1970, and the civil strife amongst Greek-Cypriots 
between 1970 and 1974, which led to the 1974 coup. Likewise, in 2.0% of the 
cases the court accepted as a relevant factor the social unrest, which followed the 
Turkish invasion. In 4.4% of the cases the defendant’s change of circumstances 
since the commission of the offence and his sentencing by the trial court was also 
accepted as mitigating, as was his meritorious conduct in 1.0% of the cases, and 
his personal tragedy in 0.90% of the cases.  In 1.8% of the cases the defendant’s 
provocation by the victim was established as extenuating, but in other 0.67% of the 
cases it was not, and in the same way in 7.3% of the cases the fact that the 
defendant showed remorse for his actions counted as mitigating while in other 
1.6% it was not. In 7.4% of the cases the defendant compensated the victim 
partially or fully, and that counted as a mitigating factor. In 4.7% of the cases the 
defendant’s physical illness was also received as mitigating. Additionally, in 8.1% 
the defendant’s psychological problems were deemed as mitigating. Furthermore, 
in 11.1% of the cases the defendant’s youth, in 1.1% his old age, and in 1.2% the 
gap in his criminal record were accepted as mitigating factors, as in 1.5% of the 
cases his stress resulting from the criminal prosecution and its subsistence pending 
completion. In 1.8% of the cases the defendant’s financial problems, in 8.1% the 
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potential adverse effects of his prospective imprisonment on his family, and in 
0.22% the withdrawal of his appeal against conviction during the hearing of the 
appeal, were also accepted as mitigating.  In 1.2% of the cases the fact that the 
defendant was pursuing or was about to pursue higher or other studies, in 0.67% 
his low intelligence, and in 0.79% of the cases his immaturity, were also deemed 
as mitigating. In 2.9% of the cases the defendant’s extrajudicial punishment or the 
prospect thereof had a decreasing effect in his sentence, as did his reconciliation 
with the victim in 0.90% of the cases. In 3.7% of the cases the court viewed the 
equality of treatment between the defendant and his co-defendants or other 
accomplices as mitigating or pertinent to the determination of sentence whereas in 
0.56% the defendant’s entrapment by the police was acknowledged as mitigating, 
as opposed to 0.11% that it was not so accepted. In 6.5% of the cases the 
defendant’s planning of the offence, in 0.90% his professionalism in its execution, 
and in 5.5% his obtaining financial gain from his illegal act was perceived as 
aggravating, as was the use of a weapon (firearm or any other object) during the 
commission of the offence in 3.3% of the cases. Aggravating were also the 
defendant’s criminal actions deriving from breach of trust shown to him by the 
victim in 2.1% of the cases. The degree of violence during the commission of the 
offence in 4.3% of the cases, the commission of the offence as a group in 4.6% , 
the value of the property stolen or destroyed in 14.5% of the cases, and the amount 
of narcotics in the 133 drug related offences, were also identified as factors with 
variable effect on sentence. The prevalence of the offence was mentioned in 15.6% 
of the cases as relevant in sentencing and occasionally as aggravating. Offending 
while on bail or on a suspended sentence of imprisonment was deemed 
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aggravating in 1.1% of the cases, as was the fact that the victim was vulnerable to 
the defendant’s actions in 1.7%. Likewise, aggravating was the fact that in 0.90% 
of the cases the defendant (or his advocate) cross-examined the victim of a sexual 
offence to an unacceptable degree.  In 11.4% of the cases the court referred to the 
individualisation as a principle of sentencing, and in the same way, in 1.3% to 
proportionality.  In 3.7% of the cases there was reference to retribution as a 
sentencing purpose.  In 8.2% of the cases there was reference to deterrence, in 
another 15.0% (which concerned different cases) to general deterrence, in 3.7% to 
specific deterrence, in 1.5% to incapacitation, in 4.6% to rehabilitation, in 5.5% to 
denunciation, and in 19.3% to social protection and public order. In 0.56% of the 
cases there was reference by the court of approaching the defendant’s case with 
sympathy and in 0.11% with compassion.  In 3.1% of the cases there was reference 
to leniency, in 1.2% to epieikeia (equity), and in 1.1% to mercy.  
The results of the Supreme Court cases analysis presented above indicate (like 
in the case of the criminal police and judicial statistics dealt with in Chapter 3.5): 
(a) The continuum within which the Supreme Court deliberates and decides on 
substantive issues of sentencing (b) That the said court is trying to administer 
sentencing justice as effectively as possible within the parameters of its statutory 
powers (c) The Supreme Court, has mapped over a period of 48 years the 
sentencing spectrum which, in turn, can be said to epitomise sentencing justice in 
Cyprus, identifying at the same time its primary concerns, aims, purposes and 





The purpose of the present chapter was to provide a succinct impression of 
Cyprus’s legal and criminal justice system and its formation and development so 
that the acquired picture could form a point of reference in the subsequent attempt 
to comprehend and process the judges’ culture, role, impact and attitudes in their 
punishtecture and mercying. It has described, between other things, the origins of 
the contemporary legal and criminal justice system in Cyprus and the role of the 
judiciary in politically turbulent times. It provided an overview of the organisation 
of the criminal courts and their jurisdiction as well as a synopsis of the role and 
powers of the Attorney General and Deputy Attorney General of the Republic, and 
the prison system. Furthermore, it outlined the sentencing hearing, explained the 
parameters of law reporting in Cyprus, and gave an empirical and statistical 
overview of societal criminality in the island, and a summation of the sentencing 
practice as derived by the content of the totality of the sentencing appeals against 
sentence decided by the Supreme Court between 1960 and 2008.  
 The next chapter will examine the question of punishment justification, the 
issue of judicial discretion and separation of powers, the explanation of the 
practice of punishment through the spectrum of external and internal criticism, and 
the interrelationship between punishment theory and sentencing practice. It will 
furthermore prepare the basis for presenting, in a micrographic form, the realities 
of the Cypriot judicial sentencing practice on the one hand, and the supposed 
parallel reality of the academic and theoretical debate on the morality and 
justification of the said practice, on the other. This analysis will assist the reader in 
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CHAPTER 4: THE QUESTION OF PUNISHMENT’S JUSTIFICATION 
 
 
This chapter examines the question of punishment’s justification, the issue 
of judicial discretion and separation of powers, the explanation of the practice of 
punishment through the spectrum of external and internal criticism, and the 
interrelationship between punishment theory and sentencing practice. One of its 
objectives is to prepare the basis for presenting the realities of the Cypriot judicial 
sentencing practice on the one hand, and the supposed parallel reality of the 
academic and theoretical debate on the morality and justification of the said 
practice, on the other.  This analysis will hopefully assist in the better 
comprehending and capturing of important elements and parameters of judicial 
punishtecture and mercying. The intention here will not be to resolve the 
normative debate that surrounds these issues, if one indeed could reasonably assert 
that such a resolution could have been feasible in any event. Such a task falls 
completely outside the purposes of the study due to its nature and aims, as already 
described. Rather, the presentation and analysis of some of the parameters of the 
theoretical debate will be pursued only to the extent relating to the objectives of 
the study and the formulation of the required theoretical setting for their 
advancement.  
 
4.1Immanent and Radical Criticism as an Explanatory Tool of Punishment 
Practice  
 
The study uses as its main background the theories of retributivism and 
utilitarianism. The reasons behind the choice have already been noted in Chapter 
1. Explaining and justifying a punishment practice requires an analogous method 
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of observation and critique, a tool that would assist in approaching the matter from 
the necessary angle of analysis. One such tool is the methodology of immanent 
and radical criticism. The sense of this categorisation is better comprehended if 
viewed through the distinction between the justification of the practice of 
punishment and the justification of a particular action falling under it.  Indeed, 
one’s conceptions of the justification of punishment can help shape his 
understanding of the justification of the practice.  No matter how much it has 
become an academic truism to mention, the mere fact of an existence of a practice 
is not in itself a justification for that practice, and indeed, justifying a practice such 
as legal punishment, is different from justifying an action within the practice. In 
order to justify it, one needs to appeal to some standard of what is right, proper or 
just. When one justifies an action within a practice, one refers to the rules of the 
practice.133It has been suggested by Tunick,134and elaborated by Keijser,135that a 
theorist of legal punishment is either an immanent or a radical critic of the 
practice.  Immanent critics of punishment accept the institution of legal 
punishment, seek a sound moral justification for it, and use this as a critical 
standard against which to test the actual practice of punishment.  They might reject 
particular justifications that are given within the practice but accept that, in 
principle, actions within the practice can be justified, with them assuming their 
immanent role inside the practice.  They believe that we can persevere within our 
ideals even in the face of a non-ideal practice if we bring the actual practice back 
to line with its ideals or perhaps with an adjusted version.  There is however a 
                                                
133J Rawls, ‘Two Concepts of Rules’ (1955) 64(1) Phil Rev 3. 
134Tunick, Punishment (n 30) 18. 
135Keijser, Punishment and Purpose (n 8) 8-9. 
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necessary caution to immanent criticism that needs to be exercised.  To think 
within a practice is to have one’s very perception and sense of possible and 
appropriate action issue ‘naturally’ (without further reflection), from one’s 
position as a deeply situated agent. Someone who looks with practice-informed 
eyes sees a field already organised in terms of clearly defined obligations, self-
evidently authorised procedures, and relevant pieces of evidence.  To be an 
immanent theoretician, one must think with the practice.  Self-consciously 
wielding some extrapolated model of its working is to be ever calculating just what 
one’s obligations are, what procedures are indeed legitimate, what evidence is in 
fact evidence, and so on.136The radical critics, on the other hand, question the 
existential foundation of the institution of legal punishment.  In effect, they deny 
that there can be sufficient justification for any action that is part of the practice, 
concluding that the whole practice, root and branch, serves no good purpose, or 
perhaps a maligned one. Their purpose is to go beyond explication and 
rationalisation, and interrogate the deeper political, historical, and philosophical 
logic that underlies the power of law.137Their theories are explanatory in that they 
attempt to explain how it is that punishment, in its current form, or in general, has 
evolved as a social practice.  They do not give an answer as to the definitional 
nature of punishment. Neither do they focus, because of the character of their 
critique, on approaches or techniques for achieving crime prevention, justice, or 
social harmony.138Nonetheless, radical criticism challenges one’s commitment to 
                                                
136Fish, Doing What Comes Naturally (n 5) 386-387. 
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the practice,139and this is important since it strengthens one’s sense of purpose and 
direction. Such reflections are positive, as they activate the primal need to question 
and rationalise certain attributes of human behaviour pertaining to the issue of 
punishment. They also stimulate the observer to recognise the possibility of 
contextualising and interpreting the development of the various theories of 
punishment within a wider socio-historical perspective attributing this growth to 
the inextricable relation between legal individualism, social individuality, and 
social control.140However, for our purposes, the premise and direction of this 
external theory is detached from the practicalities of endeavouring to criticise and 
improve the practice, and this makes for disability.  Indeed, when critical distance 
stretches into infinity, the critical enterprise collapses.141 
 
4.2 The Disconcerting Need for Legal Punishment  
Every human society, from the most democratic to the most autocratic, 
uses some form of formal or informal punishment.142Societies, history and 
observation seem to suggest, need to punish for reasons that may range from the 
purely symbolic to the instrumentally required, for limiting the degree to which 
crime interferes in the day-to-day conduct of the peoples’ lives, with the need to 
justify the sanctioning, to reflect not only history but moral logic as well.143 
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142W C Hamblet, ‘The Paradox of Punishment’ in A Sarat (ed), Crime and Punishment: 
Perspectives from the Humanities (Studies in Law, Politics, and Society, Vol 37, Elsevier, 
Amsterdam 2005) 99. 
143A Norrie, Crime, Reason and History (Law in Context, 2nd edn Butterworths, London 2001) 153. 
 93 
Legal punishment is a polymorphous concept and a most disconcerting 
social practice,144awakening conflicting and primeval emotions.145It can mean 
different things to different people, depending on their perception (pragmatic, 
philosophical, atheoretical, or uninformed) and, to some extent, their level of 
subscription to the various theories of punishment and their justification.  It is the 
medium through which the state punishes legally by invoking its authority to 
inflict pain, deprivation or some other form of suffering on the 
offender,146essentially (some argue), keeping its promise as made in the criminal 
code,147or in order to fulfil its duty to denounce injustice.148It is a form of 
obligation towards the citizen, which lies in the nature of the promise, given that 
the aim of the criminal code is, precisely, to protect his rights.  The infringement 
of any penal provision is, thus, a sufficient and compelling reason (but not 
necessarily morally justified), for imposing the prescribed sanction.149Some 
contend that punishment is a form of institutionalised revenge, and as a result, 
morally unacceptable.150The criminal justice system delivers pain in all forms of 
punishment.  Undeniably, they assert, the infliction of pain by the state through 
this system, is a process involving a number of discreet but mutually reinforcing 
stages: defining, classifying, broadcasting, disposing and punishing. These very 
processes can create social harms that bear little relationship to the original 
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offence, such as loss of employment, a home, family life, and ostracism from 
society.151However, some say, in order to understand fully state punishment, and 
therefore to be in a position to accept or reject its moral milieu, it must be realised 
that punishment is something that happens in non-institutional contexts as 
well.152Others see punishment as a cultural process, and then, as a mechanism of 
particular institutions, of which criminal law is but one.153There are, additionally, 
those who disagree with the morality of any degree of sanctioning because as they 
claim, legal punishment revengefully inflicts pain on other human beings.154On the 
other hand, there are others who maintain that the return of suffering for evil 
voluntarily done, is itself morally good.155The desire for revenge is innate to 
human nature;156after all, the reason God established exact justice in the Old 
Testament was to put a stop to uncontrolled blood feuds and tribal wars.157Western 
cultures have gone too far in seeking to de-legitimise this deep natural human 
desire for revenge.158To love your enemies may be morally beautiful but is 
humanly unrealistic. Vindictive impulse is natural and legitimate.159Vengeance 
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may be primitive, but it is still the conceptual core of justice.160People naturally 
approve of the quest for and achievement of revenge.  Most typical, decent, 
mentally healthy people have a kind of commonsense approval of some righteous 
hatred and revenge,161even subscribing to the view that truly ‘… one must forgive 
one’s enemies - but not before they have been hanged.’162Others think that being 
in an age of enlightenment and living in accordance with humanitarian principles, 
punishment is a regression to a past we have discarded and that is best to forget.  
They argue that punishment conflicts with these humanitarian principles and feel 
unease about the practice.163They are seeking new ways of going beyond 
traditional penal theory, by attempting to convert punishment in a process of 
amicable and universal restoration of the harm caused by the criminal act between 
offender and victim.164However, this perceived metamorphosis is not universally 
shared. Many are outraged, and driven by the desire for revenge for any injury 
suffered, real or fancied, and insist that criminals must suffer for their wrongs and 
be hurt the same way they harmed the victim.165Punishment, for them, is so deeply 
rooted as a societal requisite in a fundamentally violent166and 
bellicose167humankind, that they demand justification for its absence,168stressing, 
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at the same time, that there is nothing shameful for being revengeful in specific 
cases, thus underlying the need for solidarity within the group.169Others, see legal 
punishment as a morality play170heeding Nietzsche’s classical ‘Pharisees warning’: 
‘Mistrust all in whom the impulse to punish is powerful…Mistrust all who talk 
much of their justice! Verily, their souls lack more than honey. And when they call 
themselves the good and the just, do not forget that they would be Pharisees, if 
only they had worldly power.’171Some, realising the cruelty of sanctions,172but 
submissive to their necessity, seek more humane, parsimonious and merciful 
means of punishment.173Others, exasperated by those who overprotect the 
criminals, look for even stricter penalties.174Some others, conceivably convinced 
that harming another human being could never be just or beneficial in any way, try 
to persuade for the abolition of the practice.175Along similar lines, to others, 
punishment reflects a crisis of law and order, a crisis of legitimacy. Punishment, 
they say, is pure power with no authority, and it is the authority we lack not the 
power.176Punishment is not merely symptomatic of, but a reaction to, the 
aforementioned crisis. Marxists for example, argue that the state constructs threats 
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in order to legitimise an exercise of power177that in reality serves only to maintain 
existing unjust property relations.178Others support that punishment is an 
instrument of control by the governing class, but with a more visible role in 
safeguarding security and order for the community, hence fulfilling a political 
function, that is, an integral strand in the wide and complex tapestry of modern 
society.179Still, others state that in the political world where one sees crime 
through an amoral prism, those who wish to see a more humane criminal justice 
system must come to the debate with insights of moral philosophy. Mercy, they 
claim, carefully used to respect the retributive instincts of the electorate, will 
permit legislators to move away from long prison sentences to those that recapture 
a semblance of humaneness.180 
 
4.3 The Need for Punishment Justification 
The paradoxical state of affairs in the field of punishment181described 
above, requires a very strong justification if it is to escape the criticism of 
inconsistency, for instance, by demonstrating that the positive outcome of the 
practice outweighs its negative consequences.182Preceding the decision on the 
mode and extent of the penalty there must be a rationalisation and justificatory 
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basis of the punishment,183since (as already noted), the infliction of something to 
which a person objects is prima facie wrongful and morally problematic,184unless 
morally defended.185Even the very threat of legal punishment requires a 
justification because it constitutes a special form of suffering, often very acute, on 
those who, by the fear of punishment, frustrate their desires. As Duff thinks, and 
not unreasonably, a system of criminal law which aims to serve the common good, 
and which is to respect the autonomy of its citizens as forming an essential part of 
that good, can still be justified in imposing punishments on criminals, even though 
punishments involve hard treatment. If such punishments aim to persuade the 
criminal to respect his crime, and to accept his punishment as a penance, they can 
still respect their autonomy; they can be an appropriate way of pursuing the proper 
aims of the law.186Subsequent to a justification of the general practice of pun-
ishment, one needs to have consistent ideas on whom to punish and how to 
punish.187These issues form component parts of the philosophy and theory of 
punishment, and in fact, at a very general level, the philosophical discussion in the 
area of punishment is usually confined to the rationalisation of sanctions, while 
legal analysis focuses, primarily, on practical sentencing issues. It is a relatively 
precise observation for one to make that the system itself is often more 
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preoccupied with vindictiveness than mercy,188although it is equally precise to 
assert, that historically,189as long as people have been thinking about 
punishment,190they have also been thinking about its reduction, mitigation, and 
mercy.191This is true not only of the common law world,192but also of the Far 
East,193and other jurisdictions.194This view has not remained within the narrow 
parameters of strict legal thinking, but extended through the more expressive and 
aesthetic field of literature too, thus helping people communicating their stance 
and emotions in a more unrestrained manner.195To this long lasting debate on the 
purposes and justification of punishment, there is simply no end. It is repetitive, 
and feeding itself from antitheses, clash, and an alluring diathesis for novelty on 
the part of some of its thinkers. As the thesis indicates, the Cypriot judges appear 
to abstain from this fusion. However, in order to have a proper perspective of the 
relationship between the theory and application of sentencing, and accordingly, 
between mercying and justice, it is important to view matters through the wider 
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spectrum of the interrelationship between punishment theory and sentencing 
practice. Only then might it be possible to understand and appreciate the chasm 
between them. 
 
4.4The Interrelationship between Punishment Theory and Sentencing 
Practice 
 
Despite their logical interdependence, sentencing and punishment have 
evolved with minimal consideration of each other’s fundamental features causing 
as a result, inconsequence between the theory and practice of legal 
punishment.196Sentencing is the study of the link between unlawful activity and 
state-imposed punishment, an instrument for achieving the objectives of society, 
and the cutting edge of the judicial process.197It is the extended arm of punishment 
in a more pragmatic and perceptible dimension. It is the function of the courts, 
whereas the actual administration of the punishment is the responsibility of the 
correction services, prison administrations and other agencies.  It is the most 
delicate198of all judicial tasks, and an utmost critical part of the criminal trial for all 
the parties involved.199It is, possibly, the most public facet of the criminal justice 
process;200the visible pinnacle of criminal justice decision-making,201and the stage 
where the state had aimed to reach after a long trial, and the one that the defendant 
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strived to avoid all along.202It is the phase where the defendant, by pleading guilty, 
as is usually the case,203is ready and willing to accept his dues, the point where the 
state acts in its most coercive and intrusive manner,204and where the judge will 
determine how much the offender must suffer for his offence with the potential 
sufferance including deprivation of liberty.205The sentencing decision results from 
a process of gathering and interpreting information about the offence and the 
offender, with the sentencing judge evaluating the harm done by the crime and 
painting a portrait of the offender.206It is far from a mechanical process (although 
oftentimes it may appear to be so).  It presupposes a high level of human cognitive 
abilities in understanding and interpreting, as well as applying, theoretical 
considerations to specific cases and undoubtedly, being an example of human 
behaviour involving decision-making, is prone to error. History teaches that there 
are no perfect solutions to problems; and that, even if we cannot take comfort in 
the hope that God will ultimately put everything right, at least we can be humble 
enough to admit that some things, like erring, even if they concern human actions 
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and choices, are simply, not within human control.207Sentencing has also been 
characterised as the most controversial and politically sensitive aspect of the 
criminal law,208and at the same time, the least principled and coherent body of 
law,209let alone an exact science.  In fact, some sentencers (not the Cypriot) call 
it210and regard it as an art rather than a science,211with Lady Wootton once 
likening the sentencer to a small boy adding up his sums but with no one to correct 
his answers.212 
 
4.5 Judicial Discretion in Sentencing and the Doctrine of Separation of 
Powers 
 
The judicial way of thinking would be of insignificant concern if judges 
simply applied clear rules of law formed by legislators, administrative agencies, 
the framers of constitutions, and other extrajudicial sources, to facts that judges 
determined in an unbiased manner.  Then judges would be well on the road to 
being superseded by digitalised computer programmes or sentencing vending 
machines. But even legal thinkers who believe passionately that judges should be 
strictly rule appliers and unbiased fact finders do not suppose that, that is how all 
or most judges (including Cypriot judges), behave at all times. Indeed, as it will be 
shown, Cypriot judges do have and exercise considerable discretion in sentencing 
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in a legal system staunchly functioning on the constitutional grounds of the 
separation of powers. 
 
4.6 The Doctrine of Separation of Powers 
One ambition of the Enlightenment thinkers was to rationalise and 
systematise the processes of governance.  Montesquieu argued for the separation 
of powers into legislative, executive, and judicial functions, without which there is 
no liberty.213The doctrine of separation of powers refers to the decisional 
independence and decisional authority of the judicial branch, that is, the ability of 
the courts to interpret and apply, rather than create, substantive legal principles in 
the specific context of an individual adjudication; free from control or interference 
by the purely political branches.214This doctrine is most significant both 
intellectually and in terms of its influence upon institutional structures.215The 
legislature, most responsive to the people, should have sole authority to enact laws, 
while the judges would exercise neither legislative nor executive power. On this 
view, judges are, what Montesquieu called, the mere mouthpieces of the law.216As 
Lord Justice Wright put it, judges proceed ‘from case to case, like the ancient 
Mediterranean mariners, hugging the coast from point to point avoiding the 
dangers of the open sea of system or science.’217Separation of powers is a complex 
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concept that operates on several different levels.  There is a distinction, for 
example, between its application to the primary powers of government and policy-
making process.218However, it appears that this conception of the judicial function 
relates primarily to the finding of facts during adjudication, and not sentencing, 
with Montesquieu underlining that: ‘…in England… the jury decides whether the 
accused is guilty or not…and, if he is declared guilty, the judge pronounces the 
penalty imposed by law for this deed; and he needs only his eyes for that.’219  
 
4.7 The Controversy of Judicial Discretion 
Many of the controversies concerning sentencing appear to centre on the 
distinct but related questions of the necessity, extent, and administration of judicial 
discretion. Some object to it on the ground that the legislature and not the judiciary 
should decide issues involving moral judgments.220This intense aversion to 
discretion probably derives from a widely shared mistrust of the ability of others to 
make decisions for us where the result is not predetermined but depends on the 
exercise of judgment.221Certainly, rules assist in the promotion of order.  They 
contribute to the elimination of subjectivity and ensure to some degree, stability, 
predictability, and equality of treatment. They also assist in the protection of the 
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judiciary against charges of misjudgement and bias,222and other potentially 
unforeseeable situations.223Some retributivists (for whom there follows an analysis 
in Chapter 5, together with utilitarians) hold that there is a just amount of 
punishment simply by virtue of the act committed by the offender, so that there is 
no point taking into account other features of him in determining his sentence. 
Conversely, utilitarians argue that there are instances where, for the sake of public 
interest, it is necessary to individualise sentencing so that the sentencer could give 
either an extended or a more lenient sentence according to the circumstances and 
the utility involved.224For retributivists, this is unacceptable and inconsistent with 
the practice of punishment, because through the imposition of extended sentences, 
offenders receive additional punishment for something they did not do whereas, by 
a more lenient sentence, they get a less than a deserved punishment.225However, 
the question of whether there should be discretion or whether utilitarian 
considerations should weigh up in the determination of sentence is separate from 
the question of the commensurability of punishment.226  
Politicians, many of which are actively involved in the formation of 
legislation, oftentimes blame the judiciary for allegedly failing to apply the law 
correctly and grasping the true essence of the philosophy behind the ‘legislative 
wisdom,’ and this is not uncommon in Cyprus either.  Some claim that our 
democratic theories of political legitimacy have very little to say about judicial 
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behaviour, and have almost no way of justifying judicial discretion even at the 
highest judicial level, that being true, to a greater or lesser extent, in all 
democracies.227The sentiment formed is that there is a repetitious and cyclical 
struggle for the domination and control of an apparently apolitical judiciary,228by 
the executive229and the legislature.230The cause might partly be the discretion with 
which the judiciary has been empowered with in order to execute its functions. 
Legal literature is satiated with criticisms of the judicial discretionary decision-
making on sentencing as opposed to the censuring of the discretionary powers of 
the two other branches of governance and particularly the legislature, which, after 
all, passes the laws judges, interpret and apply.231The main theme is that the 
control of discretion is not only necessary but also possible,232pointing to the 
results of empirical analyses which demonstrate, as they profess, that the 
sentencing process could be more finely honed or, at least, less blunt. They assert 
that judicial discretion is poorly structured and ill exercised to the extent that it 
results to unjustified sentencing disparities, thus becoming an anathema233to 
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fairness and consistency in punishment.234These authors believe that the only way 
one can regulate235this discretion, and so attain greater impact in this facet of 
societal control,236is pre-emptively and, exactly, on the allegation of disparity, by 
limiting and structuring the breadth of the power through legislative and other 
means,237aiming, inter alia, towards a more direct citizen review.238Hence, they 
say, the exercise of sentencing discretion would become more objective and 
quantitative and, accordingly, less intuitive and more deliberative.239Some scholars 
even label this, the ‘crux of the matter.’240Punishment and epieikeia, it appears, 
must not remain at the mercy of judges but be constructively controlled and tuned, 
and thus indirectly regulated by the legislature. On their part, judges are usually 
content to blame the imperfections of the criminal justice system on others, and 
most of all on the legislature.241They view this polemic with scepticism and 
discontent. Some of them become sarcastic and ironical (but not necessarily out of 
line), not hesitating even to characterise this criticism as horse manure,242 
reaffirming to some degree, the perceptual divergence of opinion over sentencing 
between the judiciary, the Executive, and the Legislature, and part of the 
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academe.243 Similar friction, but much more subdued, exists also in Cyprus where 
there are occasional attempts to limit judicial discretionary power. To these 
attempts, rare as they are, the Cypriot judiciary projects the fundamental 
constitutional safeguards of separation of powers to reassert its dominance in the 
judicial sphere, as the vestees of the judicial power,244and understandably so. A 
characteristic example is the case of Amira v The Republic,245where the Supreme 
Court, dealing with the constitutional prerogative of the President of the Republic 
to award pardons (charis) to convicted offenders, held that:   
We do not think that our powers as a Court of Appeal in dealing with an appeal 
against sentence and those of the President of the Republic under the said Article 
53.4 are always and inevitably mutually exclusive; and this is one of those cases in 
which either our powers may be resorted to or those of the President of the 
Republic might be exercised. We are of the view that even though the crimes which 
were committed by the appellant are quite serious there is no justification at all in 
law or in justice and morality for saying that the appellant because of having been 
sentenced in respect of such crimes has to lose his eyesight by remaining in prison 
here whilst he can possibly save his eyesight by being treated without delay 
abroad by means of surgery which cannot be performed in Cyprus. We have 
decided to adopt the exceptional course of showing the Court's mercy to the 
appellant (and see, in this respect, too, Barhouch v. The Republic [1987] 2 C.L.R. 
245) by reducing his sentence so that he can be released immediately in order to 
be enabled to leave Cyprus and return to his country where his eye affliction may 
be treated in a manner not possible as yet in Cyprus. 
 
  There is an argument to be made that the ostensible elimination or rigid 
regulation of judicial discretion diminishes the role and authority of the judge, as it 
impoverishes the quality of justice and weakens public respect for legal 
institutions.246However, this does not mean that judicial discretion in sentencing is 
not, and should not be, subject to a number of constraints and influences, such as 
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statutory maxima, judicial precedent, sentencing directions from the Supreme 
Court, due reasoning of decisions, and appellate review, so as to minimise or 
eradicate the intrusion of irrelevant factors and thwart whimsicality. On the other 
hand, complete uniformity is not only unrealisable but (for some) also undesirable, 
as it can lead to the imposition of fixed sentences, regardless of the particular 
circumstances of the offender. If there are established agreed criteria for 
sentencing, one could hope in an equality of consideration, whereby in roughly 
similar situations, courts consider similar factors and have similar reasons for 
selecting particular forms of sentence. According to some scholars,247judges rarely 
acknowledge the risks of irrelevant influences that accompany unstructured or 
poorly monitored discretion.248Whether this position holds true for Cypriot judges 
is an issue explored in the thesis. Nonetheless, according to another perspective in 
no jurisdiction of the member states of the Council of Europe, such factors as the 
judge’s personality or idiosyncrasies, external pressure of popular sentiment, or 
pure chance, are or should be relevant for deciding a sentence.249Parenthetically, 
this of course, one might consider as relevant to forming and decoding the 
personality of the academics themselves and for that reason, the rationality and 
intentions behind their own sentencing analyses and motives. In spite of this, the 
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Supreme Court recognises judicial idiosyncrasy as a variable factor in Cypriot 
sentencing.250The judges on the other hand, tend to argue strongly against 
restriction of their discretion.251As it will be shown later on in the study, Cypriot 
judges insist that the preservation of wide judicial discretion is necessary, and that 
individual justice is more important than some abstract notion of systemic fairness. 
In Australia, for example, the New South Wales Law Reform Commission has 
rejected any changes that would constrain the exercise of discretion by codification 
of common law principles, creation of sanction hierarchies or specification of 
tariffs for each offence.252Scholars have interpreted the judicial firmness for wide 
judicial discretion as ‘insistence on unfettered judicial sentencing power.’253This 
assertion is sweeping. The fact that wide judicial discretion could theoretically be 
unfettered (or the reverse), neither does, nor calls, for an inelastic cause-and-effect 
hypothesis. In any case, two explanations seem to prevail in support of the 
allegation. The first stems from the rehabilitative ideal with judges seen as quasi 
healers who fit their treatment to the offender.254The second is that judges do not 
wish to part with sentencing discretion because that would diminish their power. 
Those who oppose, question the absence of similar judicial concerns in relation to 
the development of standards in other areas of the law. The discretionary approach 
is better understood as a judicial aspiration conveyed in the form of a ritualistic 
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expression of the imposed sentence rather than one in which penal purposes serve 
as principles designed to provide rational support and guidance for the choice of 
sanction. Depending on the case, the sentencer can thus express the desired 
purpose of sentence. From this standpoint, one can comprehend why is that every 
case is different and all sentencing aims relevant, notwithstanding their potential 
for leading to a conflicting result. The difficulty with this approach is that the 
infringement of the offender’s liberties demands a justification going beyond the 
expression of supposed community aspirations.255This is to show the extent of the 
divergence. 
 Inconsistencies in sentencing are expectantly prevalent in sentencing 
systems because they are human systems involving both large numbers of cases 
and judges. As long as there are human beings there will be variations in sentence; 
no two minds think exactly alike. The appointment of judges rests on the 
assumption that they are people with a sense of responsibility who are likely to 
discharge their difficult duties with care and fairness. They are inevitably bound to 
differ in their views about a case.256There are differences in the input to sentences 
as well as divergence in the way they perceive and weigh particular kinds of case 
information, and justify their decision about the disposition of the offender.257Not 
surprisingly therefore, inconsistencies in sentencing (presumably serious and 
unjustifiable), have been the cause of concern, attracting researchers’ interest for 
decades.  
                                                
255A Ashworth and A Von Hirsch, ‘Recognising Elephants: The Problem of the Custody 
Threshold’ [1997] Crim L R 187. 
256H Cecil, The English Judge (Arrow Books, London 1972) 148. 
257James, Lord Justice, ‘A Judicial Note on the Control of Discretion in the Administration of 
Criminal Justice’ in R Hood and R Sparks (eds), Key Issues in Criminology (n 224)154. 
 112 
One of the criticisms levelled against judicial discretion is that it often 
results in disparities,258a criticism with which the study will not be concerned with 
in relation to Cyprus, but only identify it as a possible consequence of discretion. 
The commonness of this view is reflected in the trend towards sentencing 
commissions, which are bodies, authorised by the legislature, to establish 
guidelines for judges to follow when sentencing. No such measure has ever been 
undertaken in Cyprus in relation to sentencing. Sentencing according to such 
guidelines is presumptive, since, if the judge parts from the guidelines, he must 
justify the departure. Discretion remains, but shifts partly to the 
Commission.259There can be little doubt that, like Beccaria in the 18th century, 
these guidelines sought to replace judicial discretion with an elaborate, less 
intuitive, and more mechanistic system for the administration of penal sanctions in 
the form of a self-contained penological calculus. What constitutes sentencing 
disparity might depend on the objective aim and the choice of sentencing 
rationale.260On a deterrent or incapacitative rationale, this might not be the cause 
for much concern, since what would matter is whether the sentencing policy on 
average intimidates potential offenders more efficiently, or restraints dangerous 
ones better. On a rationale emphasising proportionality, unexplained differences in 
sentence would be more problematic, but variations in the sentences for a given 
category of offence would be permissible – as not being disparities at all – where 
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they reflect differences in the harm or culpability of the conduct in the particular 
circumstances.   
The emphasis in reducing disparity resulting from the exercise of judicial 
discretion is somehow misplaced.261There are other participants in the criminal 
justice system with significant role in the determination of the sentence. 
Prosecutors have discretion as to what circumstances they mention in court as the 
factual basis of the sentence and as to whether they will mention the previous 
convictions of the offender and any other special characteristics that derive from 
these convictions, such as whether violence was used in the commission of the 
previous offence, whether there was compensation of the complainant, whether the 
stolen property was found, whether the offences were committed while on bail or 
while he was a fugitive, and innumerable other circumstances. Defence advocates, 
on the other hand, depending on their ability and expertise,262can indicate factors 
that distinguish or should distinguish the offender’s case from the similar cases of 
other offenders or, for that matter, bring it in line with other sentencing judgments 
that appear more favourable for the offender. In the case of an unrepresented 
offender, various reports, such as those prepared by the social services or other 
medical and psychiatric experts, acquire even more significance under the 
circumstances as they provide the court with important information, which the 
offender may not be capable of putting before the judge. Despite wide acceptance 
of the notion that sentencing disparities are rife, the empirical evidence is far from 
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persuasive, with the most common failing being that of not accounting adequately 
for the numerous factors that potentially affect sentencing decisions.263 
Unwarranted disparities impinge on the administration of justice in a 
multiplicity of ways. For example, they create the impression, that sentencing is a 
very subjective and personalised judicial function. Such phenomena might lead 
defence advocates on the lookout for lenient judges, and prosecutors for harsh and 
tough judges that will have no hesitation in imposing a sturdy sentence, given the 
circumstances of the case at hand. As a result, some suggest that the notion that the 
criminal justice system is fair and even is nothing but a myth.264There is evidence 
that unwarranted disparities also affect the correctional administration, as prisoners 
tend to compare sentences, and those who believe that have been the victims of 
judicial prejudice, often become aggressive inmates with a profound disrespect to 
the law and the justice system.265In addition, such sentencing inconsistencies may 
create hostility and resentment among the general population of offenders, which 
could be counterproductive in achieving penal aims whatever these may be.266  
According to the discretionary ethos of sentencing, each case is unique. All 
sentencing aims have relevance, and the sentencing judge, using his personal 
experience on the bench, should apply them to the particular facts of the case, 
using his intuition or common sense. What is notable about this perspective is not 
that it involves elements of discretion, for virtually any workable sentencing 
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scheme must have such elements, but rather, that sentencing should primarily be a 
matter for judicial discretion. There has never been a clear and authoritative 
doctrine on the respective responsibilities of the legislature and the judiciary on 
sentencing matters.267Undoubtedly, Parliament possesses constitutional authority 
to enact sentencing laws of general application, and in the United Kingdom (and 
arguably in Cyprus) has supremacy, subject only to higher obligations such as the 
European Convention on Human Rights. In the United States, there has been a 
constitutional challenge to the federal sentencing guidelines formulated by the 
country’s Sentencing Commission pursuant to the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984. 
The US Supreme Court rejected it by a majority of 8-1, ruling that the scope of 
judicial discretion with respect to the sentence is subject to congressional 
control.268Similarly, the High Court of Australia has held that it is no breach of the 
Constitution not to confide any discretion to the court as to the penalty.269If judges 
are considered to form part of the sentencing policy problem then they must be 
part of the solution, which can only result from the synergistic cooperation of the 
Executive, the Legislature, and the Judiciary. Ordinarily, judges decide cases by 
applying the law. However, at times the society’s sense of justice cannot readily be 
reduced to precise legal standards. In such circumstances, the legislature may 
merely announce a general standard and rely on judges to use their discretion to do 
justice on a case-by-case basis. When this occurs, the state’s policy, instead of 
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being defined by legislative mandate, actually emerges from the totality of judicial 
decisions.270 
As this study will demonstrate, the Cypriot sentencing system gives the 
sentencer a central and powerful role in the process, as that has diachronically 
been the case in the Commonwealth as well.271Because judicial discretion is a 
major part of this process, the views of sentencers on punishtecture and mercying, 
assume central importance, and can pose equally dilemmas for policy makers.  
 
4.8 Conclusions 
The present chapter examined the issue of punishment justification, the 
problem of judicial discretion and separation of powers, and the rationalisation of 
the practice of punishment through the prism of external and internal criticism, and 
the interrelationship between punishment theory and sentencing practice. The 
chapter (in concert with the succeeding chapters 5 and 6, which deal with the 
different perspectives relating to the justifications and goals of punishment and the 
role of mercy in criminal sentencing correspondingly), will mark even further the 
parameters within which the analysis on how Cypriot judges sentence, and mercy, 
will occur, and establish whether their subsequent decisions are actually reached 
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CHAPTER 5: THE THEORETICAL DEBATE ON LEGAL PUNISHMENT 
 
This chapter will focus on the theoretical debate (relevant for the purposes 
of the thesis) arising in relation to the key issues relating to the differentials of the 
general justification of the practice of legal punishment and the specific aims of 
sentencing within the realm of the competing philosophical theories. Naturally, 
and given that the present study deals with attitudes and decisions of judges in the 
Cypriot criminal justice system, the discussion of these theories will be limited to 
those that could have some practical relevance for the prescribed immanent 
analysis within the Cyprus sentencing system.  
 
5.1 The Distinction Between General Justification of Punishment and its 
Purposes 
 
The distinction between the general justification of the practice of legal 
punishment, and the specific aims of punishment is essential for a good 
understanding of the different philosophical and theoretical approaches on the 
issue of punishment. Another means to describe this distinction is to separate the 
purposes of sentencing from the purposes at sentencing.272While, in the different 
approaches, the general justification of the practice of punishment is always a 
normative matter, the purposes at sentencing can become the subject of analysis in 
a descriptive or prescriptive manner. Both types of purposes are continuously 
subjected to debate. As already underlined in Chapters 1 and 4, different 
philosophical theories of punishment offer different accounts of why we punish, 
whom to punish and what the objectives of punishment should be. For the 
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purposes of the present study there shall be no need to take a stance on which 
theory prevails or should prevail as the more politically and morally correct. 
Theories of punishment are, after all, philosophical attempts to find rational moral 
justifications for what we in fact do with criminal wrongdoers, and for the proper 
limitations that should be observed in the way we deal with them.273Although we 
do not expect judges and other officials involved in everyday practice to justify all 
their decisions in these terms, philosophical theories of punishment provide 
rationalisations for the practice of punishment in most discussions on the subject. 
We expect (or should expect) normative accounts of punishment to form the basis 
of a systematic and consistent sanctioning practice, constituting something more 
than a mere ‘…symbolic function in the cultural debate about punishment…’274as 
Tata appears to assert in a rather sweeping manner, and instead, setting a critical 
standard against which, one could consistently measure and scrutinise the practice 
of punishment. It may though be inexpedient to anticipate an explicit and unified 
philosophical theory to govern both the justification of punishment and the aims at 
sentencing for all people involved in every case. In practice, elements of different 
philosophies may be implicitly combined both at the level of purposes of 
sentencing (general justification), and of the purposes at sentencing (aims). The 
exact form of such combinations may draw from eclectic considerations depending 
on specific characteristics of the offence, the offender, and the sentencing judge. 
Because of such a gap between theory and practice, the descriptive value of any 
single philosophical theory of punishment for the justice system as a whole may be 
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limited. Yet, they can play an important role in the analysis of specific decisions 
and should continue to play the role of critical standard. Theories can (and should) 
bind the practice of punishment to a certain order and regularity.275Theory and 
social reality of punishment systems should be interrelated. However, one must be 
able to escape the narrowness of philosophical critiques of punishment that often 
derive from the social realities of sentencing systems, and have penological 
approaches and objectives that tend to focus on the effectiveness of various types 
of sentence, depending of course on their stated aim.276To isolate sentencing in 
laboratory conditions is likely to produce inadequate theories.277Upon sociological 
reflection, abstract philosophical debates about sentencing do have their place but 
with little impact on sentencing policy and practice, particularly if detached from 
the prevailing social conditions at any given moment.278Each of these perspectives 
could be more valuable when connected with the broader concept of punishment 
as a complex social institution serving conflicting objectives.279Otherwise, one 
might end up (like Nygaard J of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third 
Circuit), nihilistically (and with a quasi realist inclination), arguing that the 
difficulties faced by the criminal justice system to ameliorate the pains crimes 
cause, and to control it, categorise it as a non-system which must be rejected, 
rethought, and restructured.280We should think of our practices of holding 
responsible our own understandings of what it means to be responsible and the 
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needs we have in constructing practices and institutions of justice together.281It is 
therefore necessary, as a next step, to examine the role of punishment theories in 
the sentencing process.  One needs to foster an understanding of earlier theories, 
and particularly those of retributivism and utilitarianism, for reasons already 
explained in Chapter 1, as many of their features linger multifariously on the more 
synchronous. The tribute to these immanent theories is essential as it gives some 
direction to the pursuit of understanding (through this spectrum of analysis), 
sentencing practice and the judicial decisions flowing therefrom, along with their 
relation to punishtecture and mercying. 
 
5.2 Retributivism and Utilitarianism282  
Both retributivist and utilitarian theories have a long history. Retributivism 
is strongly associated with the German Idealist tradition,283particularly with the 
works of Kant and Hegel. The rival tradition of utilitarianism encompasses the 
justifications of deterrence, social protection or incapacitation and rehabilitation 
and is chiefly associated with Bentham and Beccaria. The taxonomy of these 
theories as groups or categories of philosophical theories derives from the fact that 
both terms represent an entire breadth of refinements and different directions but 
still fit under the general header of either label. In the descriptions of retributivism 
and utilitarianism given below, due attention is paid to such differentiations, 
although the focus will remain on the most important premises of these accounts of 
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legal punishment. Elements from both retributivism and utilitarianism are 
sometimes combined or mixed, and seen not so much as reconcilable, but as 
unobviously closely conceptually connected, offering an alternative theoretical 
approach to the two core theories and their various versions by those who 
subscribe to the need of moral justification of punishment and the consequent 
casing of sentencing judgments in philosophical dogmatism.284 
 
5.2.1 Retributivism 
Many theories of punishment can be classified as retributive.285Although 
similar in substantive respects as to the justification for punishment, they provide 
different accounts of why criminals deserve to suffer.286 
 
5.2.2 The Similarities (Not Without Distinctions) 
There are three essential similarities between retributivist theories.287The 
first similarity is the premise that only the blameworthy deserve punishment, and 
that desert is the sole justification for punishment. Those who commit crimes 
deserve punishment for the same reason that those who commit evil wrongs 
deserve to pay damages. We are justified in punishing because and only because 
the offender deserves it. Moral culpability desert is in such a view a necessary and 
sufficient condition of liability to punitive reasons.288Those of course who try to 
combine utilitarianism with retributivism must deny that desert is both necessary 
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and sufficient, in order to allow the operation of utility.289This has been criticised 
as not justifying the imposition of punishment, but rather as acting as a constraint 
on the circumstances of penalty infliction, not even purporting to justifying the 
link between crime and punishment.290 
 The second similarity is the proportionality thesis,291which amounts to the 
claim that the punishment must be equivalent to the level of wrongdoing. 
Sentences must be proportionate in their severity to the gravity of the offender’s 
conduct. In such a system, only those convicted of serious felonies must face 
imprisonment because of their severity. For less serious crimes, we must resort to 
penalties less severe than imprisonment.292This assertion is criticised on two 
grounds. Firstly, that it is not purely retributivist as it is a virtue endorsed by some 
utilitarians as far back as Bentham293and, secondly, it does no more to legitimise 
the existence of penal sanctions.294  
The third similarity is the claim that punishing offenders is inherently just. 
We must not inflict it as a means of pursuing some other aim.295Kant and Hegel 
make the additional claim that punishment of wrongdoers is not only just, but 
obligatory as well. Some, however, disapprove of this categorical imperative as 
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pure revenge296that is, ‘an enigmatic emotion of as yet unclear 
function.’297However, it seems that even if punishment is intrinsically good, there 
is still no moral duty to bring about such a state of affairs.298Retributivists assert 
that punishment is justified because it is inherently good to sanction offenders. 
This principle seems to accord with the deep intuitions of some analysts regarding 
justice,299whereas for others this justification is so self-evident that it does not 
require further substantiation,300or defence of its rightness and morality.301 
The popularly accepted belief that punishment for its own sake does no 
good is nothing but a reiteration of the consequentialist idea that only further good 
consequences achieved by punishment could possibly justify the practice. It is 
simply not the case that justification always requires the showing of further good 
consequences. Retributivism purports to be a theory of justice, and as such, claims 
that punishing the guilty achieves something good, namely justice. Therefore, 
reference to any other good consequences is irrelevant. One cannot defeat the 
central retributivist claim that we achieve justice by punishing the guilty simply by 
assuming that it is false. We certainly seem confident both that it is true and that 
we can know that it is true and that we should not punish the morally innocent 
because they do not deserve it. Based on this premise, some question why it should 
be different when we use the presence of desert as a reason to punish since if we 
can know when someone does not deserve punishment, that presupposes 
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knowledge that someone does in fact deserve punishment.302From this perspective, 
Karl Menninger’s thesis303that it does not advance a solution to use the word 
justice, because it is a subjective emotional word and a vague and distorted 
concept in its application so as to lead to injustice, cannot stand, unless one knows 
injustice when he sees it, even if injustice is a useless concept. Hence, neither 
metaphysical scepticism nor epistemological modesty can viably prohibit the use 
of moral desert as a reason not to punish. To this perception, one can detect a 
certain weakness, as human sentiment is neither universal nor inelastic. That a 
person has broken the law does not compel any particular moral deduction. As 
Bagaric rightly observes,304sometimes, we are simply indifferent that lawbreakers 
go unpunished. However, one can propose that the utilitarian human sentiment 
critique presupposes that intrinsic retributivists share the premise of these 
sentiments. In fact, that should not be the case, as the desire or obligation for 
punishment exists in all cases of proved criminal wrongdoing. There is a stronger 
criticism, in that the pervasive desire to punish simply explains the practice 
without justifying it per se.  
Even if wrongdoing triggers automatically the innate human impulse for 
punishment of the culprit (some say of our moral thinking),305it does not follow 
that the theory justifies punishment any more than an inborn sense of 
overprotection justifies locking up our children so that they are sheltered from 
                                                
302M Moore, ‘The Moral Worth of Retribution’ in A V Hirsch, A Ashworth, and J Roberts (eds), 
Principled Sentencing: Readings on Theory and Policy (3rd edn Hart Publishing, Oxford 2009) 110, 
113. 
303Menninger, The Crime of Punishment (n 170) 10. 
304Bagaric, Punishment and Sentencing (n 196) 56 - 57. 
305Moore, ‘The Moral Worth of Retribution’ (n 302) 110. 
 125 
what we perceive as external dangers.306The infliction of punishment, even when 
no positive consequences will derive from it, appears irrational to 
utilitarians.307They argue that it appears wrong to impose a harsher penalty if one 
can reform the offender through a lesser sanction. Retributive justice (they 
declare), can be a very good thing, but the saving of souls is a much better 
thing.308Because retributive theories are, as such, theories of just punishment rather 
than, as utilitarian theories are, of efficient punishment, they presuppose a 
relatively just system,309but still, even this classification, is disputable depending, 
largely, on one’s retributivist or utilitarianist inclinations. The theory of retribution 
faces the difficulty of explaining whether deserved suffering is influenced by past, 
undeserved suffering. Desert must be determined not only based on culpability for 
the particular offender but also on the cumulative effect of his life suffering, 
weighted against his wrongs. Indeed, the social deprivations of the offender may 
be such that may lead to no punishment at all.310To this, retributivists argue that 
everybody has a story that hardly excuses what they have done.311The fact remains 
though, that offenders ought to get what they deserve within the confines of 
practicality and reasonableness.312  
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On the other hand, crimes, and particularly evil crimes, evoke passionate 
responses, but it must be the aim of a moral theory to locate the particular moral 
reaction within the whole.313This objection, however, may not be decisive as it 
looks to the quantum of punishment, not its justification. The premise of the theory 
is that wrongdoers deserve punishment. It does not proceed to provide for the 
severity of the sentence. Nor does it need to provide so directly. One can achieve 
this by invoking other principles and this is not necessarily a shortcoming.  
No general theory of punishment appears to provide clear-cut answers to 
every aspect of punishment. Subordinate principles compatible with the primary 
claim of the theory, may provide for the required clarifications. Such an 
encompassing view of the offender’s life is unattainable let alone that, from one 
perspective, this aspect is already included in the sanction. The problem of the 
retributivist theory is that it cannot justify the link between punishment and 
wrongdoing, although there have been numerous attempts to that direction 
according of course to the rival utilitarians.314 
 
5.2.3 The Distinctions (Not Without Similarities) 
Retributivists provide different accounts on why criminals deserve to 
suffer. Often the answers to these accounts are interpretable on utilitarian terms, 
thereby rendering some retributivists susceptible to the allegation of being 
‘disguised utilitarians.’315Indeed, ‘sometimes the differences among retributivists 
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seem greater than the differences between some utilitarians and some 
retributivists.’316 
 
5.2.4 Negative and Positive Retributivism 
A significant first distinction is that between negative and positive retribu-
tivism. Two rules define negative retributivism. First, that only the guilty can be 
punished, and second that the punishment of the guilty must only be to the extent 
of their desert. The principle laid out by these two rules is what Hart calls 
‘retribution in distribution.’ Relying on this negative principle of retributivism 
means that punishment is not a necessary response to crime, but rather it is 
permissible only to the extent regulated by the two rules. The principle is a 
negative principle because its purpose is to restrict (limit) punitive action. The fact 
that theories of this kind are retributive lies in their adherence to proportionality in 
punishment. An offender who has been found guilty may not be punished more 
severely (as one might wish, for instance, with instrumental aims in mind) than the 
seriousness of the offence and his culpability permit. Nor may one legally punish 
an innocent person to deter potential offenders. For retribution in distribution, the 
general justifying aim of punishment need not even be retributive.317It is, 
therefore, not surprising that the principles of negative retributivism are often 
found in combination with utilitarian elements, for instance as a limiting (negative) 
principle in consequentialist accounts of punishment.  
Positive retributivism attempts to offer a more complete account of 
punishment than negative retributivism, which can only operate in combination 
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with a general justification (utilitarian or retributivist).  The positive retributivist 
holds that justice demands the meting out of punishment; punishment of offenders 
is required by certain principles of justice. In the view of true positive 
retributivists, it is not only permissible to punish up to the limit indicated by the 
negative principle, it is even a duty to do so.318 
Kant gave the classical formulation of positive retributivism. However, he 
seemed more concerned with the ‘dangers’ of utilitarianism (in the form postulated 
by his contemporary Bentham), than with formulating a thorough and complete 
account of punishment. His retributive theory, therefore, is sketchy,319and open to 
multiple interpretations. Kant, like many positive retributivists after him (and long 
after Plato for that matter),320insists that humans are rational beings capable of 
moral understanding and should never be treated as a means to promote some 
future good, neither for themselves nor for society – no wonder Kant was never 
married,321thus having the privilege of testing his insistence about the rationality of 
human beings through the furnace of marital life (and this would have been 
equally applicable had he been a woman). Punishment, in Kant’s view, is a 
categorical imperative, a moral necessity without any reference to possible 
consequences (good or bad). A wrongdoer should be punished because he has 
done something morally reprehensible, because he has committed a crime and for 
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no other reason. In answer to the question of what kind and what amount of 
punishment should be inflicted, Kant refers to talionic measures (he equates his 
law of retribution to lex talionis).322The question of why wrongdoers deserve 
punishment instead of some other (non-punitive) reaction to their actions remains 
unanswered by Kant. For the positive retributivist, the moral necessity to punish 
must lie in the retributive general justification for the practice.  
 
5.2.5 The Intuitionist Approach 
There is one very straightforward, but not very enlightening, retributive 
general justification for the practice of punishment that relies on intuition. The 
argument is simply that a guilty person should be punished because he deserves it. 
Drawing on our emotions of love and hatred, we feel that he deserves it. Although 
such an argument appeals to our sense of justice and emotions of revenge, which 
the intuitionist retributivist holds we all share,323it does not provide a clear 
theoretical argument as to why punishment (the infliction of suffering) is the 
appropriate and required response to crime. If we are to distinguish retribution 
from mere revenge, we need objective criteria to justify it. Relying on intuition in 
order to justify the practice of punishment is reductionist oriented, if not a fallacy, 
since the question that was supposed to be answered is why a person deserves 
punishment.324One cannot answer satisfactorily by asserting: ‘Because we feel that 
it is deserved’. Surely, we can go further and pose the question of where we get 
this intuition. Where lays the origin of this feeling that punishment is deserved? 
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Could it be that it is really a learned reaction to offending rather than an inborn 
intuition?325The intuitionist should then be able to show that the feeling of 
deservedness and the inclination to punish is a ‘natural’ feeling with which we are 
born. Although few philosophers explicate purely intuitionist justifications, any 
moral justification of punishment that presupposes the existence of objective moral 
values implicitly contains intuitionist elements that make it prone to discussion. 
The choice, which is usually unconscious, between intuitive and conscious 
problem solving involves a trade-off between the amount of available knowledge, 
including long-buried knowledge that nonetheless can be recovered as intuition, 
and the precision with which whatever knowledge one has can be applied to 
solving the problem. Because the unconscious mind has greater capacity than the 
conscious mind, the knowledge accessible to intuition is likely to be vast. The 
alternative to drawing on that knowledge by means of intuition is to apply explicit, 
systematic reasoning to one’s smaller stock of conscious knowledge. That is often 
the inferior choice, even when time is not pressing. When a decision depends on 
several factors, you may do better by using your intuition than by trying to 
evaluate consciously each fact separately and combining the evaluations to form a 
final standpoint. The costs of consciously processing the information may be so 
high that intuition will enable a more accurate as well as a speedier decision than 
analytical reasoning would. This often is true in the open area in law because what 
makes it open may be the number of factors that are relevant to making a decision. 
However, intuition is important in the disposition of routine cases as well. Judges 
gain experience in deciding on legalist grounds, the cases that can be decided on 
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those grounds, and that experience, enables them to decide more rapidly than a 
novice could, thereby economizing on information - processing costs,326and this, 
as indicated in Chapter 7.2.1, is idiomatic of some Cypriot judges. 
 
5.2.6 Retributivism and the Restoration of Social Balance 
Most positive retributivists, in one way or another, refer to a balance in 
society that can be disturbed by the act of crime. Punishment, in their view, is the 
required response to offset the disturbed balance. The act of punishment is purely 
retrospective and has an inherent moral value. 
One classical type of balance-restoration stems from Hegel who believed 
that punishment should be meted out in order to cancel the ‘negation of right’ 
brought about by a crime to return to a previous state of affairs.327Punishment, in 
other words, is to annul a crime. Although annulment may have a ritual function, 
as Walker points out, the fact that punishment has been meted out is, in the eyes of 
the victims, not equivalent to the crime not having been committed: ‘Victims can 
be compensated, but not unraped or unmurdered.’328Hegel, however, was more 
concerned with abstract moral notions of right rather than with concrete 
compensation to victims in specific cases. An omission in Hegel’s account is that 
he leaves largely unanswered the question of how, and how much to punish. 
However, while pointing to the absurdity of talionic measures, he indicates that 
punishment in some way must be equivalent to the qualitative and quantitative 
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characteristics of the crime. Furthermore, as a true positive retributivist, Hegel 
insists (like Kant), that the treatment of humans must not turn into the means to an 
(utilitarian) end.  
Another influential positive retributivist approach views punishment as a 
method to restore the balance of benefits and burdens in society; our system of 
rules (i.e., criminal law), the argument goes, supplies us with benefits by 
protecting us from harmful actions such as violence and deception. It defines a 
sphere for each person ‘which is immune from interference by others.’329In order 
to enjoy these benefits, everyone must exercise the burden of self-restraint over 
inclinations that would interfere with that sphere of immunity. Nozick for 
instance, goes beyond the benefits-and-burdens approach in his retributive account 
of punishment, advocating that a precondition for the infliction of a deserved 
penalty on an offender is the removal or counterbalancing of his unfairly gained 
advantage.330In the mid-seventies, Andrew Von Hirsch endorsed this theory as 
partially an account of punishment. At the time, however, he saw one pitfall in the 
approach. Imposing a deprivation on the offender in order to redistribute the 
benefits and burdens does not explain why an offender deserves punishment 
‘instead of being made to suffer another kind of deprivation that connotes no 
special moral stigma.’331Von Hirsch escaped the pitfall by contending that because 
the offender has done wrong, he deserves blame for his conduct. While depriving 
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the offender of his unfairly gained advantage, the implicit element of reprobation 
in punishment expresses the deserved blame.332 
 
5.2.7 Character Retributivism and Choice Retributivism 
The more basic question for retributivists is the conceptual one, pertaining 
to the classification of the nature of the moral desert. Two leading contenders seem 
to emerge to this regard. The first, character retributivism, concentrates on an 
individual’s character. On this view, the primary object of our responsibility is our 
own character, and responsibility for wrongful action is derivative of this primary 
responsibility, our actions being proxies for the characters such action 
express.333The second, the choice conception of desert, holds that a person is 
responsible for the wrongs he freely chooses to commit, but not for wrongs he 
lacked the freedom to avoid doing, as an offender’s desert depends on his choice 
on his having chosen to act (and having acted) wrongfully.334Thus, determining 
‘whether an action expresses the agent’s character, requires longer, more complete 
narration of what sort of person, in general, he is; whereas to see whether an action 
is freely chosen by an agent seemingly requires a more limited enquiry into his 
capacities and opportunities at the moment of acting.’335The question of mercy 
depends on a considerable degree on whether one subscribes to choice or character 
retributivism, provided of course that he chooses sectarian theorising as the basis 
for his inquisition. For the character retributivist, an offender’s post-offence 
contact will have a direct and profound bearing on whether he is a good candidate 
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for mercy. That is, in taking the measure of a person, one will have to consider the 
whole life, including the full range of individual attributes and dispositions 
exhibited over the course of a lifetime.336   
 
5.2.8 Denunciation 
Denunciation is a secondary aspect of retributivism whereby the state, by 
inflicting the punishment, acts on behalf of society to denounce, disapprove, or 
censure the crime. The idea that punishment is a public denunciation of 
wrongdoing has a lengthy derivation. Kant espoused it by suggesting that a 
community abandoning a desert island would be obliged to execute the last 
murderer in its prison rather than merely leave him behind to a solitary life on the 
island to avoid being associated with the crime that he had committed.337The act of 
punishment expresses a moral distancing from the crime, the wrongfulness of 
which is underlined by the otherwise apparently vindictive execution. This 
denunciation addresses both the needs of victim and of society. It shows the victim 
that the harm he has suffered is both recognised and denounced, and to society that 
its rules are being affirmed and strengthened. The legitimacy of the rule is spelled 
out by the very fact that there is a response to the rule’s infringement. As a general 
rule, a severe punishment sends a forceful and unambiguous message condemning 
the conduct in question; a lenient punishment correspondingly sends a message 
that although the conduct is wrong, the wrong is not substantial. Accordingly, if 
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there is no punishment at all, then the message conveyed is that the rule does not 
matter to society and one can ignore it.  
Denunciation as a penal aim involves the imposition of sanctions that are 
of a nature and of sufficient degree of severity to express adequately the public’s 
abhorrence of the crime. For some academics, denunciation seeks to contribute to 
crime prevention by strengthening people’s disapproval of the crime and thereby 
promote social solidarity.338However, viewed from this perspective, denunciation 
is a hybrid of utilitarianism and retribution. It is utilitarian because the prospect of 
being publicly denounced serves as a deterrent. It is retributive because it promotes 
the idea that offenders deserve to be punished.339Of course, the conviction and 
punishment of an offender necessarily carries a moral and condemnatory message. 
A suspended sentence for instance is a prison term activated upon breach of its 
terms; therefore, the prison term is a declaratory statement of the inappropriateness 
of conduct.340  
Denunciation relates to the aim of retribution, as harsh sentences, while 
fully merited for certain crimes, also serve the purpose of symbolically expressing 
the indignation of the public, as a form of an exclamatory sentencing 
                                                
338See for example, H Jones and N Potter, ‘Deterrence, Retribution, Denunciation and the Death 
Penalty’ (1981) 49(2) UMKC L Rev 158. 
339J Dressler, Understanding Criminal Law (5th edn Matthew Bender Publishers, Albany, New 
York 2009) 17. 
340Bagaric claims that irrespective of which theory of punishment one adopts, suspended sentences 
should be abolished as a sentencing option, primarily because they do not constitute a recognisable 
form of punishment: See, M Bagaric, ‘Suspended Sentences and Preventive Sentences: Illusory 
Evils and Disproportionate Punishments’ (1999) 22 UNSW L J 535, 562-563. The author’s 
concerns could be said to be alleviated (at least semantically) by the ratio in AG v Phanieros [1996] 
2 CLR 303, 310,where the Supreme Court reiterated that a suspended sentence is not a new form of 
punishment but simply a method of executing a term of imprisonment. 
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function.341Denunciation and retribution differ, however, in that retribution 
demands the punishment of the offender whereas denunciation does not.342It is 
difficult to make strong claims about the effectiveness of denunciation. Research 
suggests that the imposed sentences cannot influence the moral attitudes of the 
public. They seem to have sufficient respect for the law to disapprove more 
strongly of an action when the legislature passes a law against it, but they do not 
have sufficient respect for the criminal justice system so that they value the 
severity of the inflicted punishment. Denunciation may not provide a general 
justification for punishment, but it may afford an acceptable principle of 
distribution of punishment, that is, a paragon of determining the severity of the 
punishment.  
A theory that resembles denunciation, but nonetheless contains also 
elements of rehabilitation and reintegrative shaming,343is the communicative 
theory of Antony Duff, which sees punishment as an attempt at moral dialogue 
with offenders to censure their actions hoping to secure their contrition.344 
 
5.3 Utilitarianism 
Utilitarianism is a forward looking or consequentialist theory that aims to 
justify punishment by its alleged future consequences. By utilitarianism, one 
                                                
341M Findlay, S Egger, and J Sutton (eds), Issues in Criminal Justice Administration (George Allen 
and Unwin, New South Wales 1983) 133. 
342Walker and Padfield, Sentencing Theory, Law and Practice (n 185) 115. 
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encouraging others to readmit them to society: J Braithwaite, Crime, Shame and Reintegration 
(CUP, Cambridge 1989) 88.  
344R A Duff, Punishment, Communication, and Community (OUP, Oxford 2003) 110.  
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signifies the approach that sees individuals as motivated by the pursuit of pleasure 
and avoidance of pain and uses this to devise social and penal policies to promote 
the greatest happiness of the greatest number. It derives its foundation on the 
intuition that a human being, because of his ability to experience pleasure and 
pain, will seek to maximise his pleasure and minimise his pain. It is a normative 
philosophy, so it defines an individual’s desire to maximise pleasure or happiness 
as a moral virtue. Within utilitarianism, as in the case of retributivism, there is no 
shortage of esoteric dissents, sub-divisions and categorisations. One can 
distinguish between many aspects of utilitarianism, such as act-utilitarianism or 
extreme utilitarianism, rule-utilitarianism or restricted utilitarianism, indirect 
utilitarianism, mild utilitarianism and so forth.345For the strict and rule utilitarian 
the individual is a means to society’s ends. Punishment, in this approach, attempts 
to prevent or reduce offending through deterrence, rehabilitation (reformation),346 
and incapacitation.347   
 
5.3.1 Deterrence (General and Specific) 
Deterrence and the other forward-looking objectives, endeavour to 
accomplish reduction and prevention of crime as an overall scope of the criminal 
                                                
345J J C Smart, ‘Extreme and Restricted Utilitarianism’ in P Foot (ed), Theories of Ethics (OUP, 
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346Some writers define the terms ‘rehabilitation’ and ‘reformation’ differently: see, for example, P 
Bean, Punishment: A Philosophical Inquiry (Martin Robertson, Oxford) 46. For present purposes 
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234. 
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justice system. The underlying idea of the theory is that punishment is necessary 
by reference to its crime-preventive consequences.348On this approach, the purpose 
of sentencing is either to deter or incapacitate the offender, displacing issues of 
desert to the outer limits of setting punishment scales.349These aims are part of a 
utilitarian framework on how the calculation of the utility of punishment compares 
with its disutility in order to justify and measure punishment on a cost-benefit 
analysis basis. Deterrence, and the other forward-looking objectives, endeavour 
towards reduction and prevention of crime as an overall scope of the criminal 
justice system. Penal institutions must combine both general and specific 
deterrence. In the utilitarian philosophy of Bentham, general deterrence has 
priority over specific deterrence. Even in modern debates, there is little reference 
to specific deterrence in the literature.350General deterrence sanctions may extend 
their influence over differing time periods. Long-term deterrence may come about 
through the perpetuation of fear of punishment type of contact. Medium-term 
deterrence may be associated with legislative attempts to influence social 
behaviour by increasing certain maximum penalties and then there are ‘exemplary 
sentences’ occasionally imposed in discretionary sentencing systems (though not 
in Cyprus),351on certain offenders in order to deter potential imitators. If conditions 
in prison are harsher than outside, that will constitute a specific and general 
                                                
348J Wilson, Thinking about Crime (Vintage Books, New York 1985) 85. 
349E Van den Haag, ‘Punishment as a Device for Controlling the Crime Rate’ (1985) 33 Rutgers L 
Rev 706. 
350As for example in, J Gibbs, Crime, Punishment and Deterrence (Elsevier Science Ltd, New 
York 1975) Ch 2. 
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deterrent factor.352Perceptual deterrence must be enhanced so that the public 
knows of the probability of punishment but it is debatable whether punishment has 
such or any deterrent effect.353Some question the methodology used in some 
studies to prove the deterrent effects of punishment.354The better view is that we 
must think that the inability to deter some people is only temporary.355By analogy, 
to prove the utility of medicine it is not necessary to prove that it always prevents 
death and cures all disease. It is enough that it prolongs life and diminishes or 
limits suffering. To justify punishment is not necessary to prove that it always 
prevents crime by its deterrent quality. It is enough to indicate that there would be 
more crime without the existence of any punishment.356The difficulties in proving 
deterrence and interpreting the evidence do not mean that they must lead to an 
abandonment of the approach. We cannot say that deterrence never works but 
rather that punishment may deter fewer offenders or future offenders than we 
like.357Or even, that deterrence is a necessary though not sufficient element in 
punishment, which combined with other approaches such as forgiveness, 
reconciliation, and societal acceptance of the offender following his punishment, 
could complete the cycle of an overall effective systemic treatment.358There can 
                                                
352To this regard, human rights case law demands that the conditions of imprisonment and any 
special circumstances of the offender are taken into account in assessing the severity of the 
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also be little doubt that the existence of a system of punishment has some general 
deterrent effect.359According to one view, to assert that deterrence does not work is 
tantamount to either denying the plainest facts of everyday life, or claiming that 
potential offenders are utterly different from the rest of us.360Retributivists 
counter-argue that it takes more to convince on the utility of deterrence than the 
application of common sense and obviousness of real life realities.361On the same 
premise, this position is not sufficient to weaken the effects of common sense and 
social reality for the sake of elaborative arguments. One could reasonably propose 
to that end that human observation and common sense are far safer in this respect 
than statistical correlations. 
 
5.3.2 Rehabilitation 
The aim of rehabilitation is to reduce the crime rate by reforming and 
rehabilitating the offender.362It promises a payoff to society in the form of 
transforming offenders into law-abiding productive citizens who no longer desire 
to victimise the public.363Proportionality is less important to this regard, as 
indeterminate sentences provide for treatment for as long as it is necessary to 
rehabilitate the offender.364An inherent normative weakness of this approach has 
always been the great difficulty in measuring the effectiveness of rehabilitative 
                                                
359Cavadino and Dignan, The Penal System (n 240) 38. 
360Wilson, Thinking about Crime (n 348) 121. 
361Ashworth, ‘Deterrence’ (n 347) 44. 
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measures.365The generalised and often cited wrapping up associated with the 
American Robert Martinson that ‘nothing works’ became widely accepted, not so 
much because it proved true, but more for the reason that the disappointment of 
high hopes invested in reform led to an overreaction against the rehabilitative 
ideal.366The latter declined in popularity in the 1970s and 1980s, being confronted 
with high degrees of recidivism.367It was in addition criticised on the basis that the 
means to achieve rehabilitation were vague,368and that the deterrence of the great 
majority of the population from serious crime is always the consideration of first 
importance, and not the rehabilitation or incapacitation of the much smaller 
number of persons convicted of criminal offences.369It was moreover criticised for 
failing to get to grips with the underlying social inequalities and problems that 
generate crime and for treating the individual without addressing social causes.370It 
appeared to deny individual responsibility for crime and to justify apparently 
spendthrift programmes.371  
The extreme form of the rehabilitation model sees the task of the criminal 
justice system as therapeutic for curing the delinquent individual rather than 
punishing if it will be unjust to punish if he is not responsible due to an illness for 
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example which precipitates offending.372This perception originates from the 
positivist Cesare Lombroso.373Positivists believe in the doctrine of determinism, 
that is, in the belief that human beings, including criminals, do not act from their 
own free will, but they do so because of forces beyond their control374(and this 
could finally explain the mystery of marriage and Kant’s choice not to succumb). 
Thus where Beccaria’s vision of human nature had been one of untrammelled free 
will, while Bentham had admitted that the responsibility of some humans is 
limited, positivism denies responsibility altogether. It follows that for the positivist 
retribution cannot serve as a justification for punishment. Positivism is also 
sceptical about deterrence due to the absence of supportive scientific evidence. 
Positivism rejects also the classicist concept of due process and the neo-classicist 
notion of proportionality. Due process is inappropriate due to the condition of the 
offender and the consequent futility of the legalistic process, whereas 
proportionality can be of the essence only if the treatment fits the offender and not 
the offence. This individualised treatment model favours, due to its nature, the 
indeterminate sentences.  
Positivism and the rehabilitative ideal associated with it have declined in 
influence due to the lack of evidence backing their theoretical foundation. In 
response to these critiques, some argue that rehabilitation has adapted. One of 
them is Hudson,375who advocates that in-prison rehabilitation can prevent re-
offending. Prison must be a positive rather than a negative experience for the 
                                                
372Easton and Piper, Sentencing and Punishment (n 282) 411. 
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offender. The new rehabilitationism376does not entail indeterminate sentencing, as 
rehabilitative progress is not the criterion for sentence length. In cases of low 
culpability, rehabilitation must be the prime objective and punishment kept to a 
minimum. If there is imprisonment, then it must not exceed the sentence 
pronounced. The right of the state to punish and the right of the offender to due 
punishment is best protected by rehabilitation being offered within a determinate 
sentence fixed by considerations of desert and dangerousness. The obligation of 
the state is to provide basic physical standards in the prison and rehabilitative 
facilities sufficient to ensure that the effects of incarceration do not damage the 
offender.  The aim is to reduce re-offending by improving the education and 
vocational qualifications of prisoners so they leave prison better prepared to re-
enter society, and indeed this appears to be the philosophy of the Cyprus Prison 
System, as discussed in Chapter 3.2.5.  The focus must be on sentence outcomes 
looking at what works for which type of offender.  Hence, prison funding must 
increase for behavioural programmes, practical skills courses and drug 
programmes.  The emphasis must be on justice rather than treatment, to protect the 
offender’s fair trial rights and from coercive treatment. From this perspective, 
rehabilitation still offers a constructive way for improving the criminal justice 
system.377It treats the individual as possessing rights and as capable of making 
                                                
376P Walton, ‘Big Science: Dystopia and Utopia – Establishment and New Criminology Revisited’ 
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choices, but also as having a positive right to appropriate treatment to prevent re-
offending.378  
 
5.3.3 Incapacitation / Social Protection 
Incapacitation means that the offender is prevented (usually physically), 
from re-offending by the punishment imposed, either temporarily or permanently, 
and aims to protect community.379Incapacitation can take the form of 
imprisonment or that of a disqualification, attendance or restraining judicial order. 
There are questions as to whether incapacitation is inherently unfair.  A person 
who receives an incapacitating sentence, even though he might have not re-
offended, is not presumptively innocent but has committed exactly the type of 
offence for which he is being detained, and future detention or control may be 
justified. Moore argues that predictive sentencing is compatible with desert theory 
because a dangerous person is more deserving of punishment if the criminal record 
indicates that he is a bad risk.380The general problem with incapacitation is that 
behavioural predictions about offenders have proven to be unreliable.381 
Unlike deterrence or rehabilitation, incapacitation does not seem to rest on 
a particular behavioural premise, but is still justifiable on utilitarian grounds. The 
aim is to maximise happiness and restrain dangerous offenders in order to protect 
the majority of society by removing harmful individuals. Incapacitation and 
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rehabilitation are not mutually exclusive concepts.  One can combine 
incapacitation with programmes intending to reform the individual, but one can 
also incapacitate while recognising that there is no prospect of reform.  In addition, 
as with deterrence, there is the problem of isolating the effects of incapacitation on 
the overall crime rate. On the utilitarian model, to sacrifice the individual from 
persistent and dangerous offenders is justified for the greater good of society.  
Incapacitation is an expensive penal policy,382and sometimes, in 
democratic regimes, citizens are indeed hesitant, or even unwilling, to spend 
resources in order to confer benefits on hated criminal offenders, particularly when 
politicians portray spending money in prison conditions as a status competition, in 
which a citizen must choose between the interests of prisoners and the interests of 
crime victims.383Offending can resume upon release so the method will not solve 
longer-term problems of crime. A shift towards the use of prisons as warehouses 
may mean reduced funding for costly treatment programmes in prison. The 
strategy of incapacitation seems to assume a finite pool of offenders, yet there is 
no reason why others will not fill the vacuum. Available research suggests that 
even substantial increase in the use of custody will achieve only a small cut in the 
criminal rate, as punishment is only one factor linked to criminality.384The impact 
of punishment on crime will be limited if only a small number of offenders come 
before the courts and receive a custodial sentence, which raises the question of 
whether it is better to invent resources in policing rather than punishment.385  
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In addition, as with deterrence, there is the problem of isolating the effects 
of incapacitation on the overall crime rate. There is an inherent tendency for 
incapacitation to be an expansionist policy. In case of mistakes in predicting high-
risk offenders, the public’s response may well be to demand broadening of the 
range of offenders and offences within the net. Governments may be reluctant to 
resist pressures for more incarceration and so be unable to abandon it as a policy. 
Through this spectrum, the tendency in recent years has been to concentrate on 
particular offenders and groups who are more prone to recidivism, to cut costs and 
ensure that limited expensive resources are allocated to those most likely to 
benefit.386One may see selective incapacitation as ethically flawed as it may mean 
that a risk prone offender receives a higher sentence than he deserves, and because 
it denies autonomy to the individual by presuming that he will re-offend, and 
punishes him for a choice not yet made.  
There have been doubts about predictive sentencing since the 
1970s.387Over-prediction is real and inherent in the approach. True positives are 
spotted (that is, persons correctly predicted to offend), but the overwhelming 
majority will be a false positive, that is, persons mistakenly predicted to offend. 
The false-positive argument does not in principle question the appropriateness of 
predictive sentencing. The issue becomes only one of accuracy; were one able to 
reduce the number of false positives, selective incapacitation will become 
unobjectionable.388The argument however, does not address the nature of 
prediction criteria. With sufficient accuracy, it will not matter whether these 
                                                
386Easton and Piper, Sentencing and Punishment (n 282) 133. 
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criteria rely on the current crimes, past offending or social factors and whether or 
not sentences indicate parity among offenders convicted for similar crimes. Desert 
works differently. The acceptability of sentencing criteria depends on whether and 
to what extent these rely on the gravity of the criminal contact in determining the 
severity of the penalty. Standards that rely on offence gravity will pass, even on 
poor predictors of recidivism. Moreover, those that rely chiefly on ulterior factors, 
like the offender’s social history or previous convictions, will infringe desert 
criteria even if they happen to predict recidivism as well. In the interest of liberty, 
non-convicted persons are harmless and thus need not fear losing their freedom on 
grounds of their supposed dangerousness. There is a presumption of harmlessness; 
those that fall outside this category renounce or forfeit that right and give society 
the right to interfere with their lives.389An offender has a right to release at the end 
of the normal term. The right to discharge is inviolable unless the release poses a 
vivid danger to other rights-holders. Seriousness of the contemplated injury, 
predictive frequency, immediacy, and certainty are the criteria. The latter is the 
most crucial by far, as it is of pivotal importance given the extensive effect of the 
measure to the liberty of the subject. Given the very high rate of false positives, 
protective sentences only rarely can be justified. A statement of a prediction of 
dangerousness is a statement of a present condition, not the prediction of a 
particular result.390A jurisprudence that pretends to exclude such concepts is self-
deceptive. These concepts frequently figure prominently in decision-making, 
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whether or not receive mention in jurisprudence. The reality of such predictions 
must be recognised and put into a proper jurisprudential spectrum. Predictive 
punishment must rely on solid criteria and viable predictions. Nevertheless, in their 
absence, one must conclude such an approach has many dangers, as there is an 
inherent weakness in the incapacitation theory to identify the proper limits and 
judge the accuracy of the prediction.391Morris puts forward the need for statistical 
support but its reliability is questionable.392   
 
5.4 Hybrid Theories of Punishment 
Regarding the justification for punishment and the aims of sentencing, one 
strategy, although neither truly a hybrid nor a true theory, is eclecticism. For 
instance, in cases where the sentencing judge has confidence in achieving 
prevention through deterrence or rehabilitation, he chooses a utilitarian mode of 
reasoning. In case where there is little confidence in achieving prevention or the 
offence is particularly shocking, the sentencer falls back on retributive 
reasoning.393This, for some, is more of a pragmatic, multi-stage rocket approach 
to sentencing than a theoretically integrated account of punishment.394Hybrid (or 
mixed, or compromise) theories differ from such eclectic approaches towards 
punishment. They are the product of a diachronic and exigent aspiration of some 
theorists to succeed an encircling synergy between retributivism and 
utilitarianism, with dubious results.395Historically, theorists attempted this 
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endeavour in the context of defending utilitarianism against the objection made by 
the retributivists that the principle of utility, consistently applied, recommends in 
principle the punishment of the innocent.396In essence, these theories do not 
supply any new insights concerning the general justification of punishment or the 
aims at sentencing. Rather, they draw upon elements from both retributivist and 
utilitarian approaches to form hybrid accounts of punishment.397In such accounts, 
through the combination and integration of retributive and utilitarian principles, 
one type of reasoning is moderated or limited by the other type of reasoning. This 
converts hybrid accounts of punishment into theoretical and practical alternatives 
for strict retributive or utilitarian reasoning. As Hart indicates, it is unsustainable 
to offer a theory of punishment, which is either totally utilitarian or totally 
retributive, and that rather conciliation is needed.398Similarly, but on a more 
imposingly sounding tenor, Brooks proposes a rethinking of punishment in a more 
pluralistic manner by seeking the reintegration of different theories of punishment 
together rather than hopelessly apart in a monistic manner. Thus, a proper theory 
of punishment would be one that is proportionate to what is deserved, deterring 
potential criminals, and helping to rehabilitate the person punished.399One type of 
a hybrid theory is negative retributivism whereas another, that which sees 
retribution as punishment. 
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5.4.1 Hybridism and Negative Retributivism 
The shape of a hybrid account of punishment depends on the theoretical 
point of departure. Two general shapes are possible, as the general justification for 
the practice. First, is utility. The negative retributive principle superimposes to 
limit punitive action aimed at prevention: Only the guilty may be punished and 
only to the extent of their desert. Secondly, it is retribution. Retributive demands 
on punishment tone down by utilitarian considerations. Although retribution 
provides the general justification for the practice, justice no longer dictates 
punishment to mete out to the degree of the offender's desert. Rather, utilitarian 
considerations allow for punishing less than would be indicated by desert, and 
may even allow for refraining from punishment altogether by employing the 
principle of mercy under such circumstances to justify the decision.  
There are utilitarians who have recognised the necessity of independent 
side constraints of justice that forbid the deliberate punishment of the innocent, 
and perhaps the excessive punishment of the guilty.400These utilitarians have 
embraced the negative retributive principle as a limiting principle.401The negative 
principle provides protection to individuals against disproportionate and unfair use 
of punishment, for the sake of utility, by presumably employing leniency as a form 
of compromise against the rigours of unexpected and undesired results.402Pure 
utilitarian reasoning cannot provide such a limiting principle. An external principle 
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is in need to guard against the potential excessiveness of utilitarianism. Beccaria 
also saw the need for a negative principle. However, instead of the negative 
retributive principle, he refers to the social contract as a safeguard against the 
potential excessiveness of utilitarianism.403Beccaria apart, it appears that there 
must be no interest in mercy or any kind of leniency. This goes beyond Bentham’s 
principle of frugality, that is, the principle that punishment should be no more 
severe than is necessary for its utilitarian purpose. As they are not interested in 
inconsistencies, they can apply different sentences in co-defendants if they believe 
that they are thus applying the minimum severity needed to achieve their aim. 
However, this relies on the assumption that utilitarian sentencers know what sort 
of sentence will maximise the effect they want, and will not be content with 
anything less than maximisation.  
 
5.4.2 Hybridism and Retribution as Punishment 
The second type of hybrid theory takes the opposite view. Retribution, in 
this hybrid account, constitutes the essence of punishment, its general justification. 
Below the (upper) limits, defined by retribution, notions of utility determine the 
choice concerning mode and severity of punishment. Although retribution 
constitutes the justification for punitive action, punishment is not a moral 
necessity, contrary, that is, to Kant’s categorical imperative. Rather, punishment is 
permitted on grounds of retribution and only to the extent of the offender's desert. 
Retribution provides a threshold (lower boundary) in the sense that punishment is 
only for the guilty. 
                                                
403Keijser, Punishment and Purpose (n 8) 26. 
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5.5. Hybrid Dangers 
The two types of hybrid accounts discussed here are each other's 
theoretical mirror image. Interestingly, although the normative foundations (the 
general justifications) are completely different, implications for the practice of 
sentencing are quite similar. Eventually, in both hybrid accounts, utility rules 
within the limits of desert. Hybrid accounts may provide useful guidelines for the 
practice of sentencing. They also seem to circumvent some of the ethical 
objections made to pure utilitarian or retributive reasoning. However, their 
practical and theoretical attractiveness tends to hide some potential dangers. A 
question arises on whether a theory should bind the practice of punishment to a 
certain mode and frequency so as to provide the hybrid accounts with acceptable 
and stable points of reference. After all, hybrid accounts are pre-eminently suitable 
for ‘criminal politics’. In accordance with temporal and local circumstances or 
trends, a mixed theory provides ample room for shifting emphasis on functions 
and goals of punishment within the framework of the dominant mixed theory. The 
pendulum, however, does not swing from one extreme to the other. Such shifting 
emphasis will be legitimate because this occurs within the hybrid framework.404 
Nevertheless, within the parameters set by proportionality, the judge must 
impose the least severe sanction consistent with the aims of sentencing. At lower 
levels, there is more scope for flexible parsimonious sentencing punishments, 
which might otherwise be justified on predictive, rehabilitative, or merciful 
grounds. There is, however, the counter position of scholars who think that 
fundamental differences between the two theories convert the practice to an 
                                                
404Keijser, Punishment and Purpose (n 8) 27. 
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essentially contested one, with them forming in effect two mutually exclusive 
concepts. Perhaps one of the most troublesome aspects of the conflict between the 
two theories comes from the denial of the fundamental conflict, and indeed the 
support for an unachievable combination of the two as a solution.405One academic 
has even described hybrid theories of punishment as ‘everybody happy theories’ 




This chapter discussed the distinction between the general justification of 
the practice of punishment and the specific aims of punishment, as well as the said 
aims, namely retributivism, utilitarianism, and hybridism. It also argued that 
sentencing is morally problematic because it involves actions otherwise wrong or 
evil in other contents and therefore in demand of moral justification. It 
emphasised, though epigrammatically, that the pursuit of justice forms the 
common denominator among the theories discussed, as supposed and defined 
through the corresponding perspectives, and that justice in the dominion of 
sentencing rationalisation, has additional variables. These variables relate to the 
diachronic societal outlook for merciful and lenient treatment of the criminal 
offenders by recognising their human frailty and faultiness and not only pursuing 
their harsh punishment as if their crime was that of being imperfect and not that of, 
simply, violating human laws. It was also argued that the relation between mercy 
                                                
405Robinson, ‘One Perspective on Sentencing Reform in the United States’ (n 43) 1. 





and justice, and of both, with punishment needs further attentiveness and that the 
venture must take place not only within the orb of punishment theory but also in 
detachment from it as a parallel and independent aspect of the more general 
debate.  
On these perspectives, the analysis in the following chapter on the relation 
between mercy and justice, and of both with punishment, will conceivably be aptly 
encompassing for the purposes of the thesis. As indicated in Chapter 4, the present 
chapter together with Chapter 6 which follows, will serve as a backdrop for 
dealing with the different perspectives of the Cypriot judges relating to the 
justifications and goals of punishment and the role of mercy in criminal sentencing 
correspondingly, and establishing whether their punishtecture and mercying are 
actually taking place within or on the basis of a sound legitimising moral 













CHAPTER 6: MERCY, JUSTICE, AND CRIMINAL SENTENCING 
 
The objective of the present chapter is to examine mercy and its connection 
to justice, and criminal sentencing within the parameters of the dissertation’s 
scopes. This connection will provide the tool for comprehending the sentencing 
thinking of the Cypriot judges in the descriptive manner mentioned in Chapter 1. It 
will moreover reinforce the foundations for demonstrating the existence (or not), 
of a pertinently consistent legitimising framework underpinning the practice. It 
will further, illustrate that there are differences amongst approaches to mercy and 
their justification in the theories of punishment under consideration, for which 
there are equally divergent ideas as to their own moral justification. The 
proceeding analysis will additionally indicate that there are variations between 
conceptions of mercy that deny it any peculiarity in relation to justice, and 
affirming that it is simply a form of sensibility to criteria of justice, theories of 
mercy that see it as refusing to apply principles of justice, and theories of justice 
that operate a division of labour between them, and in which justice gives general 
limits for the decision, with mercy allowing the judge to navigate on the area of 
discretion. 
 
6.1 The Interrelationship Between Justice and Mercy  
As expected, theorists have approached the issue of mercy and its 
relationship to justice and punishment from different perspectives. The viability of 
these perspectives depends on the theoretical inclinations of the analyst, with no 
universally acknowledged answer given as of yet. This is hardly surprising, given 
that scholarship (penal or other) usually thrives and feeds from incongruity and 
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differentiation. Applicable examples of this are stated throughout Chapter 5, with 
reference to the sectarian theories of retributivism and utilitarianism.  
 As has already been noted, the concept of justice in the prosecution of 
criminal charges means many different things to different people. To some, justice 
invokes considerations of retribution, imposing appropriately severe punishment 
on those who cause harm by violating the rights of others. To others, it invokes 
considerations of mercy and rehabilitation, and seeks to understand and promote 
change in the behaviour of those who do not abide by society’s norms. Yet to 
others, justice should be concerned with the plight of victims in the criminal 
justice system and to aid their recovery. But if by justice one refers to legal justice 
(that which a judge is bound to administer), then one must also note that legal 
justice is not always identical to moral justice, as legal justice may fall short of 
moral justice in its ability to adequately distinguish between relevantly different 
cases. Thus, built into what the judge may do to effect justice, is discretion. And 
when that discretion is exercised in order to remit or reduce punishment, which the 
law prescribes, the discretion is mercy.407Mercy (or mercying), concerns second 
chances and forgiveness when forgiveness is not possible.408It is an act of 
benevolence or compassion that reduces what is owed,409though not as of right but 
as a gift from one harmed to his harmdoer.410By the grace of forgiveness, the thing 
                                                
407C A H Johnson, ‘Entitled to Clemency: Mercy in the Criminal Law’ (1991) 10 L & Phil 109, 
116. 
408M Braswell, J Pollock and S Braswell, Morality Stories: Dilemmas in Ethics, Crime and Justice 
(Carolina Academic Press, Durham, North Carolina 2005) 131. 
409D T Kobil, ‘Should Mercy Have a Place in Clemency Decisions?’ in A Sarat, and N Hussain 
(eds), Forgiveness, Mercy, and Clemency (Stanford University Press, Stanford, California 2007) 
39. 
410M Minow, Between Vengeance and Forgiveness: Facing History after Genocide and Mass 
Violence (Beacon Press, Boston 1998) 17. 
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that had been done has not been done,411although that does not necessarily entail 
mercy, that is, exempting an offender from atonement, restitution, or 
punishment.412Nonetheless, no matter how one conceives justice, a common thread 
running through most of these conceptions is a desire to ascertain the truth, 
accurately sorting out the facts that are relevant to a criminal charge, not implying, 
in spite of that, that the concept of truth is inevitably germane to the venture of 
amplifying beliefs. It is difficult to find much agreement on the definition of 
justice. The definitional process requires reflection and care. We are commonly 
more aware of those things that breach our concept of just than we are able to 
identify the qualities of those that are within the range of our conception of the 
meaning of the term. This does not mean that justice is a boundary-setting 
condition. Law may be boundary setting, but justice, seemingly, implies more than 
that. It is something that should be both ‘done’ and ‘seen to be done. ‘It relates to 
the conception of equity, and goes further and embraces more. It is an idea that one 
seems to learn quite early in life, although the notion may undergo considerable 
change with maturity.413Uncertain as we are as to exactly what constitutes justice, 
there is nothing like injustice for stirring emotional, antagonistic attitudes toward 
the source of that malevolence.414There is a need to develop a comprehensive 
theory of the conditions under which people are morally bound to obey the law 
and all that it involves, be it obligations, rights or sanctions. For it does seem 
                                                
411A Kelley (tr), Vladimir Jankélévitch, Forgiveness (The University of Chicago Press, Chicago 
2005) 164. 
412J Landman, ‘Earning Forgiveness: The Story of a Perpetrator, Katherine Ann Power’ in S Lamb, 
and J Murphy (eds), Before Forgiving: Cautionary Views of Forgiveness in Psychotherapy (OUP, 
Oxford 2002) 237. 
413L Kohberg, ‘Stages of Moral Development as a Basis for Moral Education’ in C Beck and E 
Sullivan (eds), Moral Education (University of Toronto Press, Toronto 1970) 23.  
414L T Wilkins, ‘Policy Control, Information, Ethics and Discretion’ in E A Lawrence and R S 
Irving (eds), Social Psychology and Discretionary Law (n 207) 44. 
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reasonable to suppose that one is sometimes bound to abide by social norms that 
leave something to be desired, but it also appears reasonable to conclude that a 
legal system does not automatically merit the respect that we might give it by our 
obedience. Law must earn that respect.415For Nussbaum, for instance, such a 
systemic respect could be attained if equity and mercy (linked under the Greek 
term epieikeia, and later translated by Seneca as clementia)416prevails that of strict 
justice (dike). The resulting ideal of merciful justice leads to milder and more 
sympathetic reactions to the offender on the basis of individualisation rather than 
on strict proportionality.417  
 
6.1.2 The Supposed Incompatibility between Justice and Mercy, and the 
Paradox of Mercy 
 
As typically defined, the concepts of mercy and justice seem incompatible 
in the sense that if justice is the austere application of the law, and mercy its 
compassionate digression, then mercy is unjust and justice is merciless. Law is 
narrower than justice, and mercy is broader than both. Justice can be merciless, but 
mercy must be just.418This incongruity (or puzzle),419still plagues jurists who 
usually attempt to deal with it by adopting, as a vaulting bar, Saint Anselm’s of 
Canterbury two paradoxes of God’s mercy, as discussed in his Proslogion, 
                                                
415D Lyons, Ethics and the Rule of Law (CUP, Cambridge 1984) 214. For a more psychologically 
oriented and empirical view, see: T R Tyler, Why People Obey the Law (Yale University Press, 
New Haven 1990). 
416R Campbell (tr), Seneca: Letters from a Stoic (Penguin Classics, Penguin Books, London 1969) 
24. 
417M C Nussbaum, ‘Equity and Mercy’ (1993) 22 Phil & Pub Aff 83. 
418J R Brown, ‘The Quality of Mercy’ (1992) 40 UCLA Rev 327, 335. 
419R A Duff, ‘Justice, Mercy and Punishment’ CjScotland (16 September 2009), 
www.cjscotland.org.uk/>accessed 14 February 2010. 
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whereby he expressed the human uneasiness with iniquitous divine mercy.420The 
first paradox asks how justice and salvation can originate from the same source. If 
God is perfectly just, how can he also show compassion and grant mercy to the 
wicked?421The second paradox is concerned with equal treatment, asking how we 
can understand God’s choice to show mercy only to some.422These paradoxes 
widely known as the ‘paradox of mercy’ seem to suggest that mercy is different or 
even antithetical to justice in punishment. Jeffrie Murphy elaborated on the 
paradox, concluding (in what has become a locus classicus position in the field of 
mercy theory), that if mercy requires a tampering of justice, then there is a sense in 
which mercy may require a departure from it.423Thus, to be merciful is perhaps to 
be unjust. However, it is a vice, not a virtue, to manifest injustice. Thus mercy 
must be, not a virtue, but a vice, a product of morally precarious over-
romanticising. This is particularly evident in the case of a sentencing judge. We, 
society, hire this individual to enforce the rule of law under which we live, and 
Cypriot judges form no exception in this aspect. We think of this as ‘doing 
justice’, and the doing of this is surely the judge’s sworn obligation as an officer of 
                                                
420S N Deane (tr), St. Anselm: Proslogium; Monologium; An Appendix in Behalf of the Fool by 
Gaunilon; and Cur Deus Homo (The Open Court Publishing Company, Illinois 1954). Anselm 
appears to have given a solution to the paradox of mercy by concluding that Justice as he perceived 
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mercy is the restoration of right order for the sake of that right order itself. 
421Deane (n 420) 14: ‘What justice is it that gives him who merits eternal death everlasting life? 
How, then, gracious Lord, good to the righteous and the wicked, canst thou save the wicked, if this 
is not just, and thou dost not aught that is not just?’  
422Deane (n 420) 18-19:‘But if it can be comprehended in any way why thou canst will to save the 
wicked, yet by no consideration can we comprehend why, of those who are alike wicked, thou 
savest some rather than others, through supreme goodness; and why thou dost condemn the latter, 
rather than the former, through supreme justice.’  
423J Murphy and J Hampton, Forgiveness and Mercy (Cambridge Studies in Philosophy and Law, 
CUP, Cambridge 1988) 167. 
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justice. What business does he have, then, Murphy could have pondered, in 
ignoring his obligations to justice while he pursues some private, idiosyncratic, 
and not publicly accountable virtue of love or compassion?424 
Antithetically, one could assert that mercy and justice are not mutually 
exclusive concepts, as the preceding argument appears to suggest, but two 
synergistically overlapping virtues,425more likely to emerge in a person who has 
compassion. This is what precisely portrays the essence of the modern dialectics 
on the issue of mercy in criminal sentencing. Whether, in other words, it has any 
legitimate role to play in criminal sentencing and if so, on the grounds and reasons 
upon which it could plausibly be mobilised by a court of law for justifiably 
reducing the amount of punishment to lower levels than those that a judge would 
have under normal circumstances legitimately determined as just and fair. Mercy, 
from this perspective, is being more beneficial to the defendant than any other 
proper determinate sentence.426Indeed, according to Aristotle, what puzzles people 
is the fact that equity (re mercy), though just, is not the justice of the law courts but 
a method of restoring the balance of justice when the law has tilted it, with the 
need for such a rectification arising from the circumstance that law can do no more 
than generalise.427Someone may deserve mercy for what he is, has suffered, has 
done, will suffer, or will do, just as he may deserve punishment for his crime. The 
difficulty, is explaining why that deserving should be a matter of justice rather 
                                                
424J Murphy and J Hampton, Forgiveness and Mercy (n 423) 167-168.  
425J Murphy, Getting Even: Forgiveness and its Limits (OUP, Oxford 2003) 55. 
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than of some weaker moral consideration.428Therefore, the question for judges is, 
or should be, whether there is a moral or legal rationale for distinguishing mercy 
from sentencing mitigation. Mercy, in addition to being a moral virtue, is also a 
sentencing attitude, standing between retribution and revenge.429To what extent 
Cypriot judges reflect on such levels of analysis, forms a parallel issue in this 
study, as that on whether they have discretion to circumvent an otherwise justified 
sentence following the mandatory mitigation-aggravation balancing exercise, and 
impose a lesser sentence as an act of mercy.  
It is necessary therefore to define the parameters of justice and accordingly 
decide whether mercy (ergo mercying) can or cannot justifiably form part of it as a 
constituent element, and be utilised as an evaluative and potentially determinant 
factor in judicial sentencing decision-making and punishtecture. This calls, as a 
first step, the filtration of the idea of mercy through the basic principles of 
retributivism and utilitarianism, as per the etiology provided for in the introductory 
part of the present chapter. 
 
6.2 Mercy and Retributivism  
6.2.1 The Synergy between Justice and Mercy 
 There is an argument that the conflict between justice and mercy is only 
apparent and that both can peacefully coexist in synergy.430The viability of this 
argument, presupposes acceptance of the premise that justice is disjunctive, in that 
                                                
428M Davis, To Make Punishment Fit the Crime: Essays in the Theory of Criminal Justice 
(Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado 1992) 196. 
429E L Muller, ‘The Virtue of Mercy in Criminal Sentencing’ (1993) 24 Seton Hall Rev 288, 290, 
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it specifies a range of deserved sanctions, with a high and a low end. Any imposed 
punishment falling below the maximum allowed is both merciful and just as it is 
being encapsulated within the array of deserved punishments; hence the seeming 
conflict between mercy and justice evaporates. On this account, mercy does not 
involve injustice since, hypothetically, injustice can arise only when an offender is 
sentenced harsher than he deserves, and not more leniently. If the giving of mercy 
means imposing the punishment that equity requires, then again, mercy and justice 
can coexist, at least insofar as equity is the name justice goes by when it attends to 
all the particulars to which it should attend, as mercy is nothing but a form of 
justice.431 
 Dolinko suggests that a judge exercises mercy when he imposes a sentence 
that is more lenient than normally expected in a case of the sort, but nonetheless 
just, based on the evaluation of a range of mitigating factors broader than what 
would be standard in sentencing an offender in a similar case for the same 
crime.432Tudor is more precise in his definitional approach than Dolinko. He 
claims that mercy is the refraining from imposing the minimally just suffering 
(distinguishing it from leniency and equity), in favour of an even lesser suffering, 
for reasons stemming, inter alia, from magnanimity, stoicism, contrition, 
compassion and forgiveness.433Consequently, by this approach, a judge can be 
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both merciful and just to the effect that ‘leniency is not in itself a vice [and] that 
mercy should season justice is a proposition soundly based in law as in 
literature.’434  
 Mercying should occur only upon fulfilling the demands of justice. To do 
otherwise would promote permissiveness that would be neither merciful nor just. 
Permissiveness neither corrects the offender nor restores the original condition that 
existed before the offence. Mercy alone fails to serve the demands of justice either 
in its deterrent or retributive functions.435 
 Jung places the argument on a somehow different level.  He says that the 
issue is not about whether mercy should claim a special privilege over justice but 
whether it is possible to talk simultaneously in a justificatory manner about justice 
and mercy. When an offender is treated mercifully, either the offender is given the 
penalty he deserves, in which case he is not being shown mercy, but justice, or is 
not given the deserved penalty, in which case he is being treated unjustly.  Thus, 
mercy is either justice or injustice without the two being in conflict,436but again, 
the viability of this approach depends on how one perceives the concept of justice. 
From this angle of analysis, a just sentence could debatably denote two things. 
First, that a sentence is just according to all the normal criteria, but subsequently 
changeable to take account of exceptional considerations such as mercy or equity 
                                                
434As per Judge LJ, in Attorney General’s Reference (No 4 of 1989) (1989) 90 Cr App R 366. The 
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factors.  Second, it may refer to the sentence that is just, taking account every 
factor with a good claim to affect sentencing, which would include mercy or 
equity factors in the first place. On this perspective, whether equity factors are 
esoteric or exoteric from justice is not significant if there is consistency in the 
analysis.  The core of the matter, somewhat differently put, is that if a judge 
purportedly departs from the just sentence to take account of mercy, then the just 
sentence (or the right sentence)437means that is just in a defeasible sense. 
However, if the judge regards equity factors as part of the process of arriving at a 
just sentence then the issue of an unjust sentence does not arise since equity is an 
element in determining the just sentence.  It is clear however that any justification 
for reducing sentence on these grounds needs to secure equality of treatment and 
avoid the possibility of discrimination.438  
A position similar to that of Lyons439(referred to above),440as to the need 
for a legal system to earn the reverence of those whose obedience demands, arises 
when one views mercy through the lens of negative retributive justice, according 
to which the state has the right, but not the obligation, to impose the otherwise 
deserved punishment on an offender.  On this perspective, mercy and justice do 
not conflict, because the state acts justly when it shows mercy.  It has (as Murphy 
argues), simply waived a right, with mercy being not an alternative or substitute to 
justice but a moral response. A response, characteristic of justice as a virtue of 
                                                
437According to one academic view, the right sentence is the one that achieves a given penal aim for 
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persons who have the right to punish, although it is not part of the justice of the 
institution of punishment as far as that institution is defined by rules delineating 
rights in accord with principles of social justice.441 
On a somewhat different streak, another retributivist, Claudia Card, 
proposes that the infliction of desert (that is, that which one deserves morally 
based on all considerations) is a duty and occasionally a mere right in the sense of 
an institutionally recognised entitlement. Mercy ought to be shown to an offender 
when it is evident that otherwise he would be made to suffer unusually more 
overall, owing to his peculiar misfortunes; the offender deserves mercy but this 
desert does not create a right to receive it.442Nevertheless, Card fails to explain, or 
so her critics say, why mercy is non-obligatory and therefore discretionary, 
creating as a result the probability of discrimination and inconsistency without 
even discussing whether judges are morally obligated to provide for such a 
course.443A counter argument could be that mercy, as proposed by Card, 
presupposes, exactly, the exercise of mercy since it is obvious from her 
proposition, that the selection of mercy results from a certain weighing of all the 
relevant considerations affecting the choice of punishment ergo the product of 
discretion. This is indeed the heart of her argument, that is, the necessity of 
discretion as the means of executing the judicial choice of mercy, hence its non-
obligatory sense.  
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6.2.2 Mercy and Power 
 Mercy is also definable not in relation to justice, but in relation to power.444 
On this approach, one might assert that an act of mercy is an action in a 
relationship of vulnerability and power in which a powerful person intentionally 
reduces or removes altogether the threat to or the present suffering of another.445 
Mercy and justice need not conflict.  If a person has the power to reduce the 
suffering of another whom he has at his mercy, his act is also a just one. Thus, a 
single act can be both just and merciful.446Biblical laws, show for example that a 
law concerned with justice, fairness or equity may also take into account the 
special needs or intentions of the persons affected by the situation or by 
application of the law.447However, where the focus is on the legalistic role of 
mercy (that is, within the context of the law), mercy is more comprehensible in 
relation to justice than power, as the former is the pivotal factor and the point of 
reference and comparison. Therefore, by deduction and logic, an act can only be 
merciful and just if an actor has the power to act unjustly.448  
 
6.2.3 The Mutual Incompatibility of Justice and Mercy 
In terms of its relationship with retribution, and chiefly positive 
retributivism, mercy is typically understood as the partial or total remission of the 
punishment that the judge can impose. On this explanation, and given the 
retributivist premise that the state is obligated to impose on the offender a specific 
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and identifiable punishment, the offender deserves no more and no less 
punishment than that. In any event, the harm caused to the victim is not lessened 
by the social origins or personal problems of the offender, even though one might 
feel compassion or sympathy for their circumstances. Reductions in such cases 
strike at the principles of proportionality, equality of treatment of offenders, and 
the presumption of human agency at the heart of retributivist theory.449Therefore, 
justice (that is, in its non-disjunctive form) and mercy, unavoidably become two 
mutually exclusive and conflicting concepts because justice means giving an 
offender the punishment he deserves, while mercy means giving him less than that. 
Another approach accepts the position that the concepts of justice and mercy are 
two independent and reciprocally exclusive values belonging to the public domain 
and when there is a conflict between them, state actors such as judges must 
promptly attempt to resolve them efficiently and expeditiously.450Doing justice is 
not constantly the ultimate objective, and when justice and mercy conflict justice 
should not always prevail. If mercy is simply the beneficial side of equity (as 
opposed to the equitable ability to increase the apparent just punishment due to 
aggravation), then it is not a virtue distinct from justice, but simply a part of 
justice. An essential point of punishment is to communicate society’s emphatic 
condemnation of criminal wrongdoing. Punishment is not merely the 
communication of deserved blame, but of justified censure. The retributive norm is 
the fundamental norm in determining what is justified as censure, but it is not the 
                                                
449S Easton, ‘Dangerous Waters: Taking Account of Impact in Sentencing’ [2008] Crim L R 105-
120. 
450Garvey, ‘Questions of Mercy’ (n 431) 322. 
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only one. As Tasioulas argues, there is also a norm of mercy,451which has a place 
in the deliberations of state actors in relation to criminal punishment.452 
Alwynne Smart claims that using the term ‘mercy’ as inclusive of 
mitigation and proportionality distracts from its genuine and most characteristic 
sense.453A judge who does not weigh mitigation and proportionality in reaching 
his sentence is unjust, whereas genuine mercy is deciding not to inflict the just 
penalty. True mercy occurs when there is a deduction in the level of punishment to 
mitigate the suffering of a third party when for instance, the offender at the time of 
the commutation is a changed person from the one who committed the offence due 
to reformation or interposition of drastic changes in his personal and family 
circumstances.454However, these factors are neither purely retributivist nor 
exoteric to the formal definition of justice, principally because equality forms a 
central role in the concept of justice. And that, Smart appears to admit it by saying, 
with a Shakespearean flair it seems,455that:‘(we are) justified in being 
merciful…when we are compelled to be by the claims that other obligations have 
on us.’456Still, treating like cases alike is a value, but not the only one as equality 
also requires treating unlike cases unalike, and forgiveness is a factor that makes 
cases unalike and worthy of differing sentences. Equality must not trump all other 
values. 
 
                                                
451J Tasioulas, ‘Repentance and the Liberal State’ (2007) 4 Ohio St J Crim L 487, 499. 
452J Tasioulas, ‘Mercy’ (2003) 103 Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 101, 106. 
453A Smart, ‘Mercy’ (1968) 43 Philosophy 345, 349. 
454Smart, ‘Mercy’ (n 453) 349. 
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6.2.4 Mercy and Justice Conflicting 
An alternative approach is the proposition that justice belongs to the public 
domain whereas mercy belongs to the private domain and when justice and mercy 
conflict, they do so because the public and the private come into conflict and it is 
to this idea that Antony Duff subscribes.457His analysis differs from that of 
Tasioulas, for, whereas the latter treats mercy as an internal competitor of justice, he 
treats it as an external competitor. In the battle between justice and mercy, Duff 
sees mercy as an invader in a conflict between sovereigns, while Tasioulas sees it 
as a combatant in a civil war though with rare and justified intrusions of the private 
into the public domain.458 
Farmer sees things differently from Duff, in the sense that if the exercise of 
mercy is beyond law, it must also be beyond punishment (or desert). The exercise 
of mercy is a different type of judgment from that exercised in doing justice, and 
while it might temper the strict demands of justice, it is strictly speaking external 
to it. Mercying or compassion requires that we do what is appropriate or right in 
the circumstances, not judged according to the measure of what is just, but 
according to our compassion or ability to recognise the situation of the other. The 
possibility of mercy must always be present, and must be exercised according to 
the individuality or humanity of the other person and the sense of compassion for 
their situation. The attention to the separation of powers (discussed in Chapter 4.6) 
will prevent us from eliding the distinction between the duty to punish and specific 
institutions of punishment. The duty of the state to punish is typically fulfilled by 
the judiciary who must determine the appropriate sentence to be imposed in any 
                                                
457R A Duff, ‘The Intrusion of Mercy’ (2007) 4 Ohio St J Crim L 361, 376-377. 
458Garvey, ‘Questions of Mercy’ (n 431) 323. 
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given case. The question of how that sentence will work or whether or not it may 
be remitted, is a matter for the Executive, to be decided not exclusively according 
to dessert criteria but on a variety of other factors such as the likelihood of 
reoffending, and public safety and interest.459 
On this perspective, Duff counter-argues that there are cases in which what 
mercy must temper is not justice itself, but the very rough form of justice that the 
normal rules and operations of the criminal justice system can do. Attention to the 
individual features and circumstances of a particular defendant show that he does 
not deserve the sentence prescribed by the law. Instead, an act of mercy is then 
needed to save him for his undeserved fate. Since we can be confident that any 
human system of justice will be at best, a system of rough justice, we need to make 
room for discretionary power to vary and temper the overtly harsh requirements of 
the law. This is not, however, a matter of mercy tempering justice. It is rather a 
matter of using discretion to do what comes closer to justice in the individual case. 
Indeed, as Duff, concludes on the point, the extent to which this kind of discretion 
is needed, depends on the degree to which the criminal justice system fails to do 
justice to those who come before the courts, and the extent to which the justice of 
its processes and punishments is undermined by the various forms of social 
injustice that lie behind so much offending.460  
 
                                                
459L Farmer, ‘Mercy and Criminal Justice: A Reply to Antony Duff’ CjScotland (16 November 
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For Twambley,461mercy properly understood (on the basis of the 
retributivist rationale) has no (and should not have any) essential connection with 
punishment. Mercy is not the prerogative of the sentencing judge. The offender 
needs to be punished and must be punished by the members of the community as 
recipients of his criminal behaviour so the avoidance of the duty to punish by the 
granting of mercy violates the rights of society and moral law, thus giving him an 
unfairly won and undeserved benefit. The judge has no right to be merciful as it is 
not to him that any obligation is due. The obligation a judge undertakes when 
sworn into office is to impose just sentences and treat like cases alike and not the 
opposite.  
Along the same lines, Kathleen Dean Moore is likewise sharp. She asserts 
that if judges decide to override considerations of justice and act out of pity, they 
become usurpers, as they are relinquishing a right that is the legitimate expectation 
that offenders will be punished, that belongs not to them, but to the people. A 
judge cannot be merciful, because the debt owed is not his to exact. The offender 
owes nothing, or nothing more, than is owed to every other law-abiding citizen. A 
judge cannot therefore exercise either real mercy or quasi-mercy in an official 
capacity, as opposed to the private individual who can and should do so in his 
relations with others. 462  
Not being retributively original, Markel similarly insists that mercy has no 
place in the criminal justice system, which must operate impartially, rationally, 
and with equality for all offenders.463State actors, Murphy and Harrison similarly 
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assert, have no business being merciful, as institutional acts of mercy are morally 
and legally indefensible.464The sole objective of criminal law, Heidi Hurd argues, 
is to distribute retributitive justice and therefore judges cannot and should not be 
merciful, as institutional acts of mercy are morally and legally indefensible, at 
least on grounds consistent with retributitive theory. Mercy is a constitutive part of 
the private domain and not only part of it, and because judges cannot always act 
without reference to their private selves in addition to their public selves, mercy 
will intrude into the public domain. This intrusion or rather the inability of the 
judge to act strictly wearing his public hat is, for Hurd, unacceptable and never 
justified. This conflicts with Duff’s approach as he treats the intrusion as 
occasionally justified and inevitable due to the existence of the private domain. 
Hurd’s position appears to be even more doctrinaire than that of the patriarch of 
retributivism Immanuel Kant who believed that mercy belongs to the realm of 
private relations between individuals who can freely act mercifully when suffering 
civil wrongs, and not to that of criminal justice, but not always. Kant admitted that 
the absolutism of the retributivist principles could only be justified in an ideal 
retributivist society, which our society has never been.465Kant also asserted that 
mercy (externalised in the form of pardon which he was discussing), may be 
justified when the crime is encouraged by the state whose laws forbid it, such as 
infanticide, or where a remission of a death sentence to one of deportation is 
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essential in order to avoid societal dissolution, ergo conceding to consequentialist 
grounds.466 
 
6.3 Mercy and Utilitarianism 
The issue of mercy is typically discussed in the context of the retributive 
approach to punishment rather than the utilitarian, as the concept of mitigation and 
its relationship to that of mercy is of greater significance in retributive sentencing 
in which the aim is to have the punishment fit the crime than when sentences aim 
to serve therapeutic or other utilitarian goals.467Such instances can be found when 
mercy is used to defend the choice of a rehabilitative measure over a retributitive 
one. As already analysed in Chapter 5.3.1-5.3.4, for utilitarians, offenders should 
not be punished merely because they have committed an offence, and purportedly 
deserve to be punished as a result. Punishment does not have to fit the crime nor 
the offender but only the public interest and the needs of society for an effective 
penal system. Sometimes even vengeance may justify punishment not because of 
justified retaliation but because people often derive pleasure when the score is 
evened. Bentham advocated that punishment ought not to be inflicted when it 
would be ineffective in deterring crime, when it would be groundless, needless or 
too expensive, but even he was not absolute in his proposition,468reminding one of 
                                                
466The point is made by Kathleen Dean Moore who supports that this apparent inconsistency in 
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468Bentham, although believing in the incompatibility between mercy and utilitarianism, has said at 
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Kant’s own qualifications to the retributivist rationale apropos merciful treatment 
of offenders upon consequentialist grounds, as indicated above. Beccaria 
suggested that punishment ought not to be inflicted where it would cause harm 
greater than the harm of not punishing. Punishment deters specifically and 
generally hence any decision not to effect the justified punishment is unjustifiable 
and to this regard a penal system cannot tolerate exceptions. It follows that to 
identify mercy as a general ground for waiving punishment, would not involve an 
otherwise avoidable mischief to society greater than the mischief of punishing the 
offender.469Individualisation of punishment has no place in sentencing unless it 
serves the greater good of the community. The right of punishment belongs to 
society at large so even if the victim forgives the offender, the obligation to try and 
punish persists, with the element of forgiveness constituting an evaluative factor in 
the determination of the sentence. As Kathleen Dean Moore explains, touching the 
shift of standards between act-utilitarians and rule-utilitarians, individual acts of 
punishment are not tested against the utilitarian requirement that each produce 
more good than withholding punishment. The beneficial consequences of 
punishment depend on certainty. So it must be general rules about punishing that 
are subjected to the utilitarian test. Individual acts of punishment are then justified 
if they comply with utilitarian-justified rules about punishment and mercy.470The 
rules themselves must be humane, but their enforcement absolute. Therefore, the 
executors of the laws must be inelastic whereas the legislators tender, indulgent, 
and humane making certain at the same time through legislation that no 
                                                                                                                                  
Bowring (ed), J Bentham, The Works of Jeremy Bentham (Adamant Media Corporation, Boston 
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punishment is imposed that does not accomplish some future societal good.471 
However, if one accepts that mercy and utilitarianism are incompatible then the 
ideal utilitarian legislator cannot act mercifully. Judges are not in a moral position 
to act mercifully on utilitarian grounds. They must impose the sentence that is 
more productive of good. Once the sentence is determined by weighing all the 
relevant factors (provided of course in all reality that one is able to know for 
certain that the required balancing of the pertinent factors is not tainted by 
elements of hidden and undisclosed mercy), the judge may not act mercifully and 
impose less than the imposed punishment as that would be morally unjustifiable. 
There is no logic for a utilitarian to act mercifully by imposing a lesser sentence 
than would be justified on grounds of utility maximisation. Either mercy is 
unjustified because it involves doing less than is justified and consequently lacks 
any utilitarian justification, or it is justified because it maximizes utility; but then 
the act cannot count as an act of mercy, since there is no justification for any 
heavier penalty at all as in this case the act ceases to be a departure from anything 
and so it fails to be an act of mercy. The utilitarian can act rightly, but never 
mercifully, or mercifully only by acting wrongly.472There are, however, ways of 
avoiding the hurdles of dogmatism. Brien, for instance suggests that if we consider 
utilitarianism, as a metaethical theory, that is, a theory dealing with what makes an 
action right rather than a decision, then a theory of how judges ought to decide 
should not create any incompatibility between mercy and utilitarianism as the 
objective is at all times the greatest possible social benefit no matter what the 
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reasoning behind the action. The ends justify the means. Therefore, if allowing 
judges to act on springs that are not directly utilitarian produces the best results 
then they should be encouraged to do so. Finally, the author concludes that mercy, 
utilitarianism, and retributivism are not necessarily incompatible (unless viewed 
with an idealistic discernment) and that we could view mercy as having intrinsic 
worth rather than because it promotes utility or accords with retributive justice. 
These intrinsic reasons are the justification to perform a merciful action, as the 
power of the judge is such as to render him immune to any ingratitude that the 
offender may show. The fact that such a merciful decision may be justified under 
utilitarian or retributive theory is only accidental, as the actual decision has been 
reached on a higher ground of reason independent of the dogmatisms of both 
retributivism and utilitarianism schools, which apparently have failed to convince 
one another of the viable ascendancy of their stance. 
 
6.4 Mercy and Justice Outside the Diarchy of Retributivism and 
Utilitarianism 
 
Not all agree on the need for categorising all aspects pertinent to the issue 
of punishment and sentencing within the parameters of consequentialist or non-
consequentialist theories. There is an alternative perspective, which supports that 
there is no conflict between justice and mercy. Mercy appropriately occurs after 
the question of justice is settled. The virtue of justice is a duty to treat all fairly and 
equally. A judge has the option of enforcing a claim, but waives that option. Mercy 
is virtuous because it exceeds obligation. By arguing that we ought to be virtuous, 
we do not produce an ethical onus to act in a particular manner. There is a 
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difference between mercying and mercifulness, since the former denotes, among 
other qualities, an action, whereas the latter, a trait not necessarily accompanied by 
an intention to act accordingly, or at all. Although the two are not certainly 
mutually exclusive, the one does not necessarily presuppose the other. It includes 
both characteristics that meet the minimum standard of behaviour, such as justice 
and honesty, as well as those that aim at excellence, like courage and mercy. This 
virtue can be both inspirational as well as essential, and mercy falls into the 
former.473 
One proponent of this perspective is Derrida who places mercy outside the 
circle of economic exchange, and his move apparently protects mercy from any 
claims of justice.474While justice operates on the plane of calculation and 
measurement, mercy runs perhaps on a higher plane of self-giving and 
consciousness. It is irreducible to the ordinary logic, freeing mercy from justice 
and the necessity to calculate who merits mercy and how much. Derrida’s account 
of forgiveness may explain how mercy is distinct from justice, but it fails to 
address whether it is acceptable or permissible to exempt an offender from the 
requirements of justice, or even explain how or when we must forgive under such 
a system. Christodoulidis locates mercy in the space between law (law’s justice) 
and particularity, as the most fruitful way of elaborating the concept because it 
treats mercy as an independent virtue that does not collapse into justice. Justice 
sets rules and rule-like exceptions to these rules, and within there ambit, all so 
determined like cases must be treated alike. If mercy is to be something beyond 
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that, an independent virtue, it must provide its own criteria for judgment other than 
these rules stipulate,475and indeed, mercy is integrally linked to judgment, with 
that linkage making mercy into a distinct and autonomous virtue.476 
 
6.4.1 Mercy and Individualised Punishment in Criminal Sentencing 
A Procrustean system of fixed penalties or mandatory minima could 
certainly ensure definitional equality by sacrificing individualisation, but justice 
demands a balance of many competing values, not a simple one-dimensional 
yardstick. The possibility of mercy is one important factor that can keep justice 
from being inexorable and rigid. Mercy involves respecting individual differences, 
and the ability of the judicial system (and the judge) to see through the defendant 
and treat him as per Goethe’s admonition, that is, not as he appears to be but as if 
he already were what he could potentially be.477In this sense, mercy involves 
individualisation of justice, a willingness to distinguish between more deserving 
and less deserving cases and circumstances.478Mercy stresses the need of the 
individual criminal, his motivation, and the intensity of the temptation to which he 
is exposed. Justice requires distribution, or retribution, according to what the act 
deserves, and equal treatment where desert is equal.479However, charity will give 
most when the need of the individual, independent of his merit, is greatest. Charity 
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will mitigate punishment most when the offender was most needy, motivated, 
deprived of other gratifications, or tempted to commit the offence.480 
 
6.4.2 Principled Mercy 
Retributivists advocate that if mercy is to be justified (as a deviation from 
proportionality), then that must take place in a principled and coherent manner. 
For example, Von Hirsch and Ashworth suggest three factors.481The first derives 
from a so-called equal impact principle. According to this principle, if the offender 
suffers from certain handicaps that would make his punishment significantly more 
onerous then the sanction should be adjusted in order to avoid an undue 
differential impact on him or excessive hardship, calculated on approximation 
depending on the particular unusual situation so that to avoid burdening the 
offender with a higher sentence.482The second stems from compassion, but as the 
authors conclude, there must at the outset be established a link between the 
offender’s misfortune and the punishment he must receive. In addition, this tie 
could concern, thirdly, quasi-retributive grounds. These do not form part of the 
general principles of proportionality in punishment. They are not directly related 
either to the seriousness of offences in terms of harm and culpability or to the 
severity of punishments or to the permissible role of previous convictions but they 
relate to the wider underlying conceptions of penal censure as a response to 
criminal offending. Censure for an offence provides reason for the offender to 
reflect on the wrongdoing and to consider the reasons for his contact. Quasi-
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retributive grounds may address special situations, which may relate to this 
reflective process and explicate why there should be extra sympathy shown for the 
offender having to experience that suffering. Examples of quasi-retributitive 
grounds are the offender’s advanced age or serious illness, voluntary reparation 
and delay in prosecution.483Nigel Walker correctly deduces that a review of the 
practice and literature suggests five criteria for mercy: (a) Compassion for 
someone (which distinguishes it from mitigation) (b) It must not be whimsical or 
random, but consistent (rule following) (c) It must not be improper in other ways 
that is resulting from bribery, intimidation, favouritism, or superstition (d) It must 
not be leniency of a kind required by justice (e) Expediency must not be the only 
motive (which would exclude bargains with hostage-takers, leniency in exchange 
for guilty pleas, economising in scarce resources, such as prison places, or granting 
diplomats immunity from prosecution).484 
 
6.4.3 Mercy and Reasons 
Irrespective of the dialectics on mercy (or mercying), in the area of 
punishment and sentencing, public agents ergo judges must always act on reasons 
relating to any pertinent decision they may take. A coherent, detailed and 
communicative reasoning to all those affected by such a decision contributes to the 
proper understanding of the action irrespective of the reasons one might have to 
differ from the outcome and its ratio. That holds true even if the disagreement 
relates to an objection as to the power or discretion of the judge to elect mercy as a 
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tool in administering and effecting justice. To say that one must reason instead of 
acting on the excitement of unsettled dispositions by the perceptions of particular 
states of affairs is not to say that certain sorts of perception are irrelevant to 
practical reasoning. The absence of the right ‘perceptive framework’ in a particular 
judge would imply that he is more likely to reach the wrong decision by means of 
a careful rational deliberation, as without the right sort of perception, reasoning 
itself could lead us astray.485Michelon argues that having taken the right decision, 
that often works as a moral excuse for those who performed wrong actions. If one 
does everything he could do, given his limitations that he cannot eliminate before 
performing the action, and if he correctly balances his reasons to decide under 
those conditions of limitation, he has a claim to be encratic although that may 
sometimes not be enough.486What remains unanswered however is the comparing 
standard for the testing in order to lead to the inference that indeed the action is 
wrong, and how one secures that the judge or critic of the first action will not face 
the same limitations anyway. Reasons for action and reasons for deciding are both 
practical in the sense that one can judge through those reasons either the 
correctness of the action or the correctness of the decision to act. Judges have a 
moral obligation to decide the issues before them based on the reasons they believe 
to be applicable to the case at hand and not on their dispositions to act, and this 
could bean additional graft to the hypothetical link between the way the judges 
sentence and mercy in Cyprus. 
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6.5 Conclusions 
The current chapter examined mercy and mercying and their connection to 
punishment, sentencing, and justice in the search of tools and associations for 
pursuing the rationalisation of the sentencing decisions of the Cypriot judges 
within the methodological boundaries of the research.  It illustrated that there are 
differences among approaches to mercy and their justification between 
retributivism and utilitarianism. The analysis indicates that there are variations 
between conceptions of mercy that deny it any peculiarity in relation to justice and 
affirming that it is just a form of sensibility to criteria of justice, that there are 
theories of mercy that see it as refusing to apply principles of justice, and theories 
of justice that operate a division of labour between them, in which justice gives 
general limits for the decision, but mercy allows the judge to navigate on the area 
of discretion. The sense Cypriot judges have of their duty to sentence and the way 
they orientate and operate within the criminal justice system in that regard, could 
indicate the way in which they interpret their systemic surroundings and allow 
those to influence their sentencing and mercying decisions. In exploring the 
manner in which mercy is being practiced and approached by Cypriot judges, the 
concept put forward by Nigel Walker on the basis of the five criteria mentioned 
above, is the one used when discussing mercy vis-à-vis the judges interviewed. 
Walker’s criteria, the researcher espouses as legitimate, rational and reasoned, 
even though (as already indicated in the introduction of Chapter 4, it is not the 
purpose of the present study to take a stance and attempt to resolve the academic 
debate that environs the question of mercy in criminal sentencing). Therefore, how 
Cypriot judges and its various actors see the process of sentencing and how they 
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place themselves in the system of administration of criminal justice, is germane on 
how they apply therein their punishtecture and mercying, and this aspect will be 
the subject matter of the next three chapters that follow. 
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CHAPTER 7: CYPRIOT JUDGES AND THE PUNISHTECTURE PROCESS 
 
What follows in this chapter, is an examination of the approaches of 
Cypriot judges to sentencing, their ideas and stance on the punishment process and 
the manner in which they view the role and impact of the other main actors in the 
sentencing function, such as the prosecution and defence advocates, as suggestive 
to the manner in which they function within the punishment practice and the way 
they exercise or utilise punishtecture and mercying. 
 
7.1 Judges as Mortals 
The way judges see the process of sentencing and place their selves in the 
system of administration of criminal justice is directly relevant on how they 
sentence. Their diathesis for work, the means they have at their disposal to execute 
their duties, all bear significance. Their morale as officers of justice is 
proportionate to how others see them and respect their performance. Judges, 
despite popular belief (the academe probably excluded), are neither divine nor by 
presumption exceptionally bright. As Lord Devlin once said, one must be a very 
arrogant man (and so probably a bad judge) if he supposes that even on questions 
of fact he is always right. In difficult cases, he cannot be right every time.487If truth 
were told, there is no reason to assume that judges are a complex subdivision of 
the human race deserving a theory of their own.488Harold Laski once wrote to 
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes that he ‘wished that people could be persuaded to 
realise that judges are human beings; it would be real help to 
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jurisprudence.’489Certainly it is a dangerous myth that merely by putting on a robe 
and taking the oath of office as a judge, a man ceases to be human and strips 
himself of all predilections, and becomes a passionless thinking 
machine,490untouched by temptation and corruption.491On the contrary, judicial 
dishonesty, arrogance, incompetence, and injudiciousness, are not uncommon 
features in judiciaries492and criminal justice systems all over the world,493in 
varying degrees of course, and there is no reason for one to suggest that Cypriot 
judges form an exception to this ascertainment, at least as a matter of statistical 
probability. 
The judicial divine model just described, was apparently once necessary to 
consolidate the judge’s impartial role in societies where blood relationships and 
the rule of reciprocity governed. Other symbols of impartiality such as the 
blindfold and the scales also became important adjuncts in creating the standard of 
a judge above the litigants and their interests. Important as these symbols may 
have been, they created an image of a judge that masked completely the play of 
human personality in judging never quite realising though the notion of the ideal 
judge in human experience.494Posner is apparently right when he writes on how 
                                                
489M Howe (ed), The Holmes-Laski Letters: The Correspondence of Mr. Justice Holmes and 
Harold J Laski (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts 1953) 845. 
490Per Jerome Frank J, in Re J P Linahan 138 F 2d 650 (2nd Cir 1943) 652-653. 
491C Banks, Criminal Justice Ethics: Theory and Practice (2nd edn Sage Publications, Los Angeles 
2009) 132. 
492See, for example, M Boot, Out of Order: Arrogance, Corruption, and Incompetence on the 
Bench (Basic Books, New York 1998), and on a lighter note (but still authoritative), D Pannick, I 
Have to Move my Car: Tales of Unpersuasive Advocates and Injudicious Judges (Hart Publishing, 
Oxford 2008) 9-80. 
493G T Lowenthal, Down and Dirty Justice (New Horizon Press, Far Hills, New Jersey 2003).  
494J Noonan and K Winston (eds), The Responsible Judge: Readings in Judicial Ethics (Praeger, 
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unrealistic the conceptions of the judge are, as held by most people, including 
lawyers and even eminent law professors.495 
Cypriot judges, like most, in order to be productive and creative must be 
given the capabilities to perform and function within the criminal justice system, 
by regulating and controlling the process and not letting it or any other actor 
therein regulate them. This has its own importance because it helps conceptualise 
better their institutional and idiosyncratic drives, and consequently their keenness 
and ambition for acting within a consistent legitimising framework based on moral 
theory, or simply purely mechanically and legalistically, and hence idly and 
monolithically (ergo completely antithetical), to how a judge must think and act, as 
most would agree. As derived from the interviews in this study, the judges’ drive 
for work, productivity and inspirational logos, seem to relate directly to the 
judicial logistics and the degree of parallel support they get from the state to that 
regard. Appropriate office space, sufficient courtrooms, adequate and properly 
trained personnel and the availability of modern opticoacoustical systems, 
computer and internet facilities, together with other amenities, least of which is 
their psychological and gnostic equanimity and wherewithal, determine the degree 
to which some of them would wish to involve themselves in a normative analysis 
of their responsibility within the system. At a basic level, legal punishment theory 
presupposes the existence of suitable institutions for the judges to be able to 
perform their societal role in effecting punishment, awarding mercy and 
distributing justice as per their moral and normative inclinations, fused with 
legislative and pragmatic factors. Without a system of practice through which 
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judges could give essence to these theories (without necessarily having to embrace 
them in any way), they might have to remain in an indeterminate state, and from 
this point of view, enfeebled at least as regards the prospect of a wider and more 
effective dissemination of their thinking among the legal world.  
 
7.2 The Compound Process of Balancing  
By far, the most common view expressed by the judges during the 
interviews was that sentencing is a balancing exercise. When offered an 
opportunity to describe how they saw the process, well over two thirds of the 
judges (48 out of 54), described it as some kind of weighing act in accord, in this 
respect, with the diachronic stance of the Supreme Court. For instance, in 
Demetriou and Another v The Republic, the Supreme Court stated that:  
‘Sentencing is a compound process that involves the balancing of a multitude of 
factors, ultimately designed to be socially beneficial.’496 
 
Similarly, in Azinas and Another v The Police,497the Full Bench of the 
Supreme Court had the following to say in one of the very rare expositions made 
by it on the issue of punishment and sentencing: 
Sentencing is a fundamental aspect of the criminal process and the principal tool in 
the hands of the Court for the furtherance of the objects of the Criminal Law. It is 
indeed a difficult and delicate duty that must be performed with the greatest care. 
In determining the appropriate sentence and measuring its extent, the Court must 
have regard to a wide variety of factors, often conflicting, and must balance them 
in a way that makes the criminal process socially fruitful, sustaining thereby the 
faith of the public in the law and the administration of justice. It is a process 
involving the exercise of discretionary powers that must never be standardised, for 
justice should never be blind in its path. In the long run the ability of the courts to 
do justice according to the intrinsic merits of the case is perhaps the one single 
factor that tends to uphold and strengthen the faith of the people in the courts as 
the law-enforcing authority of the State and arbiters of the rights of citizens under 
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the law. But we would go further and state that the proper enforcement of the law 
in the interests of the society is the most important consideration to which a Court 
of law should have regard in selecting the sentence and determining its extent. In 
our democratic society laws embody the objectives of the society and the judicial 
process is one of the avenues for the attainment of its goals. Therefore, the interest 
of the people in direct and proper law enforcement is of supreme interest to every 
citizen conscious of the pursuits of his society. It has been observed that the main 
purpose of sentence is to punish the offender far the crime he has committed and 
not to confer benefits on the defendant, implying thereby that the needs of the 
defendant cannot take precedence over those of society. 
 
The subject matter of balancing varied, from the principles that favour a 
heavier or lighter penalty to the interests of all the parties in the sentencing 
process. Additionally, judges frequently mentioned the concept of balancing to 
explain the conflict between competing interests in sentencing.  
These are some of the comments:  
The role of the judge is to find a balance within the range of circumstances of the 
offence presented to him and the offender and the reasons he offended.498 
 
Everything depends on everything else. Each sentence is a balancing workout and 
diverse factors prevail from time to time. Every case is different and therefore the 
approach must be different and appropriate for the needs of that particular 
case.499 
 
In keeping with the balancing analogy, two judges described the process of 
sentencing using similar similes: 
Sentencing is like putting the pieces into a jigsaw puzzle in each case. Some 
sentences have recurring themes, but all are different. In the end, though 
everything fits. The point is how good and reliable is the puzzle and who 
manufactured it.500 
  
On the whole I think that sentencing is a like a fixture. You have to go through it 
whether you like it or not and play by the rules. The issue is to have a winner every 
time, that being Justice.501 
 






The judges saw the concept of balancing, as a central element of judicial 
discretion, as well as a critical aspect of the sentencing exercise, articulating their 
views with a palpable trepidation and awareness of the importance of the task and 
its repercussions to all concerned:  
The quintessence of sentencing is the pondering of interests within the structure of 
law. The interests to be balanced are those of the community, the defendant, his 
family, the victim, and his family. The balance is difficult to achieve in practice. 
There are many things to consider. First, there are the constraints of the law and 
more specifically of the case law. There are judicial precedents for all intends and 
purposes. You just decide what sentence you want to impose and then you look for 
the precedent. You need case law for imprisonment of so many years; you will 
more or less find it. You need judicial precedent for suspended sentence, all the 
same. You even want for a fine and it happens to be a serious offence, let us say 
possession of drugs or even supplying, you will find it. What all these mean is that 
we must be very careful in our approach and with our decision on the selection of 
the proper sentence. The task is, as most would understand and realise, a critical 
one.502 
 
Sentencing is a balancing process; I’ve got to come up with the most appropriate 
sentence to fit all of the circumstances. Sometimes it is easy sometimes it not. It 
depends from the case. And sometimes on how tired you feel or how fed up with 
the system which lets loose the big fish and goes for the small, the poor and those 
without the proper connections or the money to appoint lawyers with the right 
connections so that the strike a deal with the prosecution or even a noble prosequi. 
So much hypocrisy sometimes; it makes you feel completely detached from reality 
when you say that you are here to safeguard the rule of law and equality and fair 
treatment and impose just sentences and all these. Fairness is among all not only 
among those who could not escape prosecution because they are ‘important.’ 
Otherwise, we are talking about a charade. And sometimes by talking about 
balancing exercises and all these I am afraid that we are becoming part of it. 
However, a good and decent judge has a duty towards society to perform his task 
appropriately irrespective of discrepancies in the administration of justice in 
general. Each must do his job as best as he can.503 
 
 The task of the sentencing judge is not to add and subtract from an objectively 
determined sentence but to balance the various factors and make a value judgment 
as to what is the appropriate sentence in all the circumstances of the case. Judicial 
precedent is rarely helpful. Anyway, I find the case law inconsistent as regards 
sentencing pretty much like I find inconsistent the general damages awards for 
pain and suffering in civil accident cases. Whenever there is discretion no matter 




how careful you are, eventually you or other judges will cause disparities and 
confuse not only the defendants and their lawyers but other judges as well. We all 
need to know where we stand more or less, so that we know whether the result of 
our balancing is fair for all concerned. No matter what however our duty is there, 
and it must be executed in a proper and balanced manner, which is easier said 
than done really.504 
 
Another judge commented: 
In deciding the appropriate sentence a court should always adhere to certain 
balancing considerations. The first is the public interest. One enforces criminal 
law publicly not only to punish crime but also in the hope of preventing it. I see 
criminal law from a wider angle, as a law that reflects the values of the society it 
serves and vice versa. I see my role in a more general socio - contributively 
manner.505 
 
This last comment reminds of a similar position put forward by the French 
intellectual Emile Durkheim to the effect that criminal law does not simply exist to 
prohibit and punish crimes, but more importantly, to shore up group values, as law 
expresses all that is fundamental in the morality of a society.506Again, however, 
this is more a subjective view on the purpose of the criminal justice system that is 
to the extent shaped and defined by judicial precedent. 
The conception of balance discussed by the judges referred to a scaling of 
various factors and circumstances either relatable to the facts surrounding the 
commission of the offence or the personal circumstances of the offender. The 
balancing, however, was never elevated to a more abstract level of moral 
theorisation, analogous for example to Hegel’s idea of meting out punishment in 
order to cancel the negation of rights, or for that matter, to the balance-restoration 
thoughts expressed by positive retributivists, as discussed in Chapter 5. 
Alternatively, no discussion took place on the justification of mercy as a 
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sentencing tool, with it being esoteric or exoteric to justice, as discussed in Chapter 
6. The judicial discussion remained within the boundaries of legalistic social 
arithmetic (or physics re balancing) without expanding to wider issues of moral 
justification. This of course is neither improper nor critical of judges for want of 
moral correctness. After all, it is the constituent element of balancing which does 
not appear to comply with this supposed division of moral theory, and not the 
balancing per se.  
Within the preceding descriptions of balancing, there is a fundamental 
premise of sentencing as a course, whereby the judge exercises his discretion to 
make the factors in the individualised sentencing process capable of creating the 
foundation upon which the Court can rely and determine the appropriate sentence. 
Cypriot sentencers seem to express, in their notable majority, concerns about the 
nature of the balancing exercise and its culture, exactly because they appear to feel 
bound by principle which requires them to impose a just and proportionate 
sentence based on well-established criteria, irrespective of whether these 
presuppositions could be seen by academics (or others), as either erratically 
intuitive or brusquely erroneous and fallacious.  
 
7.2.1 Balancing and Intuition 
 
As already discussed in Chapter 5.2.5, intuition plays a major role in 
judicial reasoning as in most decision-making processes. This factor was obvious 
in many of the judicial comments (a total of 23), which connected it and placed it 
within the balancing exercise. The most elaborative of these comments were the 
following three:  
 192 
Long before I had balanced the facts and the law, I had decided on the sentence, 
surely the type of it, whether in other words, that would be imprisonment, 
suspended imprisonment, or a fine. This comes almost automatically, you can call 
it experience, gut feeling, innate ability or what have you; I doesn’t really matter. 
You just know that, that is the correct sentence plus or minus a few months.507 
 
Balancing means weighting all the relevant facts of the case and the mitigating 
and aggravating elements. That is clear. The point is that this balancing in real 
judicial life is not so methodological, sequential, or perhaps time consuming as 
some might think. On the contrary, that is very rare. I guess that all the thoughts 
that pass through my mind moments before I decide on the sentence must have 
some coherence if uttered to the objective observer. I don’t know that, and I 
couldn’t know that. I choose the sentence before even having time to think on the 
matter. I mean that the thing comes by itself. I say, this case calls for three years 
imprisonment. I guess you have some sort of a feedback, drawing from your 
knowledge. Once I have decided, I try to find a way to justify my decision on the 
basis of the facts and any existing case law on the point. You can virtually find any 
judicial precedent for every sentence you want to pass, either an English one or an 
American one, or of course a Cypriot one.508   
 
Sentencing is my job, and I have been doing it for many years. What seems difficult 
to others, including some of our colleagues, for me is a piece of cake. Routine (or 
practice) makes perfect. I decide on what I consider to be the fairer result having 
in mind the case law but mostly my common sense, based on the logic of law and 
precedent.509 
 
What surfaces from these comments is what academic literature has 
already ascertained with specific reference to judges of other nationalities (with 
any universal generalisations following by reasonable inference, and in the case of 
Cyprus by direct evidence). Namely, that decision-making is part of routine 
professional practice and what they do daily, and what most of them have been 
doing for many years. What these comments also indicate is that, in their notable 
majority, sentencing decisions have to be made quickly with little time for 
scrupulous reflection.510As Hutton observes, with partial reference to Tata’s511and 




510Hogarth, Sentencing as a Human Process (n 76) Ch 5. 
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Freiberg’s findings,512the decision comes first, with the judges knowing from the 
start in all but the hardest cases (whichever those might be or be categorised as 
such), what the right decision is, call it instinctive synthesis or anything else. The 
judges work backwards to construct a post hoc justification, and to demonstrate 
that the sentence ‘fits’ the case and the offender.  Therefore, based on this 
perspective, an understanding of sentencing is an understanding of the range of 
legitimate accounts, which judges can construct to justify their sentence, not on the 
basis of how it was reached but on how a plausible account was constructed.513 
The faculty of intuition enables the judge to make a quick judgment 
without a conscious weighting and comparison of the pros and cons of the possible 
courses of action.  It is a capability of reaching down into a subconscious 
repository of knowledge acquired from one’s education and experiences.  
Intuition, in this sense, is related to judgment, as in the proposition that 
experienced people tend to have good judgment because their experiences, though 
largely forgotten, remain accessible sources of knowledge for coping with 
challenges that despite being new are not novel, because they resemble previous 
challenges.  Most judges in Cyprus are highly experienced; many are middle-aged 
or older, have been judges for a long time, and before becoming judges they were 
practicing advocates.  Their experiences nourish their intuitions.  Unconscious 
preconceptions, which play such large a role in the judicial process and are the key 
to reconciling the attitudinal literature with what the judges think they are doing, 
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are products of intuition.  This implies, incidentally, that the more experienced a 
judge is the less his decision in a new case will be influenced by the evidence and 
arguments in that case.  The role of the unconscious in judicial decision-making is 
obscured by the convention that requires a judge to explain his decision in an 
opinion. That is a check on the errors to which intuitive reasoning is prone because 
of its compressed and inarticulate character; hence the value of a judge’s having a 
suite of emotions that does not cut him off from considering challenges to his 
intuitive take on a case.514  
 
7.2.2 Balancing and Judicial Illusionism   
Judicial reasoning must be full and genuine thus enhancing the ability of 
observers to gain confidence in the system,515thus removing the danger of 
sentences being based on an immediate emotional reaction to some feature of the 
offence.516Yet, reason giving is only part of the overall picture.  The other part 
relates to the truth behind the actual sentencing judgment (to isolate the matter on 
what is of direct concern here) and the honesty behind its reasoning as such. 
Definitely, one cannot convincingly assert that every thought that is part of a 
judge’s stream of consciousness in deliberating about a case is connected to the 
result; nor that every thought needed to explain the decision to those affected by it 
should form part of the reasoning.  This is more or less accepted and reasonable, as 
well as practicable.  What is contested as rather improper is the existence of 
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untruthfulness behind sentencing decisions, usually warily hidden or concealed, 
needless to say.  
The following comments by one of the participating judges puts matters 
bluntly in perspective:  
Sentencing is a balancing act for the purpose of reconciling all those often difficult 
to reconcile considerations. It is like balancing scales. Of course, we all know that 
this balancing thing is somehow a deceiving façade. You balance what you 
consider as the actual balancing factors by interpreting the evidence and you no 
that this interpretation can usually go both ways. You can find strong ways to 
imprison and equally strong reasons not to. It is the same with the Supreme Court 
at the appeal stage. If they want to reverse for whatever reason, they will no 
matter what you have said at first instance because that is what they wish to do 
and I do not question their integrity. The latter factors you must mention of course 
that you have weighted and finely analysed in your mind and so on and so forth. 
However, in reality you did not. You only balanced for example the fact that the 
defendant in a breaking and entering case entered the house of a young woman 
with a child knowing she was in and stole the wallet on the kitchen table wearing a 
hood, terrorising her and the kid with the need to deter others and show this 
woman that there is somebody out there, the Courts, that really care. So, what is it, 
two or three year’s imprisonment? I could have given him 12 years but you know 
that the maximum is ten. That is what you actually weight. Who cares whether he 
pleaded guilty and saves us all of the time and hassle looking at his face until the 
trial is over and listen to his lawyer talking about his human rights and how 
difficult childhood his client had, just because he is on legal aid or he wants to 
justify his hefty fee.517   
 
These revelations, and others that follow, raise matters of particular 
concern. Evidently, to put things mildly, there appears to be a disjunction between 
the reasons appearing in judicial decisions as their etiological foundation and those 
that judges exchange among themselves as portraying the true dimension of things.  
Evidently, Dr Gregory House is right when he avers in the TV series ‘House MD,’ 
that ‘everybody lies.’518On this premise, one could conceivably agree by 
reasonable analogy with Tata’s suggestion that judicial decision-making may not 
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be very different in character to that of other discretionary decision 
makers.519However, whoever else might think in a similar manner, might not be 
relevant, or in any event comforting, simply because they are not judges who (for 
better or worse) are responsible in making such detrimental decisions concerning 
peoples’ lives, and their families. Lord Bingham asserts, and correctly so, that 
most judges and their critics would today think it generally preferable to be open 
and frank on what they are doing without any hidden policy factors,520with reason 
giving constituting part of the judicial process because they are true, and not 
merely because they are defensible.521Clearly, this judicial illusionism, as it has 
been called,522the attitude in other words, of some judges not to be frank and 
honest in the reasons they officially give for their sentencing decisions, may look, 
and is, absurd and morally unethical to those who still believe that judges are free 
from human ordinarity. Despite its immorality, to some degree, this behaviour is 
socially understandable and perhaps expected by some. Any efforts to close this 
gap of untruthfulness in judging would assist advocates who must seek to persuade 
the judge in the future, but such efforts would also assist judges in intergrading 
their work in the act of judging and their work in explaining those judgments to 
others. However, further to the practical reasons judges may have in saying what 
the say about the inconsistency under dissension, their stance on the matter is 
consistent with their sense of epistemic rationality and their bona fide intentions to 
                                                
519Tata, ‘Conceptions and Representations of the Sentencing Decision Process’ (n 274) 414. 
520T Bingham, The Business of Judging: Selected Essays and Speeches (OUP, Oxford 2005) 30. 
521C Fitzmaurice, and K Pease, The Psychology of Judicial Sentencing (Manchester University 
Press, Manchester 1986) 45.  
522See, P Atiyah, ‘Judges and Policy’ (1980) 15 Israel L Rev 346, 367. 
 197 
act fairly and justiciously in every case, as they so deem appropriate.  For example, 
judge 16, later clarified that: 
The fact that a judge can balance things as he sees correct, fair and just by 
definition means that he will do so honestly and in accordance to his judicial oath. 
What a judge does is to administer justice, and the fact that he selects the best 
possible course from those available or from those which could be selected, is 
exactly, a proof of what I am saying. 
 
Along the same lines, another judge alleged: 
 
The fact that I can write a sentencing decision with case depending on the 
sentence I wish to impose as the just and fair sentence, does not indicate that such 
a choice is malignant or mala fide. It is simply the right one, as I see things.523  
 
Worthy of special mention, are the remarks of yet another judge on the 
point: 
Sentencing is a peculiar thing. Sometimes is related to the guilt of the offender 
viewed however from another perspective. What I mean is this. Sometimes, after I 
have found the defendant guilty of an offence after a trial, I might have some 
second thoughts, for whatever reasons. When that happens, I make sure that I am 
far more lenient with my sentencing, and where I can I manage to suspend the 
sentence, so that I minimise the possibility of an appeal and the possible reversal 
of my decision.524 
 
On similar grounds, 13 other judges used terms like: 
‘You know how these things work’525  
‘I can write a sentence for jailing the defendant with the same ease as I could 
write another for fining him and vice versa’526 
 
 ‘There is always a judgment of the Supreme Court or of another foreign court that 
could back up almost any decision you want to take. You choose according to your 
needs in the particular case you are dealing with, it is a matter of judicial 
policy.’527  
 







These comments observations show plainly the total disregard of any 
consistent legitimising framework in sentencing (at least on the basis under 
discussion) and the despondency of even thinking the possibility of searching for 
such a framework in the realm of moral legal theory. In fact, the said comments 
bring-up the political and academic qualms about anarchy and capriciousness in 
sentencing referred to in Chapter 1.2. 
 
7.2.3 Balancing and Imaginative Sentencing 
A number of judges noted the ‘vanity,’ as they described it, in going 
through the process of balancing with all that it entails knowing that they will 
almost never be able to see and evaluate the impact of their sentence on an 
offender, unless of course he reoffends and appears before them again for 
sentencing. These are some of the comments: 
We go through all that process, we say things like deterrence, social 
protection, and the like, without ever knowing whether what we have so painfully 
have said had any meaning to the offender or any practical result, other than 
ending up in prison or back to his home with a fine. There is a problem in this 
regard, which must be solved.528  
 
Big fuss for nothing; we never know whether for example there has been 
specific deterrence to the offender, or any of the issues dealt with during the 
sentencing stage. It would have been interesting if there were a follow-up 
somehow.529 
 
Its good to know what happens to the defendant after his conviction and 
sentence, and more specifically whether the sentence had any impact on him, and 
the way he approaches things and his life after the sentence.530  
 
What these judges are essentially expressing (verifying applicable 
academic opinion on the subject),531is that sentencing, from this lookout, is 





imaginary, in the sense that for the most part at least, they cannot know if the 
sentence they impose actually achieves its purpose, other than for those sentences 
imposed simply on grounds of denunciation, for instance, although most 
sentencers, as it will be analysed in Chapter 8, typically involve multiple 
sentencing purposes.  On this approach, judges can only imagine the impact of 
their sentences.  They cannot know whether their sentences ‘work.’  They sentence 
because they hope that something will happen, in the sense that, at least some of 
the time, their sentences will achieve what they want them to. 
 
7.3 The Judicial Conception of the Sentencing Undertaking and its 
Harshness 
 
The intricacy of the sentencing task was one of the most regular themes 
running through the interviews.  It was noticeable that the judges took the 
sentencing part of their judicial role very seriously.  Less than one third of the 
judges (15 judges) specifically discussed the sentencing process as being 
‘harsh,’532‘difficult,’533‘messy,’534‘very hard,’535‘a necessary evil,’536‘not 
something any sentencing judge takes lightly,’537‘difficult and thankless,’538 
‘trying,’539‘hard,’540‘something that doesn’t get any easier,’541 
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‘uncomfortable,’542and ‘even worse than trying to figure out general damages in 
accident cases.’543Ten of them expressly correlated the difficulty they were 
referring, to jailing. Three of the comments were particularly elaborative:  
The sentencing process has always been a muddled situation for me. It is never 
easy to tell someone that he will go to jail, no matter for how long. Of course, the 
more serious the offence and the circumstances of its committal the less difficult is 
the decision but it is still a difficult decision. Usually however we do not deal with 
such serious cases. More often than not, we deal with cases where the offence is 
serious admittedly but the circumstances are such that they have to do with 
ordinary human weaknesses. These people just happened to be caught. Forging 
cheques, petty theft, minor assaults and the like, where the defendant has also a 
prior criminal record are the most difficult. When you tell them you will go to 
serve a sentence of imprisonment, you are sentencing at the same time their 
families as well. You create a chain of consequences to that family which could be 
disproportionate to the offence. The defendant committed the offence, fair enough, 
but how about his family. What would that mother say to her children, particularly 
if they were young when they ask where their father is? How much would that 
woman be able to carry everyday and raise her children properly? Moreover, the 
children when they go to school would they be fraught and made fun of for being 
the children of a convict? It is easy to say that all these are not directly related to 
the offence and the punishment, but are they not. Every time I sentence someone to 
imprisonment, when I go home in the afternoon, I see my children and my wife and 
I feel guilty, I do not know if is for me I am feeling guilty of or for the defendant. It 
is a bad feeling, which I have never been able to overcome all these years. From 
this perspective sentencing is messy and difficult.544 
  
Imprisonment is bad for the overwhelming majority of offenders and we all know 
that, particularly if he is a first offender with a family and all that. I think that jail 
can have some positive effects on some people but it can have some negative 
effects as well. I feel sorry for these people and their families, but what can you do, 
this is life I suppose, but the decision is difficult every time.545 
 
Sentencing is a trying process, and you do not have to imprison someone to be 
able to say that, fining can do that as well. Sometimes it is the agonising process 
leading to that fine that causes the difficulty, and you know fines can cause serious 
problems as well.546 
 







 The remaining two-thirds of the judges indicated that sentencing, even 
though a difficult task (mainly because of the imprisonment factor) did not cause 
them any problems or complexities worth mentioning. Their comments were in the 
range of ‘sentencing is just part of the everyday business,’547‘nothing special,’548 
‘not worse than having to give your findings after a hearing,’549 ‘just a part of the 
game,’550 and ‘just a necessary procedure.’551  
Two additional representative observations were the following: 
 Sentencing is part and parcel of the judicial duty. It has rules, it has practice, and 
it has case law that pretty much covers what you need to know. Granted that not 
all of these can rule how to feel, but still this does not make sentencing difficult in 
the sense of being something special or whatever. Sentencing is nothing 
extraordinary, from this standpoint. It is difficult in the sense of the responsibility 
not the action per se.  It is of course crucial to the defendant but ok, my duty is to 
sentence him and that is what I do. That is what a good and descent judge should 
do. Apply the law and do his job.552  
 
We are professional judges and sentencing is part of our everyday business. I see 
no particular difficulty in it or experience any negative feelings. I just to what I 
have to do. We all have our role in this world. We sentence and criminals offend; 
we do our part, they do theirs.553 
 
 The fact that some of the judges found sentencing easier or less 
complicated than their colleagues does not strip the former of genuine motivation 
and interest in dispensing justice, or for that matter, attribute to the rest a greater 
sense of judicial sensitivity and social concern for the proper administration of 
justice. The presumption that all judges act towards the latter scope, though 









rebuttable, is hard to refute, particularly if viewed though the prism of their 
resonance, as the above interview comments indicate. 
What ensues from the aforesaid interview statements is that punishing, for 
the most part, is an unpleasant and knotty experience for the judge.  He is after all 
the ultimate institutional critic, whether one likes it or not.  He is the one with the 
immense societal responsibility and grand powers in his hands to punish and 
decide the fate of his fellow human beings (truthfully that is), no matter how much 
Albert Einstein would aver that whoever undertakes to set himself up as a judge of 
truth and knowledge would be shipwrecked by the laughter of gods554(and perhaps 
not only them, having in mind the judicial comments in paragraph 7.2.1, above).  
The other main actors in the sentencing system, namely the prosecution 
and the defence, present their case and all the information they consider relevant, 
then sit back, and wait for the decision of the court. It is not rare however that they 
be lacunas in their cases mostly due to poor preparation or inadvertence, and 
occasionally pure and simple incompetence. The judge has to balance matters and 
decide to what extent he can or cannot interfere, and fill-in the gaps so as to 
dispense substantive justice. His responsibility for judging subsists. He must come 
to a decision strictly in accordance to the evidence and facts presented before him; 
this is the fundamental nature of the adversarial system. It is likewise a fact 
though, that this systemic pragmatism can be the cause of tension and angst to the 
judge, often times not immediately felt, or ironically, with its repercussions 
properly and timely balanced by him.  
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Twenty-five of the judges spoke specifically about the psychological strain 
and unease that sentencing causes them. This is not to say that it was not a matter 
of concern to the rest of the judges, as the researcher was able to gather by their 
demeanour during the interviews. However, reading through the lines of the 
comments presented above on the difficulty of sentencing (mainly, vis-à-vis the 
decision to imprison), such a reasoning is prima facie reasonable, to say the least. 
Possibly, it might not be far from the truth for one to assert that judges engage in 
one of the most stressful jobs in contemporary society having constantly to make 
publicly, non delegable decisions about the life and freedom of people, usually in 
dramatic circumstances, with their sentencing decisions subjected to appeal and 
criticism (often times unconstructive and spiteful), being at the same time obliged 
to discharge their functions with ‘impeccable honesty, resolute even-handedness, 
conspicuous humanity and a high degree of judicial wisdom.’555Indeed, the work 
of judges is highly varied and multifarious. It can involve criminal matters, family 
matters, private disputes of various types, and challenges to governmental 
decisions. They find themselves called upon to make decisions about the law, to 
determine facts, to assess the credibility of witnesses, to manage courtrooms, to 
impose criminal sanctions, and determine damages. Judges perform their duties in 
majestic courthouses, decrepit buildings, small hearing rooms, and their chambers. 
Some of them spend most of their time working in the same building, while others 
travel from place to place to handle cases in various districts. Advocates appearing 
before judges include accomplished specialists, struggling beginners, mediocre 
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veterans, and inarticulate self represented litigants. Throughout all of the 
variations, we expect judges to act with intelligence, dignity, neutrality, respect, 
compassion, and efficiency.556  
The four more detailed and expressive comments made specifically on the 
issue of the general psychological tension of the judge in the process of 
sentencing, were the following: 
I view sentencing as psychologically upsetting and hectic. It is not something you 
can endure for a long time. It gets on you, and at first, you might not even notice it, 
except perhaps your wife and children when you go home.  There is a lot of misery 
out there, many unhappy and unlucky people whose problems and who knows what 
brought forced to the edge, and there you come you give the final push and there 
they go. That, I cannot stand, it eats me from the inside no matter how deserving 
the punishment it that is not the point.557 
 
Sentencing is soul fading. There is so much pain and so much anger in society. I 
feel so sad every time I have to put away offenders, see, and worse of all hear in 
the courtroom the sobbing of their parents, grandparents, wives, husbands, you 
name it.  It kills me no matter what. It purely kills me.558 
 
Punishing people is hard. It causes me great stress and emotional commotion. I 
remember once I came to my chambers early in the morning and found in the 
parking area a young woman who appeared to be very distressed but in a very 
proud and decent manner. I could see into her eyes that look of a person in despair 
however. She told me ‘I know that I could end up in jail if I approach you but I 
will. I am the mother of so and so. You are going to give out his sentence today, 
you know for that fight. He is a good boy my son, a very good and sensitive boy, do 
not send him to prison, they will destroy him in there. His father used to beat him 
up everyday because he was not man enough he used to say and look what 
happened. He is a good boy my boy.’ At first, I felt anger because she dared to 
approach me in such a manner. I called up my wife to tell her. She told me what I 
did not want to hear ‘wouldn’t you have done that if you were she? It is her child. 
Imagine how hard it was for her to do that.’ I sent him to prison for six months. 
The facts were serious and he had a prior conviction, a fine for common assault. 
He was only 17 though. I gave the sentence and withdrew immediately in my 
chambers for the courtroom to clear up from his relatives. I could hear the mother 
weeping. Tears came into my eyes. We decide, we give our sentences according to 
the law and the case law for justice and so on but the bottom line is that we are 
                                                




causing anguish and sadness at the same time to a lot of people, and that I do not 
like at all.559 
 
Sometimes we have no time to think about what are we deciding. We act on 
feedback based on our experience. We use our knowledge to improvise. The 
tension is immense. Theories under these circumstances are a curse to deal with. 
We just want to finish up the case in a practical and fair way. When we finish with 
a sentence we don’t’ utter that we have awarded justice to that offender and his 
victim, although we did of course, but that we have disposed of one more case file; 
one less case file to go, yes!560  
 
The strain and the anguish many Cypriot judges feel in the exercise of their 
sentencing duties could prospectively cause serious problems to the administration 
of criminal justice and to them personally. One measure could be a more careful 
selection of judges in general and of those who are to assume duties in the criminal 
Bench in particular. Frustrated and stressed judges may face difficulties in 
executing their duties with stillness and reasonableness. They may not have the 
time to properly reflect and decide on a sentence let alone think in terms of moral 
theories of punishment and the justification of imposing a sanction, or be merciful, 
with their focus (or what is left of it) being directed elsewhere. In this ambience of 
things, the effort to speak about theoretical rationales and equilibriums between 
sentencing practice and punishment theory might actually appear pointless.  
 
7.3.1 Sentencing as a Rational Process 
Judges view sentencing as an essentially pragmatic exercise, and no factor 
is less predictive of the ultimate sentencing decision than their general theoretical 
rationale. Such a pragmatic approach involves, more or less, the judge’s response 
to a particular set of facts. The present study tended to reflect that approach to 




sentencing as did to show, in addition, that Cypriot judges are also sensitive of 
procedural justice as a precondition for the substantive justice in the particular 
case:  
My role as a judge is to stick to the facts and decide on the appropriate sentence 
based on these facts.  This is what it basically comes down to.561 
 
We judges know that we have a specific role in sentencing.  We are neither the 
prosecution nor the defence. We may suspect that what they present before us is 
not the whole truth due to a variety of reasons but that should not change things. 
Our role remains the same, which is sentence on the facts and only on them not on 
the facts, as we wanted them to be or suspect them to be. The sentencing process 
has therefore its own philosophy that is the creation of the factual basis of the 
sentencing decision more or less like the trial of the case.562  
 
Other judges saw the sentencing process in a related way as imposing 
justice according to law:  
The judge is here to give effect and meaning to the law and based on the law he 
must sentence. I do not think that there is much controversy on this if at all.563 
 
The sentencing process is planned in such a way so as to structure the manner in 
which the facts are to be presented before the judge for deliberation. The role of 
the judge is to make sure that this process is followed to the letter and fairly for all 
parties concerned, particularly the defendant. No judge wants any offender taking 
advantage of any procedural pitfalls and is released or has his sentence reduced 
for such reasons. Judges must follow procedure strictly. From thereon the decision 
is for the judge on which sentence to select and impose on the defendant.564 
 
The latter statement reflects also the inveterate assertions in the literature to 
the effect that a sentence is nothing but a mere procedural and substantive phase of 
the wider criminal justice system, and that no matter how important and difficult it 
is, it cannot be a principal means of restricting crime, though that must be the main 
aim of any penal system in its totality.565 
                                                




565N Walker, Sentencing in a Rational Society (Allen Lane The Penguin Press, London 1969) 21.  
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Another judge stated: 
The courts are not here to reform society or even the system of administration of 
justice. Judges decide on the evidence adduced. If our decisions could help in 
improving, things then that would be a blessing. But from thereon the efforts for 
solving societal problems are synergistic with the courts having a small only role 
to play.566 
 
Indeed, the limited role of sentencing in the criminal justice process 
implied in the above comment, was also borne out by Peter Taylor, the former 
Lord Chief Justice of England, who once stated that ‘…it must be remembered that 
the courts alone cannot make people good or more responsible to one another. The 
courts are only one of a number of social influences.’567Courts are, truly, 
reflections of society and not the society itself. The causes of crime are numerous, 
having little to do, if at all, with the judicial actions or inactions. Surely though, by 
examining those who administer justice, the judges, one can catch a glimpse of 
how and why penal is administered as it is.568 
 
7.3.2 The Procedural Judicial Perception of the Process and the Fear of 
Reversal 
 
A number of judges, when asked how they saw the process of sentencing, 
gave an account of the procedure they followed in court. This points to the fact 
that they perceived sentencing in practical terms, and yields some insights into 
how they handle the task. Appreciably, there appears to be an opinion by some 
judges that if one pursues the proper method, the analogous result will follow: 
I listen to the submissions, I refer to the offence in the indictment and then I 
proceed with my rationale. I usually have ready one or two paragraphs on the 
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seriousness of the offence, its nature and the need for deterrence, and I conclude 
with my sentence. I usually keep it brief. The less said the fewer the chances to say 
something that could lead to reversal. And I would not want that, and the same 
would apply I think to most other judges.569  
 
 
Another comment was made to the effect that: 
[...] I make sure that I am far more lenient with my sentencing, and where I can I 
manage to suspend the sentence, so that I minimise the possibility of an appeal and 
the possible reversal of my decision.570 
 
Thirty-eight of the judges interviewed, expressed similar concerns in 
various parts of their comments, such as: 
Do you know anybody who wants to have his decisions doubted, let alone 
overturned?’571  
 
I don’t like to be reversed on appeal, honestly. That is why I manage to form my 
decisions in a way that it would make it difficult to be reversed.572 
 
I don’t like playing hero and take bold steps in my sentencing with comments and 
social statements, and the like, because reversal is always lurking.573  
 
The less said the better. The more you say the more grounds of appeal you give 
out, and the more grounds for the appeal court to reverse you. Of course we all 
know that if the Supreme Court wants to reverse it will no matter how correct and 
to the point you were.574 
 
 These comments signify that the Cypriot judges are generally, 
institutionally responsive to specific precedents and trends in their sentencing 
decision-making,575showing however an apparent fear (and probably the greater 
constraint to their discretionary sentencing powers), to being reversed by the 
Supreme Court, though in a calculating and methodological manner, and not 







575For similar findings in the US, see D Klein, and R J Hume, ‘Fear of Reversal as an Explanation 
of Lower Court Compliance’ (2003) 37 L & Soc'y Rev 579. 
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unconsciously, as more recent research seems to suggest.576This fear might be the 
result of the widespread impression between the Cypriot judges, expressed during 
the interviews, that the Supreme Court is easy on reversals of first instance 
sentences. In fact, as indicated in paragraph 3.2.3, this impression is corroborated 
by the statistical fact that between 1960 and 2008, 36.7% of the sentences appealed 
against were reversed.  
 
7.3.3 The Procedural Judicial Perception of the Process and Defendant 
Insincerity 
 
On a different tenor, but still related to the judges’ broad perception of the 
sentencing process, one of the judges said: 
The process is a mechanistic process basically. Each actor plays his role, and I do 
not mean to underestimate the importance of the sentencing procedure. The 
prosecution mentions the facts, if there is a guilty plea and whether there are 
previous convictions for the offender. You sense almost immediately if there has 
been a plea-bargaining or some thing of collusion in the acceptable sense between 
prosecution and defence. You let the defence lawyer say what he wants to say, and 
then you give the sentence. You hear how much the defendant feels remorse for the 
offence he has committed and the like. We all know that in the vast majority of 
cases these mitigating remarks, particularly the remorse ones are far from the 
truth. The system works until the next time the same defendant will appear before 
you with the same or a different lawyer and tell you the same things.577 
 
Indubitably, everyone involved in the sentencing process (at least those 
who do not act as if they cannot see), is aware of the insincerity prevailing, 
especially the defendant. When he pleads guilty, he must at least pretend to show 
remorse. This allows the judge to also pretend that the defendant deserves special 
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Psychological Sources of Disparity’ (2010) 42(1) Aust J For Sci 19, 27. 
577Judge 33. 
 210 
consideration and leniency for being truly sorry for his crime.578The scepticism 
pertaining to the remorseful motives of defendants has been diachronic. In the 
1960s Blumberg wrote that ‘[The guilty plea is, in fact, an act,] during which an 
accused must project an appropriate and acceptable degree of guilt, penitence, and 
remorse. If he adequately feigns the role of the “guilty person,” his hearers will 
engage in the fantasy that he is contrite and thereby merits a lesser plea. One of the 
essential functions of the criminal lawyer is that he coach the defendant in this 
performance.’579More recently, Jeffrie Murphy, exploring moral and epistemic 
issues along similar lines as Blumberg, expressed considerable scepticism toward 
relying on judgments about offender remorse at the time of sentencing by 
signifying that he does not give much weight to expressions of remorse and 
repentance at the sentencing stage, as he simply sees too much chance of being 
made a sucker by fakery.580So, predictably enough, the Cypriot judges, again, do 
not constitute an exception to judicial behaviour noticed in other jurisdictions. 
 
7.3.4 Delay in Sentencing  
Thirty-three judges identified, with noticeable fret, certain procedural 
difficulties in the case of sentencing delay. The following two statements 
incorporate the gist of the rest of the comments: 
If the sentence takes place two years after the offence, the immediacy is lost, 
particularly if it is a custodial sentence. The big change I would like to see is that 
the trial should take place as soon as possible after the offence, or at least as soon 
as things such as scientific tests have taken place. This would also assist witnesses 
or people who are pleading guilty. Delay is one of the big issues in the court, and 
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the philosophy of sentencing offenders, and one that might negatively affect Justice 
and its distribution. 581 
 
The issue of delay has various parameters. One parameter is the availability of 
evidence, and this is relevant not only in case where there is a trial as to the guilt 
of the defendant but also at the sentencing stage if there be a need for example for 
a Newton type of hearing. Will the witnesses come to testify properly and not just 
show up and profess they do not remember? Will the victim be willing to continue 
with the case particularly if he or she went on and put everything behind? These 
are serious issues and they become even more serious if the delay is attributed to 
the courts. Justice might be affected.582  
 
These observations bring out a normative concern on the part of the judges 
as to the effects of delay and the way they interpret, not only their role within the 
system of punishment, but the viability and moral legitimacy of the system itself. 
Very few, if any, would disagree that punishment must be swift in order to 
strengthen the association between crime and punishment. This is indeed a remark 
of practical importance. Nonetheless, at a more abstract level, delay emits a 
problem of justification and it conflicts with both retributivist and utilitarian 
accounts of punishment. Bentham argues that in calculating the consequences of 
an action, the proximity of the punishment to the offence must be considered and 
weighed against the immediacy of the profit of the offence; so if the individual 
receives immediate gratification from the offence, this is more significant than the 
prospect of a distant punishment.583  
Two judges, linked the issue of delay, and the realisation on their part of its 
impact in sentencing, with their perceived conception of the proper and expected 
discharge of their judicial duties. They said: 
                                                
581Judge 2.  
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583Research shows that indeed punishment is more effective when it is immediate, inescapable, and 
severe and given on a fixed ratio schedule: See, G C Walters and J E Grusec, Punishment 
(Freeman, San Francisco 1977). 
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Justice delayed is justice denied. We all know that, it has become a cliché, but I 
wonder to what extent do we really appreciate the problems that can arise from 
delay not only in completing the trial proceedings speedily and effectively but also 
in sentencing the offenders. Delay can sometimes be as cruel or nerve breaking for 
the offender as his final sentence for that matter. I personally feel that if I don’t 
sentence the offender without delay I would have failed in my judicial duty, 
provided of course that the delay is due to my handling of the case and not from 
other extra judicial factors.584  
 
A judge must be the worse enemy of delay in judicial proceedings, particularly in 
the sentencing stage where the defendant has pleaded guilty in a serious offence. 
He has decided to assume responsibility for his actions. He is naturally anxious to 
proceed with his life. This anxiety usually overcomes his family as well, and also 
the family of the victim but the victim as well. A judge is responsible to bring 
closure to the case for both the sake of the offender, and the victim of his crime 
soon. This is justice.585 
 
If nothing else, these comments are indicative of the sense of responsibility 
that some judges have or show in the exercise of their duties, and of their 
sensitivities towards not only the offenders and their rights but also towards the 
victims and the idea (or notion) of justice. This judicial concern does not constitute 
a Cypriot patent. It has been troubling judges in other parts of the world as well for 
years.586 
The issue of delay is also inevitably and inextricably related to the 
sentencing workloads of the judges, as noted in the following paragraph.  
 
7.3.5 Sentencing Workloads and the Art of Edvard Munch 
Judges commonly perceive their sentencing workload as mounting. They 
are under considerable pressure to complete cases as quickly as possible so that 
other cases can take turn and the system gets moving. There are a lot of demands 
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on the courts to get through many sentences daily; otherwise, the system may 
stalemate.  A notable number of judges stated that they were under significant 
strain because of the workload placed upon them.  Apparently, many District 
Court judges, spoke of commonly having daily 10-12 cases for sentencing listed 
(in addition to the 2 -3 hearings, and several fresh cases) and the difficulties that 
this caused during the six hours for which they sit in court daily from Monday to 
Friday:  
One of the only constraints on the process is a lack of time, as I sometimes have to 
impose ten or even twelve sentences in a day. These are many sentences for one 
day in the proper criminal jurisdiction. Remember also that we have daily 
hearings as well plus fresh cases. Mistakes are happening because of this, but let 
us not discuss it now.587 
 
 There are disproportionately more cases than judges to decide on them. Either 
one must consider recruiting more judges to do the job or the prosecution must 
learn to exercise their discretion to prosecute more efficiently. It does not 
necessarily mean that all those who commit criminal offences must be brought 
before a court of law. At some point the system will collapse and much earlier 
when the few judges who are very productive and particularly competent fall back 
because the system does not reward them accordingly? It is unheard of for a judge 
to have ten serious criminal cases everyday for sentencing. It is not fair to them 
and not fair to the defendants but to the prosecution as well.588   
 
What is happening in the courts of Cyprus is abhorrent. How could a judge put in 
so many hours of work and many more when he goes home? This is unacceptable. 
We need to rest in the sense that we need to have time to think and write our 
judgments and keep informed of developments not only in Cyprus but abroad as 
well. There is no such chance.589 
 
The pressure to get through a large number of sentencing cases apparently 
extends to the Supreme Court judges as well: 
Sentencing appeals can be distressing.  The Supreme Court is under a lot of 
pressure to get work done; sometimes we hear four to five, sentencing appeals a 
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day.  Some of them are disposed of by ex tempore judgments and others are 
reserved. Do not forget that we deal with civil and administrative cases as well. 
Sometimes we feel that a particular point may have some specific theoretical or 
more general interest the resolution of which may have wider repercussions but 
we have no energy and no time to tackle it and we decide the appeal on the 
substance of things.590 
The pressures on the Supreme Court in sentencing matters are not greater than the 
pressures to try the appeals fast both in the civil and the criminal jurisdiction but 
also in the administrative law jurisdiction. We are not thirty year olds. Most of us 
are well into their late fifties plus. We get tired easily and our concentration span 
is decreasing. In the Supreme Court we must have the time to decide issues in 
depth and give careful directions and not work with the workloads and conditions 
of a newly appointed District Court Judge in the traffic jurisdiction.591 
 
The pathos and despondency with which almost all judges graphically 
described their workload anxiety and demands during the interviews, brought to 
mind Edvard Munch’s often quoted utterance ‘Am I in hell?’592It also reminded of 
his painting ‘The Scream’593(one of his best known and most frequently 
reproduced expressionistic motifs), or even the projected melancholy of his 
‘Angst’, or still of his ‘Ashes’, two more of his famous paintings dealing with 
anxiety and despair and giving shape (as with most of his art) to the inner life and 
psyche of modern man.594 
Another judge, apparently of the Supreme Court, gave a different 
dimension on the impact of stress and workloads. He said: 
We are very pressed for time. We sit in court almost everyday, that is, two and 
sometimes three divisions of the criminal division. Sometimes we don’t know what 
the other judges in the other divisions are deciding or have decided for quite a few 
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days. So there you have inconsistencies and disparities. It is a problem hard to be 
solved, if at all.595 
 
This comment is very similar to the observations made by Lane LCJ, more 
than a quarter of a century ago in relation to the difficulties arising in ensuring 
appellate consistency in judicial judgments:  
Sitting as we do in several division, each with a heavy workload, there are 
inevitably going to be discrepancies between different divisions of the Court of 
Appeal (Criminal Division), and there are going to be judgments of that Court 
which trouble judges at first instance (and, I may add, sometime trouble the Court 
which delivered the judgment. 596 
 
The same situation as that described above by Lane LCJ appears to apply 
in Cyprus as well, in the 21st century, and this might be indicative of the fact that 
certain (to say the least) issues relating to sentencing have a common denominator, 
and a diachronic transnational importance.  
The logic one could reach on the basis of the above comments is that the 
administration of the justice system must be adapted to current judicial needs and 
allow judges the luxury of time and manageable working conditions to keep-up 
with legal and extra-legal developments and to make contributions out of court to 
issues affecting the administration of justice. Once, Lord Megarry supported the 
view that judges (he was referring to English judges) needed a few days a month 
out of court, and a sabbatical term every few years to give them time to reflect.597 
This it seems could not have been more appropriate and welcomed by the Cypriot 
judges of today. 
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7.3.6 Adjourning For Reflection Before Sentence 
Related to the discussion on workloads is the practice of rarely adjourning 
a sentencing hearing and reserving the decision for a later time. Unless there has 
been a report ordered or some other specific reason, many (particularly competent) 
judges seldom adjourn, and it is standard practice to give their sentence ex tempore 
after hearing submissions, or after a short brake. Ex tempore sentencing judgments 
are however rare in the Assize Court where the panel usually retires for 
consideration, sometimes for substantive reasons and occasionally out of comity to 
the prosecution and defence advocates:  
I usually give out my decision on sentencing ex tempore. Rarely, when I am not 
sure about something such as the existence of some precedent, I adjourn. I also 
adjourn when in a rather serious case I am almost certain that I will not impose 
custody so that I can order the defendant to stay in custody for a few days until the 
decision just to teach him a lesson.598 
 
I rarely reserve my sentencing judgments, but I might recess shortly if the speech 
in mitigation is a particularly competent and well thought out, mostly out of 
courtesy for the advocate rather than from a real need to reflect, as that I do 
during the mitigation speech.599  
 
In the road traffic jurisdiction I almost never reserve my decision on the sentence. 
The case is so big that reserving will lead to absolute catastrophe of my diary.600 
 
Three judges recognised that there are, from time to time, instances that 
call for an adjournment: 
Thinking well and seriously before you sentence is the best advice you can give 
and get. Sometimes, when you think something repeatedly might change your 
perspective of things. If I am minded to hand down a custody sentence, I almost 
invariably adjourn.601 
 






On an emotional level if I am irritated about something the defendant did or the 
prosecution sometimes and I feel that that might affect my judgment, I reserve and 
adjourn.  At those times the best thing is to adjourn the court for a period.602 
 
From time to time when I have already decided that I will imprison despite the 
very able mitigation speech of defence advocate I adjourn for a while so as to 
show that I carefully considered all that has been placed before me.  It is a matter 
of respect to the advocate but the defendant as well or his family if it happens to be 
present in the courtroom.603 
 
Although the practice of not adjourning sentencing is mainly one of 
convention, it could also be indicative of time pressures on judges to get through 
matters quickly, something, which is very much connected to the workload and 
pressure issues already mentioned. 
Two other judges, evidently participating in collective bodies such as the 
Assize Court and the Supreme Court, gave a very noteworthy picture of the behind 
the scenes judicial deliberations on sentencing, proving once more the (very) 
human nature of the judicial officers: 
In the Assize Court as a rule you have to adjourn. We are three so we have to 
discuss the case and the mitigation particularly when the defence advocate’s 
speech is able and reflective. Many times we do not agree on the extent of the 
imprisonment, and the final sentence usually reflects a compromise of many 
things, not uncommonly of principle and one’s sense of justice in the particular 
case. This will depend, as you know, on who is the President of the Assize Court, 
how competent he is or considered to be by the other judges sitting with him, and 
the various interpersonal circumstances and skills (and egos) of the members 
forming the Assize Court.604 
 
In the Supreme Court we might have to adjourn for consideration so that we could 
go through the minutes of the trial and all these. We usually do so. One of us 
undertakes to write the judgment, and the other members of the bench usually sign 
it in agreement, sometimes not even reading it. Of course all these depend on the 
state of relationship between the judges. We do have our differences on certain 
matters relating on sentencing. Some of us are excessively lenient, and some 
others excessively harsh, so you do realise what happens when these people are 
part of the same criminal bench, particularly if their differences reach beyond the 





level of principle and theoretical inclinations, and reach the level of egopathy and 
psychological insecurity.605 
 
These comments, viewed in conjunction with pertinent opinions expressed 
by other judges elsewhere in the world, indicate that the judicial behaviour and 
attitudes they describe, is characterised by a sort of a universality which helps 
understand the noticeable similarities of judicial behaviour found (at least) in the 
common law jurisdictions, irrespective of country or nation magnitude and 
credence. Chief Judge Richard Posner, for instance, described his experience in the 
American judicial system by saying that judges rarely level with the public (and 
not always with themselves), concerning the seamier side of the judicial process, 
and that this is the side that includes the unprincipled compromises and petty 
jealousies and rivalries that accompany collegial decision-making and indolence 
and apathy.606  
 
7.3.7 Previous Convictions 
Interestingly, 8 judges connected the sentencing process with the issue of 
previous convictions. They indicated that the first thing they want to hear even 
before the facts, is whether or not the defendant has previous convictions as that 
alerts them and forces them to be even more attentive to the facts of the offence 
                                                
605Judge 30. 
606R Posner, The Problems of Jurisprudence (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts 
1993) 458. Another Chief American judge, Patricia Wald, expressed similar feelings to those of 
Posner, signifying that: ‘Real friendships are rare on the court. Heartfelt differences of philosophy 
and ideology militate against them. Powerful egos often impede them, even among philosophical 
allies. Judges are like monks without the unifying bonds of a common faith. They are consigned to 
one another’s company for life. They cannot speak about their work outside the walls of the 
monastery. Lingering resentment and hostilities may be kept under wraps – and a bottle of Mylanta 
at hand – to preserve the image of the court that is impartial and neutral enough to decide other 
people’s disputes’: (See, P Wald, ‘Some Real-Life Observations About Judging’ (1992) 26 Ind L 
Rev 173, 179). 
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and the mitigation because of the increased possibility of a custodial sentence. 
Two of the comments summarise the position of the rest: 
The first thing I want to know before anything else is if the defendant has any 
previous convictions. That is very helpful because it warns you to be even more 
careful in understanding the facts and have the right perspective. Sometimes if the 
prosecution starts presenting the facts without first mentioning whether there are 
previous convictions I would interfere and ask the question myself.607 
 
We all have to admit that the previous convictions of the defendant are crucial, 
whether are similar to the offence at stake or not. I want to know the kind of man 
the offender is. In an assault case, for example I do deem as relevant his previous 
convictions on gambling or road traffic violations. These previous convictions are 
indicative of his wider respect to the laws of the country and his attitude towards 
them. In such cases I say that these convictions although not directly relevant to 
the offence they take away the benefit of a clean record and the possibility to ask 
the court to show mercy. The process is therefore important and in this sense.608 
 
There are debatably some moral problems with the factor of previous 
convictions besides the practical concerns raised by some of the judges, though not 
seen or evaluated by them, at least expressly, in the context of philosophy or 
jurisprudence. Previous convictions are material for retributivists,609but surely not 
for all.610The risk of re-offending is irrelevant. Modern utilitarians on the other 
hand, like Edney and Bagaric,611claim that previous convictions lead to punishing 
the offender twice for the same offence, thus violating the principle of 
proportionality, which according to Ashworth is not part of the utilitarian ratio in 
any event.612The influence of prior criminal behaviour has been challenged both in 
                                                
607Judge 44. 
608Judge 16. 
609R Singer, Just Deserts: Sentencing Based on Equality and Desert (Ballinger Publishing 
Company, Cambridge, Massachusetts 1979) 67-74.  
610See for instance, G Fletcher, ‘The Recidivist Premium’ (1982) 1(2) Crim Just Eth 54. 
611R Edney and M Bagaric, Australian Sentencing: Principles and Practice (CUP, Melbourne 
2007) 239-240. 
612Ashworth, ‘Deterrence’ (n 347) 44. 
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the European Court of Human Rights613and the European Commission,614under 
Article 6(2) of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms,615and was held to be in harmony with the pertinent 
provisions.  
 
7.3.8 Giving Reasons 
In Cyprus, giving reasons for a decision is a judicial duty stemming from 
constitutional provisions.616There has never been a case in Cyprus (at least since it 
became an independent Republic in 1960), for a judge not to be obliged to give 
effective and detailed reasons for any decision, let alone for imposing a particular 
sentence. The judgment has always been the voice of the judge, through which he 
realises his role in a democracy. It is the exclusive means through which the 
judicial voice is actualised in practice.617This enables the parties to see the extent 
to which the Court considered their arguments; to further judicial accountability; to 
enable interested parties to ascertain the basis upon which similar cases will be 
decided in the future; and to enable an appellate court to determine whether the 
                                                
613In Engel v The Netherlands (1979-1980) 1 EHRR 647, a military supreme court had taken into 
account as an aggravating factor applicants’ participation in a forbidden publication, for which they 
had not been prosecuted or convicted. The Court refused to see a connection between Article 6(2) 
and sentencing: ‘As its wording shows, it deals only with the proof of guilt and not with the kind or 
level of punishment.’ 
614In X v Germany (1976) 6 Digest 129, The Commission followed the Court’s interpretation that 
the presumption of innocence is a procedural and not a substantive right, and held that the 
European Convention does not prevent considering an offenders personality as an aggravating 
factor in sentencing. 
615Article 6(2): ‘Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved 
guilty according to law.’ 
616Article 30.2 of the Constitution provides that the judgment of the court must be reasoned. This 
Article, forms part of the fundamental provisions of the Constitution and casts a mandatory duty on 
the judge to give due reasons for his deliberations and the conclusions embodied in his judgment. 
The structure and the style of reasoning is a matter of discretion for the judge. The object of this 
constitutional requirement is to guard against the possibility of a judgment appearing to be arbitrary 
and the feelings of grievance such judgment may give rise to. 
617A Barak, The Judge in a Democracy (Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey 2006) 
205. 
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decision is erroneous or not.  It is principally important to give reasons where the 
judge is imposing a particularly lenient or harsh sentence so that the appeal court 
could be in a position to better evaluate the decision within the parameters of the 
first instance reasoning.  
The Supreme Court has indicated that it will be less likely to interfere with a 
sentence when reasons have been given by the trial court to justify a sentence that 
is otherwise outside of the normal range,618along the lines, it seems, of English 
precedent619- to which the Supreme Court did not however refer. It has been 
argued with reference to English judges (with direct applicability to the Cypriot 
judges as well), that if judges could be persuaded to be more explicit about their 
sentencing calculations, at least in the general sense of stating what sentence they 
think appropriate for the offence itself and then roughly to what extent they have 
modified that to reflect specified aggravating and mitigating factors in the case, 
that would further accountability and transparency.620  
It is worth noting that the way the Supreme Court justifies its sentencing 
decisions, is not significantly dissimilar to that of the Court of Criminal Appeal in 
                                                
618See, for example, Michael v The Republic [2003] 2 CLR 123, 131, where it was held that: 
‘Indeed, where there appears to be a sentencing tendency in relation to the commission of certain 
offences which is justified on solid grounds, a tariff could be formed, but this tariff could not lead 
to an ossification of powers of the court to sentence according to the realities of each case and its 
particular facts. This would not mean that that the tariff will be ignored, where there are substantial 
similarities. However, caution must be exercised, because despite the fact that human behaviour is 
repetitive, certain differences and details are detectable which might give to the sentencing 
precedent a different dimension.’ 
619See, Johnson (1994) 15 Cr App Rep (S) 827, 830, where it was said by Roch LJ that: ‘a judge 
when sentencing must pay attention to the guidance given by this Court and sentences should be 
broadly in line with guidance cases, unless there are factors applicable to the particular case which 
require or enable the judge to depart from the normal level of sentence. In such special cases the 
judge should indicate clearly the factor or factors which in his judgment allow departure from the 
tariff set by this court. What a judge must not do is to state that he is applying some personal tariff 
because he considers the accepted range of sentences to be too high or too low.’ 
620A Ashworth, ‘The Roles of Legislature and Judiciary in English Sentencing’ in S Doran and J 
Jackson (eds), The Judicial Role in Criminal Proceedings (Hart Publishing, Oxford 2000) 291, 
305. 
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Scotland, in appeals against sentence. As we are informed by Hutton, a typical 
judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeal recites the facts and circumstances of 
the case to display that they have been taken into account; the Court then states an 
opinion as to whether the original sentence was within the appropriate boundaries 
or not.  Occasionally, the Court will make references to past cases, and even more 
rarely there may be some rehearsal of one or more of the conventional aims of 
sentencing. However, the judgment never articulates the nature of the relationship 
between the severity of the penalty and the facts and circumstances of the 
case.621On this basis, there appear to be two differences between the two courts 
and their reasoning approach.  The first is that the Supreme Court (but also the 
District Courts and the Assize Courts) refers to past cases almost invariably in an 
attempt to ‘give authority to the judgment,’622and perhaps portray a sense of 
continuity and consistency in their sentencing approach, without of course that 
constituting a necessarily true and accurate statement of the actual reality.  The 
second is that, more often than not, the judgments of the Supreme Court do 
correlate the penalty to the facts of the case, on the authority of the constitutional 
requirement for due reasoning and moral fairness to the defendant who has, after 
all, the right to know exactly why he ended up in prison.  
It was the view of one judge (apparently of the Supreme Court), that when 
sitting on sentencing appeals, he did not find the remarks of the trial court helpful: 
On appeal we usually see what the facts are and if the judge properly evaluated 
them.  What the trial judge said is of little if any importance.  The point is if the 
facts justify his observations.623   
 
                                                




Other comments were:  
Sentencing remarks are crucial in the sentencing process.624 
 
Giving reasons for your sentence is crucial.  You explain to the defendant and to 
the public at large the real reasons why you have decided the way you did and not 
otherwise. You communicate to everybody the stance of the state on the matter, a 
stance that becomes even heavier if expressed by the Supreme Court for obvious 
reasons. This communication can only take place, or at least most of the times by 
the media. The media need caution however.  Sometimes are not accurate or bona 
fide in their coverage in sentencing matters.625  
 
The reasoning must be clear and frank, and expressed in a comprehensible 
manner so that everyone can understand it, including the journalists who will be 
the ones transmitting the court’s reasoning and messages to society.  We judges 
must realise that we do not write our judgments for the other judges but for the 
public, part of which is illiterate or close to illiterate, and so are some 
defendants.626 
 
What the last judge is alluding is the importance of giving reasons for the 
sentence in everyday language so that both the offender and victims understand it.  
With constant criticism of the courts in the media,627in terms of both public 
accountability and the perceived lack of sensitivity of the court to victims, it is 
important that the courts do whatever is possible to communicate the reasons for a 
particular decision.  If the obligation to give reasons is honestly discharged, in the 
sense that the judge gives what really were his reasons, then it will, in principle, be 
possible to disagree as to whether the decision has been motivated by proper or 
improper considerations. So long as it is motivated by proper reasons then it will 
be possible to disagree as to whether the decision was correct or incorrect, but the 




627O Tsoudis, ‘The Portrayal of Crime in the Cyprus Media: An Exploratory Study’ (2001) 3(1) 
Western Criminology Review 1. 
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manner in which the decision was reached will be a legitimate exercise of the 
judicial role.628 
The sentence as a communication tool is becoming a critical aspect of the 
process, at a time when politicians and the media regularly focus on law and order, 
and calls for harsher sentences are becoming louder.  If the sentences, handed 
down, are not properly communicated to the parties and the public at large where 
necessary, a lack of proper understanding of what is occurring in court will 
compound the difficulties, and result in further criticism.  To put it differently, 
proper and effective communication in court is a necessary, but not sufficient, 
condition for wider understanding by the media and the community.  This is in 
accord with Nozick’s stance on communication, that retributive punishment is, 
essentially, the communication of a moral message.  This message is to be 
communicated through punishment (i.e., infliction of suffering) in order to make 
sure that it has a substantial effect (in some way) on the wrongdoer’s life. The 
moral message of punishment must match the magnitude of the wrong or harm 
without aiming to the moral improvement of the offender (this would be 
teleological). Rather, such consequences are ‘an especially desirable and valuable 
bonus, not as part of a necessary condition for justly imposed punishment.’629The 
objective merely is to connect the offender to the correct values even though he 
might never accept them. 
 
 
                                                
628B Simpson, ‘The Reflections of a Craftsman’ in M Andenas, and D Fairgrieve (eds), Tom 
Bingham and the Transformation of the Law: A Liber Amicorum (OUP, Oxford 2009) 197. 
629Nozick, Philosophical Explanations (n 330) 374. 
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7.4 The Role of the Defence Advocate in the Determination of Sentence  
As was the case with some topics already discussed in this chapter, there 
was no express inquiring about the function of the defence advocates in 
sentencing, but a number of judges commented on it as a matter of essence to 
them. Most comments stressed the importance of the role of the advocate in 
putting information before the court. The judges particularly highlighted the 
importance of the advocates being well prepared and competent, expressing 
concerns though that this is not always the case. They indicated that advocates 
could help them understand the real stakes in a case, shed some light to the not so 
obvious aspects of it, and assist the court dig below the semantic surface of things.  
In the Crown Court Study, there was questioning concerning the judges’ 
expectations and opinions of defence advocates. There were also related 
discussions with a small number of barristers. Most of the judges, stated that good 
submissions in mitigation were or could prove influential on the result of the case, 
with the exception of very serious crimes where the outcome was inevitable. They 
underlined that a good mitigation submission is that which is ‘articulate, not 
repetitive, and well attuned to the judge’s own thoughts.’630This point is significant 
in that it denotes that the judges in that study tended to believe that advocates were 
doing a good job if they told them what they wanted to hear. This view was not so 
evident in the present study however. Quite the contrary; the majority of the judges 
who dealt with the matter said that they saw the role of defence advocates as 
critical, and rightly so.631They viewed them as being the mediums for putting the 
                                                
630Ashworth and others, Sentencing in the Crown Court (n 44) 43. 
631N G Santis, ‘The Role of the Defence Advocate in the Determination of Sentence’ (2004) 3 
Cyprus L J 38, 39. 
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defendant’s mitigating factors before the court, and who by their argument and 
ability to distinguish his case from subsisting precedent, could direct things to an 
entirely different direction. Even from that which, they as judges predicted hence 
imposing a lesser sentence,632or the least punishment consistent with justice.633The 
following two comments encompass the general mood of other remarks or 
observations made on the point by 22 other judges: 
Mitigation speeches can make all the difference or a lot of difference. The 
competent ones I mean. The incompetent as well, however towards the opposite 
direction. If the speech in mitigation is succinct and sincere with reference to the 
facts and the personal circumstances of the defendant and how those contributed, 
if at all, to the commission of the offence then that can make the judge pay real 
attention to his argument. The manner of presentation is also very important. 
Pompous submissions and eloquent words destruct and weaken the presentation 
and inevitably its content. The speech in mitigation is not a political speech. 
Mannerisms and the like also do not help, like the occasional turning back to the 
court spectators to check whether they see and admire his eloquence. Similarly, no 
particular benefit will derive if while the advocate conveys to the Court how truly 
sorry the defendant is for his actions the latter shakes his head with disapproval 
for his lawyer’s submission or stares with condemnation towards the complainant. 
This behaviour may be the result of anxiety or insecurity but no less it creates a 
certain image which can hurt his case, and you know us judges know from 
experience to detect the truth either through words or behaviour.634 
 
 The role of the defence advocate during mitigation is almost as important as that 
of the judge. It is the defence advocate who presents the case for the defendant and 
pinpoint the grey areas. He is the one that could control to some degree the 
decision of the judge and the way he decides the right sentence, aiming towards 
the minimum sentence possible within the proper boundaries of justice in the 
particular case.635 
 
What comes to light from these comments is that because legal 
representation increases the ability of the individual to influence discretionary 
decisions affecting him it has indeed considerable potential as a control over 
                                                
632For a similar position, see R H Kuh, ‘Trial Techniques: Defense Counsel’s Role in Sentencing’ 
[1978] Crim L Bull 433. 
633Sir David Napley also offered such a schematisation of the ultimate purpose of the speech in 




discretion.636Another aspect is the fact that judges, although they view the speech 
in mitigation as a most important facet of the sentencing process, they also express 
their dislike for it becoming an insincere and portentous endeavour. This, however, 
does not mean that the role of the defence advocate in the plea in mitigation cannot 
be creative in the sense of him becoming an ‘author,’ aiming to producing an 
empathic narrative on behalf of his client, analogous to a work of 
literature,637provided it be sincere and true. The most important aspect though is 
that Cypriot judges do recognise and accept as crucial the role of the defence 
advocate in the sentencing process, regarding it, inter alia, as a form of external 
constraint to their discretion. 
There were also concerns that the advocates appearing before the courts 
were poorly prepared: 
The sentencing process is in disarray. The prosecutor sometimes treats serious 
criminal cases as if they are routine road traffic cases. They do not seem to care 
although we all no that they do. It is just that they are seriously overloaded, like 
us. They need more personnel and fewer cases to deal with. Many cases end up in 
court for nothing. The system must find ways to dispose of these cases more 
efficiently. The Attorney - General of the Republic has discretion which cases to 
prosecute and which not to prosecute. Let him exercise that discretion freely.638 
 
The final decision is for you as a judge and alas, if the defence lawyer does a bad 
job in the sense that his mitigation speech was totally general and unacceptable 
then what do you do? You cannot do whatever you want that is for sure. You have 
to stay within the boundaries of the case law otherwise; there is a good chance 
that the sentence will not stand in the appeal court. People think that we do as we 
like and blame us for everything. The task is very difficult, particularly if the 
defence lawyer is inadequate. That is the worse. You have to puzzle how to avoid 
imprisoning the defendant because of stupid thing the lawyer said, for example in 
a case of contempt to a court order to close down a dwelling that the defendant did 
                                                
636R O Dawson, Sentencing: The Decision as to Type, Length, and Conditions of Sentence 
(American Bar Foundation Administration of Criminal Justice Series, Little, Brown and Co, 
Boston 1969) 408. 
637See on this interesting analogy, R Edney, ‘Literary Concepts and the Plea in Mitigation (2004) 9 
Deakin L Rev 183, 184. 
638Judge 13. 
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not obey immediately because that would have been against his best financial 
interest; and they pay these people! The defendant would have been better off 
without him. He would have escaped imprisonment in all probability. It is the most 
difficult job that a District Court Judge does; it is the complexity of the balancing, 
which is emotionally draining.639 
Every sentencing process involves a balancing of the principles of those, which 
tend to favour a heavier penalty and a lighter one. The key here is how good the 
mitigation is. If the defence lawyer succeeds in shedding light to the dark areas 
that no one could see and led things to a different direction from what the case law 
points. Therefore, I would say that a lot depend on how well the lawyer does the 
balancing in order to help you do yours. Still however we are talking about 
weighting not with an accurate scale but the way our grandfathers used to weight 
things, that is with their own two hands.640 
 
Being rushed and having too many cases listed would also tend to make 
reliance on advocates imperative for much of the time. The fact that some judges 
perceived advocates as insufficiently prepared is a matter for concern. The results 
of this study do however raise a paradox with a system that is adversarial and 
assumes thoughtful and researched submissions, when the reality may be 
otherwise.  
As indicated in Chapter 4.4, the sentencing process, despite its fundamental 
significance, tends to be a relatively rudimentary affair in comparison to the 
process for determining criminal responsibility. There are relatively few 
procedural and evidential rules involved, at least in comparison to those applicable 
at the trial stage.641Nonetheless, defence advocates, being in the centre of this so-
called unprincipled and unstructured environment, often seem not to realise642the 
                                                
639Judge 26. 
640Judge 9. 
641For the position in Cyprus, see, Loizou and Pikis, Criminal Procedure in Cyprus (n 118) 125-
131. For the position in England see, Hooper and Ormerod, Blackstone’s Criminal Practice 2010 (n 
123) D19.1-D19.108. 
642M McConville, J Hodgson, L Bridges, and A Pavlovic, Standing Accused: The Organization of 
Criminal Defence Lawyers in Britain (Oxford Monographs on Criminal Law and Justice, 
Clarendon Press, Oxford 1994) 182. 
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vital importance of their role643in the determination of the proper punishment,644 
the structuring of judicial discretion,645and the minimisation of unjustified 
sentencing disparity. Of course, disparity is less common in the presence of 
statutory sentencing guidelines,646or other discretion restrictive circumstances 
since the advocates’ role diminishes notably.647All these can leave one pondering 
over the justness of the process,648particularly having in mind the hearing stage 
and the meticulous emphasis placed therein in securing the fair trial of the 
defendant.649Sentencing is in fact part of the trial process, given its character and 
inextricability,650with the complex trial issues,651with the presumption of 
                                                
643For the role of the prosecuting counsel, see, I Tembly, ‘The Role of Prosecutor in the Sentencing 
Process’ (1986) 10 Crim L J 199; G Zellick, ‘The Role of Prosecuting Counsel in Sentencing’ 
[1979] Crim L R 49; C Humphreys, ‘The Duties and Responsibilities of Prosecuting Counsel’ 
[1995] Crim L R 739. 
644I B Cooper, ‘United States v. Unterman: The Role of Counsel at Sentencing’ (1977) 13 Crim L B 
101,113; H Williamson, ‘Defence and Mitigation in the Juvenile Court: The Role of the Solicitor in 
Juvenile Justice’, in Z Bankowski and G Mungham (eds), Essays in Law and Society (Routledge 
and Kegan Paul, Oxford 1999) 38. 
645C Guthrie, J Rachlinski, and A Wistrich, ‘Inside the Judicial Mind’ (2001) 86 Cornell L Rev 
777. 
646The rigidness of these guidelines and the overpowering of judicial discretion can however 
become the cause of other and more serious concerns, resulting from a fear of judging due to the 
resulting suppression of informed discretion by judges. As pertinently argued by Stith, the 
elimination of judicial discretion in sentencing under the sentencing guidelines, transforms 
sentencing into a puppet theatre in which defendants are not persons but kinds of persons or some 
kind of abstract entities. Judges under such a system become instruments of distant beurocracies. 
The abolition, in essence, of judicial discretion affects other parameters of judicial sentencing 
powers as well, and more specifically mercy, as without moral authority neither mercy nor moral 
condemnation is possible. Mercy by which the full application of the law is relaxed in furtherance 
of the laws ends is rendered obsolete: See, K Stith, Fear of Judging: Sentencing Guidelines in the 
Federal Courts (University of Chicago Press, Chicago 1998) 84, 169. 
647M Etienne, ‘The Declining Utility of the Right to Counsel in Federal Criminal Courts: An 
Empirical Study on the Diminished Role of Defense Attorney Advocacy under the Sentencing 
Guidelines’ (2004) 92 Calif L Rev 425. 
648N Lacey, ‘Discretion and Due Process at the Post-Conviction Stage’ in I Dennis (ed), Criminal 
Law and Justice: Essays from the W G Hart Workshop  (Sweet and Maxwell, London 1987) 221. 
649A Ashworth, ‘Article 6 and the Fairness of Trials’  [1999] Crim L R 261. 
650J Knowles, B Emmerson, A Ashworth, and A Macdonald (eds), Human Rights and Criminal 
Justice (Sweet & Maxwell, London 2007) 692. 
651In X v United Kingdom (1972) 2 Digest 766, the Commission emphasised that Article 6 
continues to apply at the sentencing stage. Thus, rights such as those of legal representation and 
legal aid, a public hearing, equality of arms, adequate time and facilities and free interpretation 
would all continue at the sentencing hearing. There was no dispute about this position before the 
European Court of Human Rights in T and V v United Kingdom (2000) 30 EHRR 121. 
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innocence continuing to have effect even after conviction.652One needs only to 
remind that, at a basic level, the fundamental aim of a criminal trial is the 
attainment of justice by the fair establishment of criminal liability and 
determination of the appropriate sentence to the offender.653Most legal systems 
share the values and principles on which such liabilities and penalties are 
determined. Their implementation varies, of course, from one jurisdiction to the 
other.654 
 
7.5 Specialisation and Training 
Judicial education and specialisation was a topic that concentrated a lot of 
meaningful smiling and head nodding by the judges. Here are some of the 
comments: 
We need more education on sentencing matters. Combined with education and 
specialisation it will empower us with more weaponry and support to deal with the 
everyday battle for fairness and justice. We need to have audiovisual support 
systems in the courtroom. We need to have computers on the bench while we are 
presiding to assist us in locating precedents or even academic articles. We have 
been asking for all these for years but to no avail. No one cares. Evidently, the 
judicial system is not in the government’s high priorities any government’s I mean. 
Probably we are not bringing in enough proceeds.655  
 
                                                
652If, for example, previous criminal activities were held to constitute an aggravating circumstance, 
whether formally in the sense of recidivism or in some other way, the presumption of innocence 
would be violated if a court were to apply such a rule in the absence of prior convictions: See, S 
Trechsel, Human Rights in Criminal Proceedings (OUP, Oxford 2005) 172-173. 
653A Duff, L Farmer, S Marshall, and V Tadros, ‘Towards a Normative Theory of the Criminal 
Trial’ in A Duff, L Farmer, S Marshall, and V Tadros (eds), The Trial on Trial: Truth and Due 
Process (Vol 1 Hart Publishing, Oxford 2004) 1. 
654In Anglo-American common law jurisdictions the mode of procedure is adversarial while in the 
Continental system is inquisitorial. The essential feature of the adversarial system is concentrated to the 
fact that the onus rests on the litigant to advance his case for a decision to be made by the judge remains 
more or less passive throughout the proceedings whereas in the inquisitorial system he plays a most 
active role in conducting the proceedings to their conclusion: See, W Zeidler, ‘Evaluation of the 
Adversary System: A Comparison: Some Remarks on the Investigatory System of Procedure’ (1981) 
55 ALJ 390; S Landsman, ‘A Brief Survey of the Development of the Adversary System’ (1983) 44 
Ohio St L J 713; E Sward, ‘Values, Ideology, and the Evolution of the Adversarial System’ (1989) Ind 
L J 301.  
655Judge 13. 
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I think the judges are poorly trained in criminology and sentencing. There should 
be specific judicial education in this area and there ought to be compulsory 
training in criminology and sentencing for all judges.656  
 
Specialisation could solve many problems, but is not going to be a panacea. 
However, it will make judges stronger and more assertive, and therefore justice 
will benefit.657 
 
We need specialisation. Judges must specialise and deal with cases only in their 
respective fields and this includes criminal law and sentencing. The judges will be 
more productive and more assertive. They will know their stuff well, and the 
lawyers will know about it so they will be more hesitant in wasting the Court’s 
time with their accustomed mambo jumbo.658    
 
Thirty-two other judges put forward the need for further education and 
specialisation. The core of their position is that sentencing is a crucial part of the 
judicial functions and dealing with human behaviour in an ever changing 
multicultural society, judges must at least familiarise themselves with the pertinent 
developments and ongoing arguments. Many judges come to the bench from a 
successful commercial practice at the bar and would have had little criminal law 
experience. This has also constituted a reason for concern among some of them. 
Two judges discussed specialisation, with opposite views: 
I am a firm believer in specialist jurisdictions, so that judges who have experience 
and expertise in crime for example can be appointed only to do that. Some judges 
can be appointed to the court after having spent 20 years in common law practice 
and have not much experience in crime at all.659 
 
Many judges come from a background of civil law and know very little about 
sentencing on their appointment. I don’t believe however in formal specialisation 
of judges.660   
 







The increasing complexity of the law, coupled with greater public and 
media scrutiny of the practices of the court and more accountability requirements, 
may justify the re-examination of the issue of specialisation of the judiciary. 
Criminal law is a specialist and difficult jurisdiction, and may merit a distinct 
specialisation in the courts. This may also be reflecting what is occurring as a de 
facto practice, by self-selection and other means. 
 
7.6 Conclusions 
The present chapter discussed that the way Cypriot judges perceive the 
sentencing process and their responsibility within that context, which is directly 
relevant to their resulting actions within the system of punishment practice, and 
their sentencing decisions, and of course their punishtecture. It indicated that a 
primary premise arising from the interviews is that the judges, view sentencing as 
a balancing process in which they see themselves as playing a predominant role 
and that many of them, consider sentencing as a hard, taxing and emotionally 
draining activity. Numerous judges felt under pressure to get through many cases 
rapidly, and some felt that this affected the quality of their decision-making. A 
range of procedural facets of the sentencing process were also mentioned as 
reference points for analysing the judges’ interview responses and presenting their 
observations and insights on the rationality of the process. The judges placed 
particular emphasis on the role of defence advocates describing their role in the 
sentencing process as vital. This factor is indicative of the judges’ unselfish 
admission and realisation that they are indeed only one of the actors in the 
sentencing process. Perhaps not surprisingly, quite a few judges discussed the need 
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for further training in criminology and like matters. There was an overall (with 
noted exceptions) high level of confidence on the part of the judges as regards 
their ability to carry out their sentencing role.  
The next chapter will concentrate on the judges’ remarks on the various 
sentencing aims and theories of punishment, isolated as relevant to the thesis, in an 
attempt to explore the possibility of deducing therefrom any indications or proof 
that when Cypriot judges decide sentences, they do so within a particular 



























CHAPTER 8: PUNISHTECTURE AND THE SENTENCING DECISION 
 
The present chapter will focus on the Cypriot judges’ comments on the 
various theories of punishment in an attempt to investigate whether when they 
sentence they do so within retributive, utilitarianist, or hybrid parameters. 
Furthermore, the discussion will show the judges’ sentencing motivations and 
intentions as leading actors in the sentencing stage and provide evidence on 
whether they understand and appreciate the wider manifestations of the theoretical 
debate or whether they have no such feedback, but nonetheless exercise their 
sentencing functions without needing normative legitimacy for the exercise of 
their discretion within the realm of punishtecture already described. 
 
8.1 The Multiplicity of Sentencing Aims and Sentencing Balancing  
Judges in Cyprus sentence in the absence of pertinent legislation specifying 
the aims of criminal sentencing, under a system of multiplicity of punishment 
purposes set forward by the case law of the Supreme Court. In addition to the case 
of Azinas v The Police,661 two other cases illustrate the point fully: 
In Mirachis v The Police,662it was said that: 
 
When all other alternatives are considered unsuitable to meet the particular case in 
hand, the Court may well have to resort to imprisonment. However, in such a case, 
the sentence has to be justified upon one of the purposes to be served by such 
sentence. Rehabilitation, mainly in the interest of the offender; deterrence, mainly 
in the public interest and protection; retribution, in the proper enforcement of the 
law; all these matters have to be considered and weighed together with the 
consequences and probable effect of imprisonment on the particular offender. Four 
months in prison, or any such short term, while sufficient to upset radically the 
offender's family life and business, cannot operate on his mind and habits for 
purposes of rehabilitation; short terms have, as a rule, proved of very little 
deterrent effect; and are hardly justified as retribution. Moreover, they are 
                                                
661[1981] 2 CLR 9.  
662[1965] 2 CLR 28, 32-33. 
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undesirable as tending to disturb discipline, and the proper mental attitude within 
the prison walls.  
 
In Savva v The Republic,663the Court indicated that: 
The responsibility of a court in measuring and imposing sentence has been 
described as immense to both the community and the defendant. The wide 
discretionary powers vested in the Courts in this connection make that 
responsibility all the heavier. The need to deter or reform the offender must be 
weighed together with the equally important need to protect society and to deter 
potential offenders. The principle that a judge in considering sentence in a 
particular case should pay due attention to the individual offender’s criminal 
record and should take that into serious consideration, is well established in the 
criminal law and widely accepted in judicial practice. Sentencing has been the 
subject of endless academic discussion and continuous experimental study on the 
part of a great number of judges in different times. Together with the accepted 
main criteria, there are a variety of factors, which weigh in the mind and 
conscience of the judge in forming his decision as to sentence, including factors 
peculiar to different times and different places. The nature and organization of the 
prison where the convict will serve a sentence of imprisonment, is one of such 
factors. 
 
These cases, despite being two of the most encompassing and detailed 
judgments of the Supreme Court on the issue under assessment, do not offer 
guidance as to the use of the punishment purposes they referred to. Their rationale 
is eclectic and their approach akin to a form of ‘pick-and-mix’ sentencing.664Not 
surprisingly, they do not refer to an integrated or compromise theory of 
punishment between, say, retributivism and utilitarianism in the manner, for 
instance, Hart espoused it by thinking and arguing in favour of a hybrid theoretical 
alternative in the realm of legal punishment justification, as discussed in Chapter 
5.4. Rather, the whole picture reminds of Keijser’s illustrative observation, 
mentioned in the same chapter, that such approaches refer to a pragmatic, multi-
                                                
663[1968] 2 CLR 218, 221. 
664See a similar comment made by Andrew Ashworth in relation to the English Criminal Justice 
Act 2003 s 142, in the 4th edition of his book Sentencing and Criminal Justice (Law in Context, 
CUP, Cambridge 2005) 74. See also, C Wells and O Quick, Lacey, Wells, and Quick 
Reconstructing Criminal Law: Texts and Materials (Law in Context, 4th edn, CUP, Cambridge 
2010) 60. 
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stage rocket approach to sentencing rather than a theoretically integrated account 
of punishment, with the rationale of the said cases not resembling retributivism 
and utilitarianism as discussed in Chapter 5, in any event. With such guidance 
given to trial judges, and implicitly to the rest of the judges of the Supreme Court, 
one could not have possibly sincerely expected a different judicial approach in 
practice. 
The following comments are characteristic of the more general judicial 
attitude: 
In deciding what sentence to impose I have in mind deterrence, rehabilitation and 
retribution mainly and depending what sentence I want to impose, I apply some of 
the rules that characterise the particular purpose and I apply them.665 
 
When I sentence I do not have in mind neither the purposes of punishment as 
outlined by the Supreme Court, neither any other philosophical boundaries nor 
restrictions. I decide according to what the law and the case law say. That is a 
good way to be consistent and fair to all.666 
 
Perhaps predictably, all of the judges said that they would decide which 
sentencing purpose they would use depending on the facts of the case: 
You balance deterrence, rehabilitation, social protection, and retribution 
according to your facts. The exercise is rather simple.667 
 
The whole judicial functioning is a matter of balance not only sentencing. You 
weigh the facts of the case, the circumstances of the defendant, his previous 
convictions or clean record and having in mind the purposes of punishment you 
reach your decision, the sentence of the court.668  
 
Above all are the facts. It is the facts that regulate so to speak the method of 
sentencing and not the reverse. That makes sentencing easier than what happens if 
you bring into the picture other factors such as complicated legal principles and 
theories.669 
 







The balancing of the purposes discussed by the judges is evocative of the 
way in which they deal with the position of having five competing aims of 
punishment from which to choose, and being provided with no judicial or 
legislative guidance as to how to do this. None of the judges identified this as a 
problem though. Most of those who discussed it saw themselves competent to 
undertake the choice of sentencing aims in a particular case. Ashworth however (to 
the extent that it would matter to those judges), is critical of a sentencing system 
which aims to have the purposes of sentencing balanced in every case, and notes 
that a major source of disparity in sentencing is the difference in penal 
philosophies between sentencers, concluding that the desire on the part of some 
judges for balancing the purposes in each case might not necessarily be a desirable 
goal.670 
The balancing of the purposes as described by the judges appears to 
operate as a subset of the general balancing in the sentencing process. The 
application of sentencing purposes to specific offences will be discussed below. As 
it will be seen, this differed between individual judges. The general lack of 
guidance on the application of these purposes to particular cases tends to confirm 
                                                
670Ashworth in his Sentencing and Criminal Justice (Law in Context, 5th edn, CUP, Cambridge 
2010) 76, says that: ‘There are many who would agree that sentencers ought to have some 
discretion so as to take account of the peculiar facts of individual cases.  So be it. But does that 
remove the argument for bringing the rule of law as far into sentencing decisions as possible?  The 
rule of law, in this context, means that judicial decisions should be taken openly and by reference to 
standards declared in advance.  It is one thing to agree that judges should be left with discretion, so 
they may adjust the sentence to fit the particular combination of facts in an individual case.  It is 
quite another to suggest that judges should be free to choose what rationale of sentencing they will 
adopt in particular cases or types of case. Freedom to select from among the various rationales is a 
freedom to determine policy, not a freedom to respond to unusual combinations of facts.  It is more 
of a license to judges to pursue their own penal philosophies than an encouragement to respond 
sensitively to the facts of each case.’ 
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the argument put forward in relation to lack of consistency and accountability in 
the application of these aims and purposes.671 
 
8.1.1 Do Cypriot Judges Specifically Refer to Sentencing Purposes? 
Most judges said that they kept the purposes of sentencing at the back of 
their mind, rather than specifically referring to them. It is debatable however 
whether or not safe conclusions could be drawn from this, other than 
presumptively on how judges think (or not) about philosophy and jurisprudence 
when sentencing (or about anything else for that matter) since, as already noted in 
Chapter 7.2.2 judicial illusionism while deemed unacceptable, forms part and 
parcel of Cypriot sentencing and judicial reality. Twenty-four of the judges 
distinctively said that they do not think or write ‘in such abstract terms.’672 
Other specific comments were as follows: 
I do not have a background on criminology although I would have liked it. Thank 
God I do not deal in theories and I dread the moment a defence lawyer will come 
and start theorizing about the purposes of sentencing and that I should not take 
into account this or the other factor because it conflicts with this or that factor and 
so on. This theorising has no place in a court of law, and anyway have all these 
theoreticians unanimously agreed on which purpose or theory is the best and we 
have refused to apply it?673 
 
I don’t specifically refer to the purposes of punishment in the sentencing 
process.674 
 
                                                
671Ashworth in his article ‘Criminal Justice and Deserved Sentences’ [1989] Crim LR 340, 355, 
claims that even where a system pursues a plurality of aims rather than a single aim, it is essential 
that the various aims be either ranked in order of priority or confined to distinct spheres of 
application and that any system which allows courts to choose among sentencing aims without 
clear guidance will produce disorganisation, with scant respect for consistency, accountability or 
rights. 
672The remark belongs to Judge 43, and its essence reflects the relative opinions of the remaining 




I do not believe in theories. When I have to sentence I do so on the basis of the 
facts and the case law of the Supreme Court675 
 
This theorising is for the academics not for us. We are judges. We deal with real 
problems. Sentencing is about real life, not about the ‘aims and purposes of 
sentencing’ and so on and so forth.676 
 
I do not think of philosophy during the exercise of my duties. I am a judge and I 
think that I am doing just fine as a criminal judge for the last eight years without 
being a philosopher or a theoretician of the law.677 
 
Stating the purpose of sentence is also part of giving reasons, which assists 
the offender, the prosecution, and the public at large to understand the reasons and 
rationale behind the sentence, at least to the extent that the sentencing judges so 
deem appropriate to utter in their judgment, given that published reasons usually 
form a rough outline, if at all, of the main factors that led to the final decision. Not 
surprisingly, the judges, for example, made no prescriptive mentioning of Nozick’s 
ideas on communications (as noted in Chapter 5.2.6), or of the wider moral 
necessity of the state to be able to offer a viable justification of its practice of 
punishment to the people. This, however, does not point towards a definitive 
premise that such normative processes are absent from judicial thinking on this (or 
any other) issue. 
Forty-three of the judges said that they did not know of any penal 
philosopher or a specific penal philosophy, and that the particular fact did not 
bother them at all. One of the comments was particularly interesting and rather 
reflective of the rest on point at hand: 
I do not know any penal philosophers or penal philosophies. Good for me though 
because if I judge on what I sometimes read about the philosophy of religion, these 
people get lost in words, semantics and superficially complicated thinking. There 





is only one philosophy in sentencing if you want to call it like that, the philosophy 
of judicial sentencing. Do these philosophers know anything about it? I don’t think 
so.678 
 
From those judges who claimed to have known of particular penal 
philosophers or philosophies, only one commented that he had these philosophies in 
mind when sentencing. He said: 
A few years ago I bought a book on sentencing by Ashworth and there I discovered 
that there is so much to read and take into account in sentencing. I do not remember 
of a particular name right now but I do remember that utilitarianism made sense to 
me, particularly the bit on deterrence and rehabilitation, so when I have a sentence to 
decide, that is a serious sentence, and not a routine one, I direct my mind to the things 
I have read, to the degree I remember them. 679 
 
Another one alleged rather sullenly: 
 
I wish I could see Ashworth and Thomas, or what have you, on the same Bench 
trying to decide on a sentence and start discussing moral theories and the like with 
the defendants waiting on line to hear their decisions. I don’t think that they would 
ever agree.680 
 
In relation to this obvious and almost sweeping objection of Cypriot judges 
towards academics, one has to be able to separate whichever pragmatic problems 
preoccupy the practice of punishment, and the normative dimension of those 
problems as seen through a more abstract analysis; and of course to be able to 
discuss and listen to relevant information in the appropriate forum. There is 
undeniably a big gulf between academia and practice, and a sense of suspicion and 
sometimes-outright resentment towards the former by the legal profession.681The 
interrelationship between punishment theory and sentencing, and the various penal 
theories is complex, and to a notable extent conflicting, primarily because there 
exist apparently valid reasons to support, but at the same time criticise each one of 




681F Cownie, Legal Academics: Culture and Identities (Hart Publishing, Oxford 2004) 156-158. 
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them. In fact, one could conceivably ascribe to the proposition that the founding 
ideological principles of the criminal law are in essence contradictory and hence, 
any rationalistic readings of the law are bound to fail.682The significance of the 
sentencing debate is vital as, if one does not know the reasoning behind a 
particular sanction, it is unlikely that he could subject the decision to an effective 
and logical evaluation, matters seen of course within the prescribed normative lens 
mobilised for the objectives of the thesis. To place the debate about punishment is 
not to resolve it; it is to make it more intelligible, and hence more amenable to a 
reasoned decision. If we have no idea of the context within which the punishment 
question is taking place, we have no idea what might count as an 
answer.683Consequently, determining what constitutes the justice of particular 
punishment requires a decision on the particular theory of punishment.  Unless of 
course such a decision is considered unnecessary since it might be thought that its 
justness emanates, precisely, from the fact that it was reached without resort to 
inelastic and dubious principles with sole criterion the correctness of the judicial 
approach resulting from legalistic considerations (and why not), spiced even by a 
flare of normativity.  
Just punishment from a retributivist standpoint might seem unjust from a 
utilitarian perspective, and vice versa. It is not difficult to substitute the question 
‘What is deserved?’ with its consequentialist counterpart ‘What is necessary?’ The 
point is though ‘What do we want?’684No human institution will ever distribute 
ideal justice even assuming there was an accord as to what that was; neither of 
                                                
682A Norrie, Law, Ideology and Punishment (n 140) 231. 
683E Pincoffs, The Rationale of Legal Punishment (n 144) 61. 
684W Wilson, Central Issues in Criminal Theory (Hart Publishing, Oxford 2002) 76. 
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course a perfect sentence. Justice embodies notions of fairness to all members of 
the community, including victims and offenders, and striking a balance between 
their competing interests is the cornerstone of current criminal justice policy. 
However, it also assumes consensus on what constitutes justice. To withdraw to 
the empirical level only, and try to tackle the problem there or attempt to set up all 
of our principles of punishment in a vacuum of pure reason at the exclusion of 
everything else, is nonsensical.685The need is for synergy.686Whatever the case, it 
is a utopia to believe that the sentences that the courts impose (whether perfectly 
just, or nearly just, to paraphrase John Rawls) will resolve the problems of crime 
and probe the limits of the realistically practicable, that is, how far in our world 
(given its laws and tendencies) a democratic society can attain complete realisation 
of its appropriate societal values.687 
 
8.2 Cypriot Judges on Retribution  
Thirteen judges referred to retribution in a manner clearly suggestive of the 
fact that it is well into their thoughts, though they expressed them in a far more 
direct and desiccated manner compared to the usually more elaborate and abstract 
syllogisms of academe, without this being necessarily objectionable. The judges 
projected their own understandings of the term ‘retribution’ rather than reflecting 
the criminological literature on the matter. This finding applies in almost all other 
cases where the judges mentioned or attempted to elaborate on such terminologies. 
                                                
685R Gerber and P Mc Anany, ‘The Philosophy of Punishment’ in N Johnston, L Savitz, and M 
Wolfgang, The Sociology of Punishment and Correction (2nd edn John Wiley and Sons, New York 
1970). 
686C Valier, Theories of Crime and Punishment (Longman, London 2002) 2. 
687J Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement (The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge, Massachusetts 2001) 13. 
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Of course, the same occurred in relation to the terms ‘justice’ and ‘punishment.’ 
These are some of the comments: 
Imposing the right punishment cannot ignore the purposes of the law. The offender 
will have to pay its dues. That is what his fellow civilians decided by passing the 
laws he broke. Once proven guilty the defendant must be ready to accept his dues 
and most certainly the judge must punish him accordingly. 688 
 
Retribution is the essence of sentencing. It constitutes I would think a pretty good 
basis or justification if you may for the court to sentence him in accordance with the 
law.689 
 
The meaning of justice is to sentence fairly and indeed what better way there is than 
punishing according to the law? Letting the offender know that no matter what, the 
law is the law and he must pay for what he did, no matter what.690 
 
It’s all a matter of responsibility I think. The offender must accept the responsibilities 
of his actions by accepting the punishment. This is justice. Now, if the offender was 
not in a position to be responsible or his capability of comprehending the nature of his 
actions that is a different story. Still however he must be judged under the perspective 
of the society’s reaction to his offence. The defendant’s guilt should be a sufficient 
basis for the judge as the representative of the societal values and attitudes relating to 
criminal responsibility to effect the right punishment.691 
 
Clearly, these judges appear to accept the Kantian view that guilt is a 
sufficient condition for punishment regardless of utility,692irrespective of the fact 
that they did not pay tribute to his theory expressly. In fact, it seems that there is in 
many of us an Immanuel Kant (but not necessarily knowing of it, or him), 
allowing thus, an interpretation of their own moral stance through appropriation, as 
it so usually happens with the works of such philosophical icons.693  
 
 





692J Murphy, Kant: The Philosophy of Right (Mercer University Press, Macon, Georgia 1994) 120. 
693R Dworkin, Justice in Robes (The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 
Massachusetts 2006) 261. 
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8.2.1 Retributive Pressure from the Community 
It was evident from the responses in this study that the judges were feeling 
pressurised by the community to sentence based on retribution, but that they were 
resisting, feeling that this pressure needed to be kept in balance with all other 
factors in the process. Some of the pertinent observations have as follows: 
As judges, we punish according to the law. Our motives are to neither avenge nor 
revenge. The community can ask and complain about many things, but it is not the 
community the one to judge but only the courts. The expression of the needs of 
community can be expressed strictly speaking by the Parliament. Retribution has 
its place, and the same applies to the other purposes as well. We are usually, or 
should be, sensitive to the needs of the public and try not to antagonise their 
feelings and emotions.694 
 
The public always is bloodthirsty. If it were possible they would hang the offenders 
and put on a party, in certain cases. That is why we have to be careful on how we 
approach sentencing, and evaluate these feelings, to the degree possible and 
judicially acceptable that is. We are in a unique position to judge our fellow 
citizens and to some extent society at large. The public can have its impact on 
sentencing through lobbying with the legislature, not by pressing the courts. This 
is unacceptable and to some degree anarchic oriented. 695 
 
The courts impose sentences but you are not really sure what these sentences 
represent be it deterrence, rehabilitation, public order, retribution or what have 
you. Judges are coy. You cannot know ever if the judge by saying retribution 
meant deterrence, retribution, social protection, or even rehabilitation. These are 
the intricacies of judging. Part of it is some sort of judicial politics, you know. 696  
 
These comments look compatible with the findings of much social science 
research, which assumes that since judges are ‘politicians in black robes’, they will 
behave in about the same way as legislators or other officials in the political arena. 
Indeed, while judges have a lot in common with other officials, they are also likely 
to see their job (or mission) as unique with how they see themselves, their relations 





with other people, and their duties, contributing to their conception of the judicial 
role.697  
One of the judges questioned the method of applying this pressure and the 
motives behind it: 
Punishing another human being has its moral dimensions these on which 
academics thrive on. They all demand punishment. I understand that, but they have 
to realise that we are exercising a certain power here and we have to be careful. 
We should not act on passion and pure vengeance.698 
 
Commentators have noted that the continuing retributive pressure from the 
community often derives from perceptions of societal breakdown, rising crime 
levels and the need for tougher counteracting sanctions.699Potent elements in this 
process are violent crimes that attract substantial media attention, marginalising 
due process and distorting the debate.700 
The present study reveals that Cypriot judges are aware of the community’s 
punitive feelings and feel under pressure to act accordingly, without this implying, 
however, that they will actually do so. This initial judicial predisposition verifies 
to a certain degree academic opinion to the effect that on the basis of an 
examination of vengeance and retribution from a historical, philosophical, and 
psychoanalytic perspectives, retribution has a valid general aim in allowing 
individuals who have suffered the loss of an object of personal meaning to satisfy 
                                                
697H Click, Courts, Politics, and Justice (McGraw-Hill Book Company, New York 1983) 243. 
698Judge 31. 
699R Hogg and D Brown, Rethinking Law and Order (Pluto Press, Annandale, NSW 1998) 54.  
700G Zdenkowski, ‘Sentencing Trends: Past, Present and Prospective’ in D Chappell and P Wilson 
(eds), Crime and the Criminal Justice System in Australia: 2000 and Beyond (Butterworths, 
Sydney 2000) 161, 185. 
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their instinctive desire for vengeance.701Retribution, or at least the concept of just 
deserts, does not figure largely in the thinking of the judges. On the other hand, it 
is possible that desert is considered one of the major sentencing purposes, but that 
it is not expressed as such as can be seen by many of the comments above. The 
overall impression given by responses to the study was that while the community 
and the media were clamouring for primarily retributive sentences the judges were, 
at least as identified by themselves, holding steadfast against the tide of public 
opinion. 
 The (morally) discouraging aspect of these responses is the total absence 
of reflection on any aspect of the retributitive theory or any other thought 
pertaining to a similar perspective, even at the level of sophistry. This is true of 
almost every similar feature dealing with theory in this research. The decision to 
deal methodologically with the aspect of theory in some detail in Chapters 4, 5, 
and 6, was not based on a particular proclivity to refer to what so many other 
people have said on almost everything in the satiated field of legal punishment 
theory. Nor, there was any possibility for such an exposition to have even a stroke 
of originality, under the circumstances. The reason has been one of showing 
something simple but simultaneously crucial; that there exists a notable chasm 
between punishment theory and criminal practice as perceived by Cypriot judges. 
Academics appear to know it,702but judges do not seem to care. None said that he 
did. One judge thought: 
A couple of times I tried to read a few articles on penology written by academics. 
My daughter is a second year law student in Wales. They were impossible to 
                                                
701K Wilson, ‘Vengeance and Mercy: Implications of Psychoanalytic Theory for the Retributive 
Theory of Punishment’ (1981) 60 Neb L Rev 276, 302. 
702M Bagaric, ‘Sentencing: The Road to Nowhere’ (1999) 23 Syd L Rev 597, 625. 
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comprehend. I had to read them repeatedly but to no avail. How do these people 
write? Don’t they want judges to read and comprehend their thoughts and try to 
improve or whatever? Don’t they want judges to understand anyway the answers 
to the questions academics put on their behalf?  703 
 
This comment, appears reminiscent to Leo Tolstoy’s query more than a 
century ago: 
He asked a very simple question: ‘Why, and by what right, do some people lock 
up, torment, exile, flog, and kill others, while they are themselves just like those 
they torment, flog, and kill?’ And in answer he got deliberations as to whether 
human beings had free will or not; whether or not signs of criminality could be 
detected by measuring the skull; what part heredity played in crime; whether 
immorality could be inherited; what madness is, what degeneration is, and what 
temperament is; how climate, food, ignorance, imitativeness, hypnotism, or 
passion affect crime; what society is; what its duties are - and so on… There was 
much that was wise, learned, and interesting; but there was no answer on the chief 
point: ‘by what right do some people punish others? 704 
 
Three other judges said: 
 
If Aristotle or whoever else of these otherwise academic giants were present in my 
court experiencing what I experience in there every day having to deal with all 
sorts of unbalanced and dangerous people under the pressure of my workload, 
they would have probably reconsider some or all of their theories of punishment 
and the like. I know I would if I were in their position.705   
 
Has anyone of these penal philosophers been to court before embark writing their 
theories?706 
 
I do not think that the problem of sentencing lies in the courts. I think that the 
problem lies to most of the academics and their inability to grasp the essence of 
practice. It is as simple as that.707 
 
The last three remarks encapsulate the feelings of many other judges, not 
only the Cypriot ones. Philosophers seek to propound an overarching theory, valid 
in all situations. A judge faced with an infinite variety of circumstances under 
                                                
703Judge 18. 






which crimes are committed and the unique qualities of each criminal and each 
victim has more modest goals, a theory that will morally justify what the judge is 
impelled by law to do in a particular case, deriving essentially no assistance from 
the philosophical fortitude of theoreticians,708even if they would wish to, but failed 
to do so, because of the lack of common language and effective communication 
between them and the latter.709The fact that Cypriot judges, firsthand and 
indolently, express the same thoughts as those of Forer and Thomas, could become 
a cause of concern to those who favour a narrowing of the gap between 
punishment theory and sentencing practice, as a synergy between academic and 
judicial thinking (an otherwise typically incompatible exercise) might lead to a 
redefinition of the perceived disassociation between moral legitimisation of 
punishment and sentencing practice, for all that could worth. There is however an 
alternative angle of approach. That is, by accepting that the essence of the matter 
depends on the ability of judges to be self-consciously reflective about their 
practice, and therefore more likely to display a more consistent and 
                                                
708L G Forer, Criminals and Victims: A Trial Judge Reflects on Crime and Punishment (W W 
Norton & Company, New York 1980) 7, in which the author asserts that a painstaking review of 
philosophical literature from Plato to Hart, Rawls and Foucault, has failed to provide judges with 
an acceptable rationale for the sentences they are obliged to impose every day. 
709 E W Thomas, The Judicial Process; Realism, Pragmatism, Practical Reasoning and Principles 
(CUP, Cambridge 2005) 9-12. The writer, an academic and judge of the Supreme Court of New 
Zealand, pertinently asserts that: ‘Many legal theorists seem to write to and for each other. In the 
result, jurisprudence theory has become burdened with a surfeit of theories and sub-theories... 
Jurisprudence has come to possess the variety of a giant supermarket. Small wonder that the 
practitioner is bemused as to what to take from the shelf…More critical than these strictures, 
perhaps, are the recurring more substantive shortcomings of legal theory, which, to the experienced 
judge immersed in the reality of the legal process, are likely to seem somewhat remote.  One such 
shortcoming is the vain but persistent efforts of legal theorists to unearth a predetermined or 
impersonal law. A second is the failure to recognise the full extent of judicial autonomy necessary 
to resolve the vast array of choices confronting a judge in reaching a decision, and the essential 
place of that judicial autonomy in the legal system. A third is the distance seemingly placed 
between theory and the basic requirement that the law exists to serve the needs of society. It is not 
and never can be an end in itself. Legal theory that departs from or obscures this basic truism does 
a disservice to the law and legal process.’ 
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methodological judicial behaviour. In Dworkin’s view, a judge is always a 
philosopher whether he is aware of it or not, for any practical legal argument, no 
matter how detailed and limited, assumes the kind of abstract foundation offered 
by jurisprudence, hence rendering any of his opinions a piece of legal philosophy, 
even when the philosophy is hidden.710They follow instructions they have never 
properly considered and derive at their arguments from distinctions they have 
never subjected to scrutiny. The good judge is supremely aware of his philosophy 
and is always in the process of both consulting and refining it whenever he takes 
up the task of making a decision about a fresh case. The choice is clear. One can 
either be an unreflective judge and be at the mercy of one’s theory, or indeed, one 
can be in command of one’s theory and use it as a mode of ‘calculation’ to 
produce coherent and considered decisions. 711   
 
8.3 Rehabilitation 
Twenty-three judges in all discussed the importance of rehabilitation as a 
sentencing purpose, with the following four comments summarising the overall 
stance: 
 For me rehabilitation is the essence of sentencing. Society must strive to help 
offenders not to repeat their criminal behaviour particularly young offenders. We 
as judges must exercise care on this respect. Sentencing requires reflection and 
deep thinking; it requires concern for the offender. It is very easy to say that all 
offenders in imprisonable instances will definitely end up in jail. This is the easy 
way out. Rehabilitating or as judges giving the offender the chance of 
rehabilitation has societal benefits as well. You communicate to them that society 
has not erased him and that it still cares for them. I already said that this is not the 
easy way out. A rehabilitative sentence will have to depend on a variety of 
circumstances such as the seriousness of the offence, the offender’s criminal 
                                                
710R Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Clarendon Press, Oxford 1979) 90.  
711R Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (New Impression with a Reply to Critics, Duckworth, 
London 1996) 104. 
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record, his personal circumstance and many other factors depending on the case, 
even the whether for example the victim has forgiven the offender.712 
 
Rehabilitation can be used and I do use it if the case before me with its particular 
facts justifies such an action, particularly if the offender is a minor or a young 
person.713 
 
 I consider suspended sentences of imprisonment as rehabilitative sentences. I use 
this method when I can do so justifiably. You give the defendant a second chance. I 
am particularly careful in cases where the defendant is very young or very old.  
We are all humans and we all make mistakes. You do not have to erase the 
defendant from the first time, and I say not even from the second or the third time. 
A lot depend on the facts of the case in such instances and the circumstances of the 
offence, which could be numerous to outline.714 
 
The point is not only what we as judges are doing towards the rehabilitation of the 
offenders, which I espouse as a most important punishment purpose. The point is 
what the criminal justice system is doing to assist these people to rehabilitate. Can 
the system find them employment? Secure them counselling for themselves and 
their families? These are important parameters.715 
 
These comments reflect a strong emphasis on rehabilitation as a sentencing 
goal among the Cypriot judiciary. Judges linked rehabilitation with protection of 
the community, because they view reformation of the offender from a utilitarian 
perspective as serving the interests of all, since, in most cases, an imprisoned 
offender releases back into the community. Once more, the judges referred to the 
surrounding facts of the offence and the circumstances of the defendant as 
determinant for the exercise of their discretion to choose the particular sentencing 
purpose. 
8.3.1 Rehabilitation and Imprisonment 
Some judges spoke about rehabilitation in relation to imprisonment: 
It is peculiar really, to send a defendant to prison and at the same time talk about 
rehabilitation in your decision. We know what is happening in prisons. Drugs, 






rapes, bullying, violence of all sorts; it is a crooks’ university in there, 
postdoctoral stuff. Chances are that they come out worse than they got in. I have 
my doubts if imprisonment can be rehabilitative.716 
 
I do not see rehabilitation microscopically. An offender can rehabilitate in prison 
if he wants to and the prison system helps him. At the same time, he does his time 
for the offence for which rightly and deservingly he was sentenced. The two 
purposes can coexist.717 
 
Jail can certainly rehabilitate offenders and punish them at the same time 
deservingly for what they did if the prison system works properly and on scientific 
basis having for example expert and specialised personnel, schooling, the learning 
of arts and crafts, all of these and many others could contribute to his 
rehabilitation. However, the question is if the prison system works properly 
indeed. Well it does not. We all know that, but few of us admit it. Political parties 
initiate corruption in society, and that corruption spreads to the microsociety of 
prisons. Look at the problem of drugs in prison for example. There must be ways 
to eradicate the drugs and the violence that it appears to scourge the Central 
Prison. It is a shame for a democratic system whish supposedly respects human 
rights to imprison offenders for their betterment and them coming out worse.718 
 
What one deduces from these comments is that some judges consider 
feasible the combination between retribution and rehabilitation provided that the 
prison system is equipped and ready to assist them in doing so. Imprisonment was 
mainly seen as a sentence that did little for the offender’s chances of rehabilitation, 
in fact probably producing the opposite effect. A recurring theme was the judges’ 
belief that drugs were somehow available in prisons, and the fact that the 
harshness of prison would serve to reinforce and intensify criminal behaviour 
rather than have a rehabilitative effect, giving life, in a perverse sort of way, to 
complaints made by prisoners to the effect that: ‘You are sent to prison as a 
punishment, not to be punished. Unfortunately, that is what happens most of the 





time.’719Interestingly so, some of the judges’ comments gave life to some of 
Foucault’s pessimistic views on prisons, as a torture and spectacle, and a façade of 
politics of power.720 
Another judge was more philosophical (and poetic) in his comments on 
prisons and imprisonment (and perhaps historically informed as well), by saying 
that: 
Prison is the beacon of state authority over the individual. When we 
imprison, we help preserve this notion of state power and authority. Prisons are 
also an expression of democracy. It is there we send those who having the right to 
choose how to live their short and sweet life, they select offending. We as judges 
have to do our duty.721 
 
This comment, gives a feeling of judicial politicisation of the wider prison 
system and its functions, more than simply categorising it as merely a place where 
convicts end up after sentencing. Indeed, ever since the Enlightenment, the prison 
has been a major site of democratic state building as it created new institutions of 
crime control and new sites of state power from policing to sentencing. The prison 
helped establish new frameworks for understanding and classifying citizenship in 
democratic societies as it distinguished which people are subject to state sanctions, 
which are not, and why. By setting the limits of what the state authorities could do 
to someone who broke the law, penal sanctioning helped define individual rights 
and protections from state power,722and by analogy to the observations of judge 
                                                
719The comment is attributed to an ex-prisoner as cited in D Robins, Just Punishment 
(Understanding Social Issues, Gloucester Press, London 1990) 41.  
720Sheridan A (tr), Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison (Vintage Press, 
New York 1977) 55. 
721Judge 28. 
722V Barker, The Politics of Imprisonment: How the Democratic Process Shapes the way America 
Punishes Offenders (Studies in Crime and Public Policy, OUP, Oxford 2009) 12. 
 253 
28, gave the free choice to the polity not to become members of prison society by 
breaking the law (and getting arrested). 
The present study revealed strong support for rehabilitation as a sentencing 
aim, particularly in relation to young offenders and interestingly enough to elderly 
offenders. Rehabilitation as a sentencing aim appeared to be clearly understood by 
the judges. What appeared to contribute to the popularity of rehabilitation was the 
fact that judges see it as being not only important for the offender but also for the 
community as a whole. The finding coincides with that of a study by Indermaur on 
offenders’ perceptions, according to which there was a tendency on their part to 
see the purpose of a sentence as rehabilitative. Indermaur also noted the propensity 
of judges to favour rehabilitation, which coupled with defence advocates 
presenting similar views, creates a possibility of an unintended collusion 
emphasising the needs of the offenders.723  
Lastly, one of the judges commented on the ‘politics’ of rehabilitation, 
indicating that a rehabilitative sentence does not necessarily denote what ex facie 
denotes, but it is rather the product of a policy choice: 
Rehabilitation is an interesting concept. It is a good thing to give a second chance 
to someone, and help him find his way, preferably outside the incarceration 
system. We know that prisons are full, and that there is a lot of niggling by those 
who fail to understand that judges are not the only ones responsible for this 
phenomenon. Many other factors play their role. Whether we like it or not we as 
judges take into account this situation in the prison system, at least I do. So, when 
I can avoid sending someone in prison, say by imposing a suspended sentence, or 
a hefty fine, I do so, and in this way I help the system.724 
 
This comment clearly puts the issue of rehabilitative sentencing on an 
interesting new ground, not necessarily correct however from a legal point of 
                                                
723D Indermaur, ‘Offenders’ Perceptions of Sentencing' (1994) 29 Aust J Psychol 140, 143. 
724Judge 29. 
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view. Courts could not be held responsible for prison overcrowding. This problem 
is within the responsibilities of the Executive and the Legislative branches of 
government, not of the Judiciary. The judge’s comment nonetheless, describes a 
reality, not far different, in essence, from that analysed in recent academic 
literature in relation to the policy and practice of rehabilitation. In Canada, for 
example, it has been argued that rehabilitation measures may be a way of dealing 
with prison overcrowding due to an abundance of tough-on-crime laws.725 
 
8.4 Deterrence  
Judicial opinions in the study displayed a strong approval of deterrence.   
Twenty-four judges were of the opinion that deterrence was a primary goal 
in sentencing, not specifying however whether they were referring to general or 
specific deterrence. Five of the most encompassing comments are the following: 
Deterrence is the most effective penal measure in the armoury of judges. It 
provides a very reasonable ground for punishing offenders and teaching them a 
lesson. At the same time it serves as a paradigm to other potential offenders.726 
 
I think that deterrence is the primary purpose of sentencing. It expresses fully and 
clearly the societal feeling for punishment and exemplification.727 
 
 I am personally sceptical about deterrence generally, but it doesn’t mean that you 
shouldn’t give a person a deterrent sentence merely because you don’t know that it 
will have that effect. Similarly we do not know what it would happen if we did not 
have deterrence type of sentences. One must be careful though not to overdo it.728 
 
Deterrence only works with some offenders but it can backfire. One needs to be 
prudent on this.729 
 
                                                
725D A Andrews, ‘Rehabilitating Criminal Justice Policy and Practice’ (2010) 16 Psych Pub Pol 






I often use deterrence as an excuse the basis of my sentence but that does not 
necessarily mean that I espouse everything that accompanies the concept. I am not 
sure if deterrence works, nonetheless if one case works and prevents in actual fact 
the repetition of the crime either from the offender or a potential offender, then 
that is enough justification for me.730 
 
Some of the observations focussed on how judges consider and evaluate 
the issue of deterrence in their decision-making process: 
Deterrence has always been part of my reasoning in sentencing. In general, 
potential offenders know that they will be punished for their offence. The rest is 
mechanics; it is for the system to decide how to punish them. Deterrence works, 
perhaps not all the time but it works.731 
 
Deterrence is one of the recognised purposes of sentencing, so I use it when I 
deem necessary. I do not care whether it works or not, for me it works by 
presumption. Has anybody proved that punishment works? People all over the 
world get punished and still they offend and sometimes the same people. That 
means that we must stop punishing. That is not a logic I could support.732 
 
Of all the purposes for sentencing discussed in the interviews, deterrence 
generated the most interest among the judges, with some holding the view that it 
constituted the primary purpose of sentencing. Generally, however, deterrence was 
not looked upon with favour as a sentencing purpose, although a number of judges 
stated that they felt under pressure to use it, although they did not agree with it 
personally. Significantly, there was little agreement between the judges on which 
offences should attract a deterrent sentence, and few judges discussed why they 
imposed deterrent sentences.   
Many of the judges did not differentiate between general and specific 
deterrence, preferring to speak generally of ‘deterrence’ and ‘deterrent sentences.’ 
Noticeably, the Supreme Court in its case law on sentencing, as summarised in 





Chapter 3.6, referred to deterrence in 8.2% of the cases, to general deterrence in 
15% of the cases, and to specific deterrence in 1.5% of the cases. This could mean 
that the Supreme Court uses the term ‘deterrence’ for both concepts and does not 
meticulously differentiate between the two, either intentionally or unintentionally, 
hence the resulting comments. Alternatively, it could mean that in a number of 
cases the Supreme Court was in fact referring to general deterrence rather than 
specific deterrence. It could also point to lack of understanding in some cases on 
the difference between the two types of deterrence, with corresponding confusion.  
 
8.4.1 Deterrence and Other Purposes of Sentencing 
Two judges identified links between deterrence and other sentencing 
purposes, such as retribution, incapacitation, and social protection:  
Deterrence is a side dish for all other punishment purposes. It goes well with 
retribution as it sends out a loud message that punishment is not only for the 
offence the defendant has committed but for the warning of all other potential 
offenders and the defendant as well that this is the proper treatment. It also goes 
well with denunciation as you denounce the defendant’s behaviour in an even 
stronger manner. Deterrence goes well also with rehabilitation in that he will have 
to cooperate in his rehab attempts so that he will not have to repeat the same or 
any other offence.733 
 
Deterrence goes part and parcel with social protection and incapacitation. It has 
to do with social protection because it can help deter other offenders to the benefit 
and protection of society. Moreover, it can help in the giving of the wider message 
that people who offend, and the circumstances of the case and their personal 
circumstances are such, will be punished in such a way as to be deterred and 
incapacitated according to the provisions of the law. In this sense, incapacitation 
has a deterrent effect as well.734 
 
These judges were of the view that deterrence may be effective in 
combination with other sentencing rationales, and were therefore supportive of the 




use of deterrence in sentencing. Of course, analysing the grounds of their 
approach, one easily detects their probable confusion as to the moral justification 
of the said rationales and their function, as explained in Chapter 5, without the 
need of any additional elaboration as (by sardonic analogy), the axiom of res ipsa 
loquitur applies fully in this instance (‘The thing speaks for itself’).  
The discussion of the use of deterrence by the judges revealed endorsement 
of the notion of deterrence generally, with qualifications for that support in cases 
where it was seen to be inappropriate. 
 The next section looks specifically at general deterrence and the judges’ 
respective comments.   
 
8.4.2 General Deterrence 
Ironically, despite many of the judges stating that deterrence was a useful 
sentencing purpose (21 judges), with some having the opposite idea (9 judges), a 
number of those who did not support it, gave examples of cases where they would 
use general deterrence as a sentencing tool. The other noticeable aspect was that 
there was little agreement between judges as to which categories of offences 
merited the deployment of general deterrence as part of the raison d’être of the 
sentencing judgment: 
General deterrence is a very powerful sentencing purpose. Through it the State 
makes a point and it deters all those who might think to offend.735 
 
General deterrence is a justifiable purpose in every case where the offence is 
serious. The court must without more be able and ready to impose such deterrent 
sentences as to make people think two and three times over before committing an 
offence. 736 





Deterrence does not serve any meaningful purpose. It is generally ineffective and 
unfair to the defendant who has committed one crime and he will be punished for 
another offence that he has not committed. I could conceivably see general 
deterrence applied in cases of hooliganism and sexual offences against children 
but as I said I do not believe in its effectiveness.737 
 
General deterrence is generally speaking (and I emphasise the ‘generally’) an 
empty letter in the sentencing reality and from one perspective an unfair measure 
as well as it can lead to a higher sentence than the one deserved for the particular 
offence under the particular circumstances. I see however how one could think of 
utilising it in cases of serious assaults sexual and others against small children. 
That is an area where we must be absolute and vertical in our approach for 
extremely heavy sentences.738 
 
As judges we decide on proof. Is there any proof that general deterrence works? I 
personally have not heard of any.739 
 
 
8.4.2.1 Categories of Offences 
The following, were categories of offences where judges stated that general 
deterrence was appropriate: 
(a) VAT Fraud and Contempt of Court  
Specific examples I can give are VAT fraud and contempt of court. These two 
offences need to be addressed and punished with ‘special’ general deterrence. The 
first has to do with people collecting the VAT tax from the consumer and not 
returning it and later on, they try to strike a deal with the VAT Office to pay a 
lesser amount as a compromise. It is a classical case of fraudulent theft. The 
second has to do with the discipline in courts and the respect of judicial orders 
and judgments, without which the justice system will fall in disrepute.740  
 
(b) Sexual Offences Against Children 
Any kind of sexual offence against children particularly the very young ones 
deserves the maximum even without prior convictions. The message must be clear 












(c) Domestic Violence 
 Domestic violence is a very important area to which general deterrence can have 
an impact. Wives (more often than not the victims are women) are not possessions 
to be thrown left, right and centre, kicked, beaten, and spat at, quite often in front 
of the children - which is another facet of the problem. Wives and children have 




Hooliganism is social terrorism for the healthy fans and spectators. Many 
hooligans are young offenders but here we must make an exception and not 
consider their youth as a mitigating factor. We should impose crushing sentences 
so that others know that they will end up the same way.743 
 
One judge while discussing, in broad terms, the issue of general deterrence, 
mentioned hooliganism as an area where general deterrence must have no 
utilisation, where the offenders are young persons: 
General deterrence equals to severer sentences usually of imprisonment. I have no 
problem over that with the exception of one qualification regarding young 
offenders. These kids need attention and understanding. The mass hysteria and 
anarchy carries them away and makes them misbehave, and I do not mean to 
minimise the seriousness of the offences related to hooliganism. In this respect, I 
am in favour of normal sentencing preferably non-custodial as for example a 
suspended sentence.744  
 
(e) Drinking and Driving Offences 
My mind goes directly to the drinking and driving offences. Of course, other 
offences deserve a general deterrence approach. Drinking and driving is a kind of 
behaviour, which I think it can become the subject of manipulation. With the 
proper approach driving without previously drinking can become some sort of a 
culture, and part of this positive and bona fide manipulation is the imposition of 
strict sentences for purposes of general deterrence.745 
 
(f) Drug Trafficking 
Narcotic drugs constitute a scourge for society. The battle is and must remain 
universal. There are no mitigating circumstances for these offences in my opinion. 
Sentences must be such as to convey the message that drug supply and the 
commercialization of the white death will be viewed with intolerance at its 






maximum. General deterrence can help towards this direction. If a dealer or a 
carrier want to take their chances let them take them but they must know that once 
caught the sentence will be such that it would not make it worth the while. Only in 
this way we could deal with this problem. I would not mind at all if for this offence 
we had the death sentence in Cyprus.746 
 
(g) Spying for the Enemy 
Fortunately, we do not have that many cases relating to spying and the divulging 
of information on defence works but it is an area where I would have been very 
willing to sentence on the principle of general deterrence as well. Turkey is 
illegally occupying half of our country and it is inconceivable to me how one could 
work for the enemy.747  
 
Themes emerging from the judges’ statements were diverse, and did not 
always fit within the normal use of deterrence. In most of these cases, the offence 
would be unlikely to be committed on the spur of the moment, and offenders may 
be well aware that what they were doing was legally wrong. However, this does 
not guarantee that deterrence would have been an effective sentencing option.  
Eighteen judges mentioned sexual offences against children. This category 
of offence is a doubtful candidate for deterrence due to the nature of the offences 
where the offender is unlikely to be motivated to desist based on the prospect of 
criminal sanctions. One of the judges who nominated deterrence as being 
appropriate for this offence, acknowledged this qualification by stating that it 
would not be so much the deterrence of the offender but general deterrence the 
appropriate mode of sending a ‘clear community denunciation’ for the particular 
criminal behaviour.748Although the judges are talking about ‘sending a message,’ 
which involves general deterrence, the better description of what is being referred 
to, is denunciation, and perhaps also just deserts. 





The offence of drunk driving was nominated as being a subject to possible 
deterrent effect by 19 judges. The offence would often be committed without 
sensible thought (by definition the offence is committed while the offender is 
intoxicated); however there may be stronger arguments for deterrent sentences for 
drunk driving rather than the other types of offences. This may however have a 
general deterrent effect based on the existence of the sanction itself, rather than the 
actual sentences being handed down by the courts, particularly on the basis that 
most are not publicised. Ashworth points out that there is strong empirical 
evidence of a general deterrent effect based on the existence of a punishment 
structure.749Thus in the case of drunk driving, it is arguable that it is the existence 
of the punishment structure which deters many offenders from committing the 
offence. It is also arguable that many offenders cease from offending because of 
the real possibility of being caught, rather than a fear of the actual penalty to be 
imposed. Added to this are other reasons for desisting from such behaviours, such 
as moral grounds.750Again, as discussed above, it is debatable whether the 
preferable basis of such a sentence should in fact be general deterrence, when just 
deserts and denunciation may be more appropriate. The same approach applies to 
the remaining offences proposed by the judges as calling for general deterrence. 
It seems fair to conclude that while the judges were giving examples of 
cases where general deterrence may be appropriate, these cases may not in fact be 
suitable for general deterrence by their very nature. In most instances, just deserts 
or denunciation were more appropriate bases for the sentence than deterrence. This 
                                                
749Ashworth, ‘Deterrence’ (n 347) 51.  
750Ashworth, ‘Deterrence’ (n 347) 50. 
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raises the enigma of the continued enthusiastic use of deterrence by the judges, 
despite their analysis of its faults, and the empirical evidence. The reasons could 
not but be speculative, although the interviews suggest that it may have been due 
to familiarity with the concept of the deterrence perceptions (real or otherwise), 
that the public were calling for deterrent sentences, and statements by the Supreme 
Court that were perceived as indicating the appropriateness of deterrence, at least 
in relation to certain offences.  
 
8.4.3 Public Communication of Punishment  
General deterrence has a strong tie with publicity, since without 
propagation of the details of the sentence, it can hardly be argued that the sentence 
could be justifiable on general deterrence, provided of course that the court knows 
this weakness. Likewise, the imposed penalties must be publicised widely as 
deterrent, and the public to perceive them as such.751Comments by the judges 
tended to display disparagement as to the efficacy of general deterrence if potential 
offenders did not know of the sentence. This group of judges centralised their 
rationale on the extent of the contribution by the mass media. Other judges’ 
comments saw things from a different perspective and disconnected the whole 
issue from that of the media factor: 
The media do not deal with all of the sentences all of the time. They deal with 
sentencing when the particular case is a high profile one or when they have 
nothing better to report and they are in need for some interesting sentence, 
conviction, or acquittal. The judicial system cannot rely on the media to put 
forward an argument in favour of general deterrence.752 
 
The role of the press is very important. Reporting of sentences help spread the 
judicial message around, which is after all the essence of general deterrence. 
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However, we have to make sure that they do hear about the sentences we impose 
so that they deal and with the not so ‘important’ ones. We also must make sure 
that the reporting is accurate. Experience shows that this is not always the case.753 
 
I would still exercise general deterrence nonetheless still if I thought that I am not 
being reported because you do not know when this will be the case.754 
 
Our sentences become known not only through the media. The become known from 
mouth to mouth and those who must know about them or many of these do find out 
about them eventually I sentence with deterrence in mind, both to the person and 
to others.  If it is publicised, then others may feel that they should not commit a 
certain offence.  It gets through one way or another, not necessarily through the 
media.  It gets around enough to have some effect.755 
 
If, as it is normally the case, the media report cases selectively, there is 
probably little chance of covering a particular case that the judges consider 
‘reportable’ and in any event, the judges will be unaware in advance whether or 
not this will be the case. Even if a case is reported, there is no guarantee that it will 
be reported accurately, or in sufficient detail.  In any event, even if all cases 
intended to have a general deterrent effect were in fact reported, there is no 
guarantee that reports of these cases would reach the persons to whom they were 
intended, that such persons would recall the details, and whether knowledge of 
such a sentence would have an effect on their propensity for offending behaviour, 
this latter factor being, of course, one of the criticisms of deterrence through the 
years. Deterrence is a subjective notion, depending on what potential offenders 
believe to be the case with respect to certainty and severity of punishment; and 
how those offenders evaluate the risk of offending in relation to their own 
situation. If offenders have no knowledge of previous sentences, there is no basis 
for their subjective belief, and therefore little deterrent effect. This can be 





contrasted with the type of deterrent effect produced by the presence of sanctions 
themselves.756The judges’ comments, disavowing the deterrent effect of sentences 
by way of publicity are significant, and contrast with statements by some, that 
general deterrence is a useful sentencing implement. The fact that 30 judges 
expressed reservations about general deterrence by characterising it as an 
essentially futile aim without it being accompanied with efficient reporting, 
suggests a reasonably widespread belief among the Cypriot judiciary that this is 
the case.  
 
8.4.4 Offence Prevalence 
The immediate social environment at a particular period of time helps to 
establish the areas to which the vigour of the law should be directed. That is why it 
is permissible for a court to take judicial notice of the prevalence of crimes at any 
particular time and their repercussions.757As noted in Chapter 3.6, prevalence was 
evaluated as a factor determinative of the imposed sentence in 16.1% of the 
appeals against sentence decided by the Supreme Court between 1960-2008. 
Like publicity, prevalence is often linked with general deterrence, with 
assertions being made by its supporters that a prevalent crime requires a deterrent 
sentence particularly in order to deter other potential offenders. Some judges held 
the view that individual offenders should be punished only in accordance with the 
severity of the offence and their culpability:  
Prevalence is a factor that sets the parameters of the seriousness of the offence. 
The more prevalent the offence the more likely it is to attract a strict sentence, but 
                                                
756A Von Hirsch, A E Bottoms, E Burney, and P O Wikstrom, Criminal Deterrence and Sentence 
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this is not an absolute rule. A lot depends as always on the circumstances. I 
usually connect it with the need for general deterrence and social protection but 
again this is not unqualified.758  
 
Prevalence would most likely lead to a deterrent sentence.759  
 
When looking at the offence I always take into account prevalence and the effects 
of this on society and the need to uphold the law and protect the citizens from 
similar criminal behaviour.760  
 
I would be more inclined to impose a deterrent sentence if there was evidence 
before me of prevalence.  Such proof is only not often given.761 
 
I always take prevalence in consideration. I do need evidence on that by the 
lawyers. I have and can have judicial knowledge of prevalence of a variety of 
offences based on my knowledge of how many cases were tried before me similar 
to the offence under consideration or based on the statistics the various district 
courts are publicising from time to time. I can also derive and do take judicial 
knowledge of prevalence on the basis of the judgments of the Supreme Court of 
Cyprus on similar issues.762 
  
Prevalence is not a precondition for the imposition of deterrent 
sentences;763other offences, which are not prevalent, can also attract particularly 
harsh sentences depending on the nature of the offence and the circumstances 
surrounding its committal. The presence of prevalence as a marker for the use of 
general deterrence raises the issue of how to establish this factor. The factual basis 
should perhaps be something more solid than judicial notice, such as official 
statistics or through the offering of relevant evidence.764Nonetheless, the most 
popular method cited by the judges in the study for incorporating prevalence was 
indeed judicial notice and an utilisation of their local knowledge and consequent 






763The Attorney-General of the Republic v Pavlou [1997] 2 CLR 170, 175  
764P V Lowenthal, ‘Some Issues in Fact Finding for Sentences (1980) 11(2) U Queensland L J 145, 
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capability to assess the situation in that particular area. Courts can use their own 
general judicial knowledge on the extent of crime; however, there have been 
instances where such judicial assertions and findings on the prevalence of 
particular offences have later been proven erroneous and capricious.765This raises 
the risk of the judges’ views on crime being derived by other, potentially 
inaccurate sources, for example the media. Ideally, the prosecution must present 
official data before the court to support assertions that an offence is prevalent, 
unless of course there is available recent case law of the Supreme Court directly on 
the point, or knowledge on the part of the judge of the prevalence of an offence on 
the basis of similar cases he has tried or which he knows that they are pending for 
sentence based on official information by the Registrar.766   
Several judges expressed dissatisfaction with the lack of proper evidence 
put before the court on the alleged prevalence of offences. The following is the 
most encompassing comment:  
There are times where you know that certain crimes are prevalent but you cannot 
derive judicial knowledge for the fact. The Supreme Court must issue frequent 
directions on this matter or the prosecution must be able to present official and 
pertinent evidence.767 
 
A better view would appear to be that of supporting the issuing of frequent 
and up to date directions by the Supreme Court (or even by the police and the 
Ministry of Justice) as to the prevalence of particular offences. Such a course will 
assist in the detachment of the court from either the competency or the motives of 
the prosecution, which could in turn wish to be lenient to the accused due to a deal 
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cut with the defence, or in fact for any other reason deemed appropriate by those 
responsible to utilise such a course.  
 
8.4.5 General Deterrence - Other Considerations 
In considering general deterrence, issues of compliance are closely related, 
as many people will obey the law for reasons other than the legalistic threat of 
criminal sanctions.  For example, they may normatively obey the law because it is 
morally appropriate to do so, or because they agree that the behaviour is wrong, or 
even because they may not necessarily agree but respect the need to obey the 
law.768Two judges noted this:  
There is a stance related to general deterrence that courts can deter potential 
offenders from committing serious crimes. This stance is not viable. People who 
obey the law usually do so for a variety of reasons not necessarily connected with 
deterrence, such as their own morality and upbringing and a plethora other social 
factors.769   
 
People do not need the courts to tell them that child rape, murder, burglaries, 
assaults and so many other offences are serious and one must avoid committing 
them; that is pedantic. One need not therefore rely or pursue deterrence to make a 
point.770 
 
Certainty of punishment is an important aspect of deterrence theory, and 
general deterrence in particular. A number of judges specifically mentioned this: 
General deterrence can be deterrent to some but not to others. It is rather the 
prospect of arrest that is really deterrent.771 
 
General deterrence has its value. It conveys to people that if they offend they will 
be punished.772 
 
                                                






These comments relate to both the certainty of detection and arrest and the 
certainty of punishment, both of which are important aspects of deterrence. If, as is 
often the case, the offence is committed impulsively and spontaneously, deterrence 
may have little effect: 
There are times where anybody, even us judges, can commit a serious criminal 
offence either due to momentary loss of self-control or for other similar reasons. 
So, do other people. Deterrence can make no difference in such cases, of 
provocation and impulsive reactions.773   
 
 
8.4.6 Specific Deterrence 
A sentence based on specific deterrence would require detailed information 
on the personal circumstances of the offender including his previous criminal 
record, with the court then calculating what sentence would be required to deter 
that person. This may give an appearance of lack of consistency in sentencing, and 
result in harsher sentences for persistent offenders.774It would also make such 
sentences of little use as precedents. Although significantly fewer judges 
commented on specific deterrence compared to general deterrence, there were 
some thoughtful comments on its utilisation in the sentencing practice:  
Specific deterrence is an indirect form of incapacitation in that you punish the 
defendant for a longer time so that to show him that he must abstain for future 
criminal behaviour in the future while keeping him out of the streets for a longer 
period of time, if the sentence is custodial.775 
 
The actuality of the matter is that personal deterrence is certainly an aspect and 
can be important. In my experience, specific deterrence can be very significant.776 
 
Specific deterrence is tricky. Where do you draw the line between the deserved 
sentence of the offender based on the offence and the facts of the case and taking 
into account proportionality issues and that extra punishment attributed to specific 
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deterrence? And how do you know that a sentence based on the first criteria will 
not have been sufficient?777 
 
One judge pointed out the relative needlessness of specific deterrence in 
theft, burglary and robbery cases where the offender is a drug addict:  
No matter what you give the offender in (such cases) the possibility is that the 
defendant will repeat his criminal behaviour.778 
 
 There was an obvious support from the judges on the use of specific 
deterrence, although in many cases this was qualified to apply in certain 
circumstances only. In comparison with general deterrence, specific deterrence 
was less controversial with the judges, and received analogically greater support, 
although paradoxically, it was mentioned much less frequently in the interviews 
than general deterrence.  
 
8.5 Denunciation  
The judges expressed the view that denunciation is about visible and felt 
justice, with the following comment encircling the substance of other similar 
observations: 
Denunciation the way I see it has its importance in the punishment process in that 
it allows people to hear and feel the anger of society for the type of crime the 
defendant has committed. It is also a way for the court to express in so many 
words its resentment for the particular criminal action and to send a clear 
message of criminal and societal intolerance to prospective offenders in the form 
of general deterrence and to the defendant specifically in the form of specific 
deterrence. That can make an impact.779 
 
In this sense, one sees that judges employ denunciation in a similar manner 
to general and specific deterrence linking them in terms of thematology and 





sentencing purposefulness. However, in one view, denunciation had little judicial 
significance:  
In my view denunciation or rather the issue of denunciation is misunderstood even 
amongst us judges. It is not we, judges, which denounce the criminal conduct of the 
offender but the House of Representatives (Parliament). It is the Parliament, which is 
responsible with the passing of the legislation that has created the offence, and not the 
Judiciary. Therefore, one can say that the community, the people through their elected 
representatives have already decided on the degree of denunciation to the defendant’s 
criminal behaviour.’780  
 
In contrast, two judges spoke about the relevance of denunciation: 
 In one way you are society’s angry voice, which denounces the offence and the 
defendant’s behaviour.781  
Judges cannot entirely ignore the sentiment of the community. We are here to serve 
the community’s legitimate interest in social safety and protection. To this extent 
denunciation has its place in the system.782   
 
One judge used the concept of denunciation by comparing the behaviour of 
the offender to those who are law abiding thus vindicating their behaviour by 
implying some type of a judicial positive reinforcement for the law abiding 
members of the community or more fancifully a sort of a reverse general 
deterrence: 
Denunciation can also become a means for vindicating the conduct of other 
citizens who choose to abide by the law in contrast to the defendant.783 
 
Most judges saw denunciation as a factor parallel to other punishment 
objectives, and a means of highlighting the purposes of the defendant’s 
punishment: 
Sentencing is the culmination of many factors, deterrent, rehabilitative, retributive 
and sometimes denunciatory. When I sentence, I always say that it is a serious 






case, provided of course that it is, and that with my sentence I will show the 
defendant but also to the public at large the court’s stance and abhorrence to such 
a type of behaviour.784 
 
As to denunciation, I will usually include general comments about the public’s 
aberration to such behaviour but I would avoid getting too personal with the 
offender. I do not want to sound and look patronising and arrogant so to speak. It 
is easy for someone to say that you were spiteful with the defendant due to 
prejudice and I who knows what. One has to be very careful.785 
 
At times a reason for sentencing the offender is to confirm the anguish of the 
victim and also denounce the conduct of the defendant. Punishment and 
denunciation are sometimes inseparable.786 
 
Two judges gave examples of specific offences for which denunciation is 
important. These were generally seen as the more serious and violent offences: 
I adopt a denunciatory approach only in cases that are really repulsive to me and 
to the general public such as sexual offences against young children, including 
incest.787 
 
The public disapproves of many offences and this sometimes changes according to 
the social circumstances prevailing at any one time. However, to me a particular 
offence stands out the most, without implying that it is the most serious one 
because it is obviously not, and I am referring to burglary and theft. The citizen 
has the right to be safe in his castle. No one must be able to take that away. In 
such cases I make very strong comments against this sort of behaviour by the 
defendant.788 
 
It was evident from the interviews that the judges did not see denunciation 
as a central sentencing purpose, in broad consistence with the relevant literature. 
There was, perhaps surprisingly, a good understanding of the concept (not 
necessarily in its scholarly dimension), from most of the judges who chose to 
discuss it, with many claiming to use it as a practical and communicative 
sentencing purpose. Several of the comments showed obvious intersections of 







denunciation as they connected it with other sentencing purposes, particularly 
retribution and deterrence.  
 
8.6 Incapacitation / Social Protection  
In common with denunciation, the judges did not comment in much depth 
on the purpose of incapacitation and social protection despite the fact that it is the 
factor most often referred to in the case law of the Supreme Court (in 151 
cases),789to which case law, surprisingly enough, no judge cited in any way or 
form.  
One judge considered that social protection included deterrence of the 
unspecified kind: 
Social and public protection is also an important purpose; probably the most 
important and this cannot but include deterrence.790 
 
Some judges saw social protection as an important sentencing rationale 
even though of limited purpose and use. A characteristic comment was the 
following: 
Occasionally it is vital to punish for public protection so as to isolate the offender 
for such period as necessary so as to secure the protection of the public, for 
example in the case of a serial rapist or a forger.791 
 
This judge seems to connect social protection with incapacitation in the 
sense of using the premise of social protection to ‘isolate’ the defendant for a 
longer period than he would otherwise have done. This is, admittedly, an approach 
resembling an approach with elements of incapacitation. This observation seems to 
                                                




gain more ground, considering several other comments put forward by some 
judges while discussing social protection:  
In approaching matters from the perspective of social protection one must be 
careful on how he is going to predict the future dangerousness of the defendant on 
the basis of his past behaviour.792 
 
In a similar way, the following judge also pointed out the possibility of 
mistake, but added that there are times when there is clear evidence that the 
defendant will offend again: 
The difficulty is that you cannot sentence an offender on the mere possibility that 
he might become a recidivist. But if I have clear evidence that the person is a 
psychopath and constitutes an obvious threat to the commune, then society needs 
to be protected from him and a heavier sentence may well be appropriate.793 
 
The need to protect society from dangerous offenders was important to a 
number of the judges: 
I think you should jail people to protect society when it is evident that they are a 
threat to society.794   
 
I would use social protection to imprison an offender for a longer period only in 
exceptional and very clear cases.795 
 
Another judge alleged:  
Protection of the community is definitely an important matter, but not one that is 
essentially evaluated by the Supreme Court as it is really in the District Court, 
where a judge can assess the risk.796 
 
This statement conflicts with the case law of the Supreme Court, which in 
fact deals evaluative with the issue of social protection, as already stated in 
Chapter 5.3.3.  
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Another statement was: 
I would rarely use social protection as a sentencing purpose because I am not sure 
if it is proper to make such sweeping statements without evidence of prevalence.797 
 
Again, this statement appears to connect social protection to offence 
prevalence and not to the nature of the offence per se, as most judges said or 
implied in their comments. The fact that prevalence can conceivably have some 
bearing on the wider issue of social protection does not convert it in to a 
definitional parameter. The fact for example that serious sexual offences against 
very young children are not prevalent does not mean that they must not become 
the subject of social protection.798  
Social protection is something I evaluate but I do not feel bound to refer to it 
explicitly in my judgment.799 
 
This statement relates to similar observations made in Chapter 7.3.8, as to 
the tendency of some judges not to explicate in their reasoning the punishment 
purpose they used in order to reach their decision. This usually happens either 
because judges think that they simply do not have such an obligation or because 
they are under the impression that their reasoning will be easily deduced from the 
overall drift of their judgment, unless of course they simply fail to think at that 
level, being unaware of such a potential perspective.  
 
8.7 Sentencing Discretion 
All of the judges were of the view that a wide judicial discretion is 
imperative in sentencing, and that the sentencing judge is not merely the only one 
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authorised to do so but also in the best position to make decisions about the 
sentence because of his experience and knowledge, and that includes Supreme 
Court judges. These views consort with those expressed in the pertinent literature 
as discussed in Chapter 4.7. In addition, judges stressed that District Court judges 
as opposed to Supreme Court judges are in a better position to evaluate the 
defendant for purposes of sentencing:  
Discretion is vital in sentencing as in many other judicial functions. You see the 
defendant and his reactions in the live judicial process. The Supreme Court lacks 
that opportunity.800 
 
  Some of the judges perceived wide discretion as necessary, to take into 
account the variety of facts in different situations and to tailor the sentence to fit 
those individual circumstances:  
How on earth can a judge assess the proper sentence without discretion?801 
Judicial discretion is absolutely crucial. It is the means that will enable you to 
evaluate the circumstances of the offence, the circumstances of the defendant, and 
every other possible and relevant factor in order to reach your decision.802 
 
Judges saw the evaluation of the defendant’s individual circumstances as 
critical in order to lead to a fair outcome, without that necessarily implying that 
these circumstances also constituted a mitigating factor as well:  
I must take into consideration the personal circumstances of the defendant in 
order to evaluate them without that denoting that in actual fact I will credit the 
defendant with any mitigating factors related to those circumstances. However, 












The chapter dealt with the way Cypriot judges decide sentences. There was 
an analysis of the factors they take into account and the reasons for their choice. 
There was also reference to case law of the Supreme Court to provide a legalistic 
milieu for the ensuing analysis, to the extent that such a case law existed to cover 
the issues under examination. The analysis shows that there are multifarious and 
morally conflicting sentencing purposes in the Cypriot practice, with the judges 
appearing to be unconcerned about the resulting uncertainty and any 
inconsistencies flowing as a result of their diverse punishtecture.  
The next chapter will deal with the way Cypriot judges view and practice 
mercy and enquire whether the attitudes extracted by the interview comments 
show similar tendencies as those expressed by the judges in relation to the 













CHAPTER 9: MERCYING AND THE SENTENCING DECISION 
 
The present chapter will examine the attitudes and responses of the judges 
in relation to mercy and its practice inside the Cypriot sentencing structure. There 
will be, at first, a presentation of all the Cypriot case law on the issue of mercy (all 
10 of the reported cases since 1960, that is), and following that, an analysis of the 
judicial interview statements and comments, in order to extract the mode in which 
Cypriot judges mercy.  
 
9.1 The ‘Merciful’ Jurisprudence of the Supreme Court  
The commonly accepted impression in the Cyprus sentencing reality is that 
neither hardship nor purely humanitarian considerations allow, in the usual course 
of things, to override the primary duty of the court for proper law enforcement. 
However, there have been some hard cases where the Supreme Court had to 
employ mercy in order to do justice (as the judges perceived it), on the force of 
their residual discretion.  
In Mavros and Others v The Police,804the Supreme Court, mercifully 
reducing the appellant’s 12-month sentence of imprisonment to 8 months’ 
imprisonment for the commission of homosexual offences under sections 171(a) 
and 171(b) of the Criminal Code, Cap 154 (now repealed), indicated that: 
Men suffering from such disorders [i.e. homosexual] do not come within the 
purview of the Mental Health Act 1959 unless the disorder is so gross that it 
amounts to psychopathy. The types of disorder may vary: at one end of the scale 
there is the mentally immature adult who is in the transitional stage of 
psychosexual development: be can be helped to grow up mentally. At the other 
end are those with severely damaged personalities, such as the obviously 
effeminate and flauntingly exhibitionist individuals and the deep resentful anti-
social types. Probably nothing can be done for these individuals; but their pitiable 
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condition calls for understanding and mercy… [The appellant] realized himself, on 
his own, the depravity and impropriety of his conduct, long before he was arrested 
by the police, and had been living a moral and normal life since 1973, one whole 
year before his arrest.  
 
In Georgiou v The Republic,805the appellant, a member of the House of 
Representatives and a practicing advocate, was convicted by the Assize Court for 
the forgery and uttering of an official document, namely a faked authorisation of 
the Central Bank of Cyprus for the export of money, and was sentenced to 1-year 
imprisonment. The offences were committed whilst he was acting for the 
administratrix of the estate of a deceased person who died in England but was the 
owner of movable and immovable property in Cyprus. In dismissing the appeal 
against conviction but allowing the appeal against sentence reducing it to one of 6-
months imprisonment, the Supreme Court observed: 
We have anxiously examined the sentence imposed from every angle. Certainly, it 
was right in principle and warranted by the grave facts of the case, made all the 
more serious because of the identity of the appellant, a lawyer pledged as every 
lawyer, to defend the law and, a Member of the House of Representatives, 
entrusted by the people with one of the highest offices of the State. It has been said 
repeatedly and, now we repeat, that the higher one stands, the higher becomes his 
duty to observe the law; in fact, give by his conduct an example of obedience to 
the law. On the other hand, we cannot overlook that the sentence of imprisonment 
is not the only punishment of appellant. He forfeited his seat as a Member of the 
House of Representatives-no small punishment by any measure-whereas his law 
practice, the means of support of himself and his family, was shattered, no mean 
punishment either. Faced with this human tragedy, we decided, not without 
reluctance, to temper justice that justifies a sentence of one year’s imprisonment in 
the interests of law enforcement, with mercy-that judicial power that enables the 
Court to adjust punishment to the human dimension and intrinsic complexion of a 
case.806 
 
In Barhouch v The Republic,807the appellant was a young Lebanese woman 
of 27 with two minor children. She was sentenced to 4 1/2 years imprisonment 
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after having been found guilty of the offence of possessing 727 grams of heroin. 
The Court, in allowing the appeal said: 
On the basis of the medical reports which are now before us we have a quite 
complete picture about the health of the appellant; and, unfortunately, the appellant 
is in an, indeed, grave predicament. The mental condition of the appellant has 
deteriorated greatly while she has been in prison…(and) as it appears from the 
reports of two psychiatrists… she is suffering from depression… she has suicidal 
tendencies which must be taken seriously as she has attempted to commit suicide 
in the past. Another psychiatrist… states in his report that further incarceration will 
make the condition of the appellant worse. While she has been in prison it was 
discovered that she has a lump in her left breast; and we have now before us the 
reports of two surgeons…according to which there are strong suspicions that it is 
malignant, but, of course, no final diagnosis can be made unless and until a biopsy 
is performed. Due, however, to her mental depression she refuses to undergo the 
surgery necessary for a biopsy. In the meantime the appellant has been granted by 
an Ecclesiastical Court in Lebanon custody of her two minor children and an order 
of separation from her husband; and there can be no doubt that her condition is 
being aggravated by the knowledge that her children need her and she is away 
from them. This is really a tragic situation. Though we cannot regard the sentence 
passed upon the appellant as being either manifestly excessive or wrong in 
principle it is quite clear that since she has gone to prison there has been serious 
deterioration of her physical and mental health. Actually her life is now in grave 
danger because she may either commit suicide or the malignancy in her breast may 
spread with fatal results before it is definitely diagnosed and treated as such. It 
appears that in a case of this kind an appellate tribunal may, on the ground of 
subsequent developments regarding the personal or family circumstances of a 
person sentenced to imprisonment, interfere with a sentence that is considered as 
being otherwise appropriate… The time has come to show the mercy of this Court 
to this appellant; and in the very exceptional circumstances of this case we order 
that her sentence is to be so reduced that she can be released immediately.808 
 
In Amira v The Republic,809the Egyptian appellant was sentenced to 3 
years' imprisonment after he had pleaded guilty to uttering three false traveller’s 
cheques for $100 each. While in prison he was examined by a Government eye-
specialist and was found to have been suffering from a serious affliction of the 
right eye, with nearly complete loss of eyesight. According to the 
ophthalmological report it was not possible to treat the eyes of the appellant in 
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Cyprus (the affliction affected the other eye as well), but it was possible that they 
would improve if they were operated on abroad. The Court held that:  
We are of the view that even though the crimes which were committed by the 
appellant are quite serious there is no justification at all in law or in justice and 
morality for saying that the appellant because of having been sentenced in respect 
of such crimes has to lose his eyesight by remaining in prison here whilst he can 
possibly save his eyesight by being treated without delay abroad by means of 
surgery which cannot be performed in Cyprus. We have decided to adopt the 
exceptional course of showing the Court's mercy to the appellant… by reducing 
his sentence so that he can be released immediately in order to be enabled to leave 
Cyprus and return to his country where his eye affliction may be treated in a 
manner not possible as yet in Cyprus. 
 
Similarly, in Zewar v The Republic,810the appellant pleaded guilty to 
possession and supply of controlled drugs (194.2 grams of heroin), and was 
sentenced by the Assize Court to a term of imprisonment of 4 ½ years. The 
Supreme Court reiterated the need for deterrent sentences in this type of offences 
stressing simultaneously that they should not be cruel and inhuman. The health 
problems suffered by the appellant were deemed exceptional and sufficient to 
justify his merciful treatment thus lessening the sentence to one of 3 ½ years of 
imprisonment. 
In Gregoriou v The Republic,811it was indicated that feelings of sympathy 
are not out of line but should not take the form of reduction of sentence, as that 
would be not the reasoning of an appellate Court but of a parole board (which 
Cyprus did not have at the time). 
 In Khalife v The Police,812the court held that a 12-month sentence for 
uttering a forged document (passport) after a guilty plea was not manifestly 
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excessive but reduced it to 9 months due to the appellant’s serious health problems 
as an act of mercy.813 
In Karyolemou v The Republic,814the appellant pleaded guilty to robbery. 
He had no previous convictions. He confessed and returned almost the entire 
stolen amount. His psychological problems (which led to his partial paralysis), 
deteriorated because of the imprisonment. The Supreme Court dismissed the 
appeal, indicating that the imposed 5 years imprisonment was lenient. The court 
underlined that in such cases the Supreme Court acts, in essence, as a first instance 
Court due to the principle of the greater principle of mercy and eleos. For this 
latter function, the Court expressed doubts and concerns, leaving however the 
matter to be conclusively determined by the Full Bench.  
In Piskopou v The Republic,815the 48-year-old defendant pleaded guilty to 
intentionally wounding the 26-year-old complainant with a knife causing him 
grievous bodily harm during a brawl in which the defendant attacked the 
complainant following the slapping by the latter of the defendant’s daughter. After 
the attack, the defendant carried the victim to the hospital for treatment. He was 
convicted to a 6-year term of imprisonment. The court recognised that there was 
no planning and that the attack occurred at the spur of the moment. The Supreme 
Court dismissed the appeal and a plea for reducing the sentence as an act of mercy 
by stressing that such a course can only be taken in exceptional instances and on 
the basis of the extraordinary facts of the case.  
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In Kara v The Republic,816the 61-year-old Lebanese appellant admitted 
possession of 247 grams of heroin with the intention of supplying it for money. 
She was sentenced to 7 years imprisonment. The Supreme Court distinguished her 
medical condition to that of appellants in other cases where the principle of mercy 
was applied, and rejected the appeal. 
In view of the above, and as a general observation, it can fairly be stated 
that the Supreme Court, though recognising that ‘justice is sweetest when 
tempered with mercy,’817could be loosely classified as being relatively mean with 
mercy,818and very reluctant indeed towards expanding such a discretion, except in 
truly unique and exceptional cases bringing to the fore the benevolence of man 
before a human tragedy,819a position one might add, not particularly dissimilar to 
either that of the House of Lords820(now Supreme Court), or the Scottish 
judiciary.821  
 
9.2 The Individual Judicial Perspectives  
9.2.1 Balancing Again 
The judges were far more philosophical in their comments on mercy and 
mercying compared to those on the sentencing process and the punishment 
purposes, presented in Chapters 7 and 8, respectively. Only 36 judges commented 
on mercy. The rest indicated that they simply did not desire to discuss it, and 
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refused further embellishment on their choice. The general approach of the judges 
was to deal first with the concept of justice as an introduction to their individual 
syllogisms and attitudes towards the issue in perspective, and its role in criminal 
sentencing in Cyprus, interrelating at the same time justice and mercy:  
I think of mercy sometimes when the facts are indeed exceptional for the offender. 
My sense of justice just revives. However, I worry, because my sense of justice 
might be different from the generally acceptable one. For me justice is to sentence 
in a way that the punishment is consistent to the gravity of the offence but at the 
same time be equitable and fit to assist the unfortunate offender in his plight. 
Remember, we are talking here about serious mitigating circumstances such as 
health problems, death in the family and the like.822  
 
Justice demands that the judge sentence according to the provisions of the law, of 
the particular sections of the Criminal Code or other criminal statute that he 
violated. The sentence must be appropriate. Mercy has no role to play. Should we 
say to the offender take I month imprisonment instead of five years because you 
have cancer? No. At least I don’t think so.823 
 
Justice is the key word. For me justice is for the judge to be able to give a 
reasonable and equitable sentence to the offender that it will make him realise that 
the court took into account all the mitigating considerations, and the victim realise 
that he or she was in the mind of the judge during sentencing. Is a question of 
balance really and this applies to mercy.824 
 
I cannot possibly think of mercy without having in mind injustice. My primary 
concern is the victim and not the offender. Of course, this does not mean that I 
dismiss it altogether. It will depend on the circumstances, such as the development 
of cancer after the offence or the deterioration of pre-existing cancer after the 
offence.825  
 
These comments are in line with the observations presented in Chapter 6.1 
regarding the interrelationship (or incompatibility) between justice and mercy, and 
the difficulty in finding a unifying stance on the definition of ‘justice’. The judicial 
observations are also in accord with the remarks pertaining to the resultant 
multiplicity on the definition of justice, which encompass, inter alia, 






considerations of retribution, rehabilitation, forgiveness, and victim-respect. The 
comments also indicate that some judges view justice as a boundary setting 
condition having associated it in a strict legalistic manner, with law in its 
pragmatic statutory sense rather than in a more abstract and normative level. The 
comments made by judge 53,826regarding the connection between mercy and 
injustice as an initial attitudinal response, bring the issue squarely within the 
parameters of a similar observation put forward in Chapter 6.1.1, in relation to the 
antagonistic attitudes between the two.  
Three judges indicated that mercy is the judicial means of correcting legal 
injustices: 
Mercy helps in alleviating or even curing wrongful legal decisions and their 
results of whatever form.827 
 
Mercy balances any imbalance between law and justice.828 
 
Judicial mercy contributes in minimising injustice and contributes in social 
stability, in appropriate cases.829 
 
These rather philosophical explications appear to convoke with the view 
that the of mercy, as correcting legal injustices arising out of both the written and 
customary law, has to be the essential ingredient to diagnosing what is wrong with 
any legal order.830Thus, as these comments appear to imply, mercy is required if a 
judge is to avoid doing grave wrongs, with one academic even saying that only a 
merciful judge could achieve a truly just result.831 
                                                




830J Anderson, Why Lawyers Derail Justice: Probing the Roots of Legal Injustices (The 
Pennsylvania State University Press, University Park, Pennsylvania 1999) 188. 
831J Adler, ‘Murphy and Mercy’ (1990) 50 Analysis 262, 268. 
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9.2.2 Mercy and Individualised Sentencing 
Six judges made the connection between mercy and individualised 
sentencing:  
Mercy is the end product of individualisation. If the circumstances of the offender 
are there it may be granted, but they have to be exceptional.832  
 
It will depend on the crime to a large extent. I would be minded to be merciful so 
to speak to an offender who has committed a crime of moderate seriousness with 
no aggravating circumstances rather than the opposite. I would also take into 
consideration the type of the criminal behaviour, for example if he was tempted to 
commit the crime due to his personal circumstances, for example if his has any 
addictions without implying that addicts of any kind should receive special 
treatment in the courts of law.833 
 
The personal and family circumstances of the offender are the most important 
aspect on the issue of mercy if and this is a very big if the circumstances of the 
offence are not aggravating and the offence is not very serious in its facts.834  
 
There is no possibility in my mind that I would consider mercy as an alternative if 
the offender has not truly regretted what he did to the victim. Mercy is compassion 
among other things. How can you say to someone that I am merciful to you even if 
you are not sorry for what you did? A few times in the Supreme Court, we hear 
submissions of mercy. The first question I ask is whether the offender pleaded 
guilty and repented. If the answer is negative that is that’s the end of the story for 
me.835 
 
Mercy is related to many variables. One cannot be rigid and absolute. A reason 
for mercy is the weakness of the trial court’s decision pertaining to the issue of 
guilt. Sometimes if we see that, the decision is wrong but there is no appeal against 
sentence we might interfere. It may sound radical or nonconformist but that is how 
it works. It is something that many of us judges do either up here or down at the 
district courts. There is nothing wrong with it provided that the action you take is 
for justice to prevail, always in accordance to legal principle.836 
 
For Cypriot judges therefore, mercy is also about respecting individual 
differences, in divergence with the wider utilitarianist perspective supporting that 
individualisation of punishment has no place in sentencing unless it serves the 







greater good of the community; and that the right of punishment belongs to society 
at large, so even if the victim forgives the offender, the commitment to try and 
penalize persists. Nonetheless, despite the absence of moral justification on the 
part of the consequentialist school (unless of course one accepts Brien’s 
metaethical theory approach mentioned in Chapter 6.3), Cypriot judges are very 
much eager to distinguish between more deserving and less deserving sentencing 
cases and circumstances, and evaluate the offender’s motivations, and the strength 
of the enticements or temptations to which he was exposed. These judges view 
justice as requiring justified distribution according to offence deservedness, and 
equality of treatment upon equal desert. They say in fact that justice can be 
tempered by mercy but cannot be replaced by it.837They associate the nature of the 
offence and its surrounding aggravating circumstances with the discretion to 
mercy in accordance to a certain perception of positive retributivism and the 
state’s obligation to impose on the offender the deserved punishment, and only 
that. By so doing the judges appear to imply that justice (that is, in its non-
disjunctive form) and mercy, inescapably turn into two mutually exclusive and 
contradictory concepts as justice means giving an offender the punishment he 
deserves, while mercy means giving him something lesser. Their criteria however 
for the justification of mercy appear to differ from those proposed, for example, by 
Von Hirsch and Ashworth (discussed in Chapter 6.4.2), in one important respect 
(though none of the judges referred to the said authors or appeared to have any 
knowledge of their theories and notional quests). They insist, contrary to the 
                                                
837See, E Van den Haag, Punishing Criminals: Concerning a Very Old and Painful Question (Basic 
Books, New York 1975) 47. 
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position of the two authors, in the existence of a direct relation of the mitigating 
factors with the seriousness of the offences in terms of harm and culpability.  
 
9.2.3 Mercy, Balancing and Discretion 
Three judges discussed the balancing equation within the parameters of 
mercy, characterising the exercise as the quintessence of sentencing discretion:  
There are times where you know that the facts of a case are such that you must be 
as lenient as you possible can with the defendant. The circumstances of the 
offence, any serious health problems that the offender is facing or any other 
serious problems of his immediate family are important weighing factors. All these 
combined with a less serious offence can do the trick. Everything of course is 
relative. You do have the discretion to show mercy, give much less than he would 
normally get.838 
 
Discretion equals mercy and mercy equals discretion. Discretion and mercy 
together equal justice, the justice of the courts.839 
 
Mercy is part of sentencing, and to sentence you must balance everything before 
reaching your decision.840 
 
The approach mentioned by these judges is similar in essence to the 
comments made by the Supreme Court in Georgiou841 to the effect that: ‘… mercy 
(is) that judicial power that enables the Court to adjust punishment to the human 
dimension and intrinsic complexion of a case’842but not, it seems, in an 
unstructured manner, by simply using compassion as a variable in a purely 
discretionary exercise.  




841[1984] 2 CLR 65. 
842[1984] 2 CLR 65, 97. 
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Two other comments, the only ones in this direction together with those of 
judge 53 above,843raised the issue of the conflict between justice and mercy in a 
rather elaborative manner, and more forcefully than their brethren:  
The administering of mercy and the administration of justice are two different 
procedures.  The first is capricious, the second orhological, although both could 
be wrong as a matter of law (the first for sure as it has nothing to do with the law), 
or fact.  It all depends.844 
 
To my mind one must not confuse mercy with justice and vice versa. Justice is your 
sentence based on the mitigating and aggravating factors. If you say after you do 
that, that ‘I must however give him less because of this and this reason’ that is 
doing something different from justice. The constitution provides for the right of 
the President of the Republic to pardon. He can pardon, not you. Otherwise there 
will be injustice.845 
 
The remarks of judge 47 (whose name interestingly enough, is not Jeffrie 
Murphy, and that much the researcher can divulge), fall evenly within the paradox 
of mercy on which the judge elaborated in Murphy’s classical ‘temperings are 
tamperings’ approach referred to in Chapter 6.1.2. His comments show an 
acclamation of the paradox, in that mercy is or can be different or even antithetical 
to justice in punishment. Another judge elaborated in detail on the matter as 
follows:  
Mercy is not only a matter of mitigating factors. It is also a matter of equality and 
justice. We all know that there are indeed some cases that stand out as potential 
candidates for mercy. However, say that defendant’s child is ill with an incurable 
disease and needs his father 24-hour attendance in order to be emotionally 
capable to undergo treatment and because of this, you are minded to be merciful. 
What about his co-defendant who might say, ‘Sorry for not having children so that 
they would become sick but I want the same treatment.’ Alternatively, say that 
there is no co-defendant; but another defendant who is in the courtroom waiting 
for his sentence for a similar offence and more or less the same circumstances of 
offence, and he says also, ‘I want the same treatment like the other one with the 
sick child, or the co-defendant of that guy with the sick child. I do have children 
but they are not sick, should I go to prison for more time because of that?’ I know 
                                                




that there are legal ways of differentiating the cases between them. We judges are 
very good in ‘differentiating’ and ‘distinguishing’ circumstances and case law 
when we want to support a decision we want to give just because that is how we 
want things to be done in that particular case unless of course the facts against 
such a decision are such that if you proceed with your intentions the decision will 
cry out loud ‘I am a capricious decision.’ I will say for example that the cases 
differ and that the defendant with the sick child can have mercy whereas the other 
defendant not because his circumstances are not the same and so on. I will also 
say that the defendant or co-defendant who does not have a sick child or children 
at all is not punished because of that but simply he cannot have mercy because he 
does not meet the criteria. However, is this fare? It might be justice for the 
defendant with the sick child but not for the others. On the other hand, if you were 
not merciful with the defendant with the sick kid, wouldn’t that be unjust to him? I 
had a case like that once. I was merciful to the one with the sick child but not to 
the others. I have already told you my rationale. When I was having my dinner I 
was thinking about the case feeling worried that I was unjust to the other 
defendants but relieved that I was just about the defendant with the sick kid.846 
 
These observations of judge 33 are indicative of a judicial recognition of 
the paradox of mercy. The judge appears to have considered it unjust not to be 
merciful. But as Murphy would argue, what business did he have ignoring his 
obligations to justice while pursuing some private, idiosyncratic, and not publicly 
accountable virtue of love or compassion to the defendant with the ill 
child?847Assuming that Murphy’s observations and epithets are accepted, then the 
judge’s thoughts and dilemmas are indicative of the actual problems facing 
sentencing practice and its need for justification. Of course, one could instead 
agree with Card’s position that the infliction of desert is a duty, and infrequently a 
mere right, in the sense of an institutionally recognised entitlement, and that mercy 
ought to be shown to an offender when it is obvious that, if not, he would be made 
to endure unusually more due to his atypical misfortunes.848Nevertheless, the 
judge’s statement portrays a qualification on the correctness of mercy’s role in 
                                                
846Judge 33. 
847Murphy and Hampton, Forgiveness and Mercy (n 423) 167-168. 
848Card, ‘On Mercy’ (n 442) 182. 
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sentencing. To this perception of things, one could maintain that the judge acted 
under a serious moral misconception in his insistence that justice (as he saw it) 
prevails. Doing justice however, is not always the definitive intention, and when 
justice and mercy conflict, justice, some say, should not always prevail, as the 
essential point of punishment is to communicate society’s emphatic condemnation 
of criminal wrongdoing.849  
There is additionally, one more aspect of judge’s 33 comments that needs 
addressing. He said that when a judge makes up his mind about the sentence he 
would find a way to etiologise it irrespective of any other considerations, unless 
such a course would objectively be clearly whimsical. This brings to the surface 
other similar comments made by other judges, for example in Chapter 7.2.2 in 
relation to judicial illusionism. This approach is not necessarily deplorable, if the 
decision could be legalistically justified and the discretion be deemed as 
judiciously exercised, although issues of moral justification could arise 
irrespective of whether the said decision is or could be legally defensible. The 
concern is that a judge can decide the outcome of a sentence first, irrespective of 
merit, or on a lower key, after considering the merits, balance them in such a way 
as to guide them to the decision he had been aiming to in the first place. This, 
however, is fickle and it would still be so, even if the merits symptomatically 
coincided with the decision as first perceived by the judge. It would have been 
eclectic and morally indefensible. In the reality of things, and this is the bottom 
line of the matter, no one but the judge would ever know the niceties that took part 
in his nous in deciding the sentence, and this applies obviously to every judicial 
                                                
849Tasioulas, ‘Repentance and the Liberal State’ (n 451) 499. 
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judgment, unless of course something said or implied in the dicta reveals the 
actuality of the reasoning. A reminder is due on this aspect on Michelon’s 
argument on the necessity of reasons and the resulting moral obligation of judges 
to decide the issues before them based on the reasons they believe to be applicable 
to the case and not on their sheer disposition to act, as referred to in Chapter 6.4.3.   
One judge commented on his mercying rationale as a purposive element of 
judicial discretion:  
In every case I can impose the sentence the law provides. I have the right even not 
to impose any sentence whatsoever. The law does not provide for minimum 
sentences. Therefore, I can select anything from one-day imprisonment to life or to 
whatever the maximum is and from one euro to the maximum if we are talking 
about a fine. So why are we talking about mercy? Mercy is something you do when 
you cannot do otherwise. Here you can you have the discretion. That is the essence 
of your power. You can select the sentence that you think appropriate on the 
circumstances and let the appeal court decide. This is another way of looking at 
mercy.850  
 
The part of the comment referring to mercy being ‘…something you do 
when you cannot do otherwise...’ has some abstract resemblance of the proposition 
set in Chapter 6.1, that mercy concerns second chances when that appears 
impossible. As to the remaining part, the statement points to the coexistence of 
mercy and justice on the premise that justice is disjunctive, in that it specifies an 
array of deserved sentences, with a high and a low end with any imposed 
punishment falling below the maximum been allowable. Hence, the sentence by 
being encapsulated within this range of deserved punishments is both just and 
merciful. On this account mercy does not involve injustice. The judge’s position 
also bears some resemblance to similar views held by Twambley,851Kathleen Dean 
                                                
850Judge 8. 
851Twambley, ‘Mercy and Forgiveness’ (n 461) 85. 
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Moore,852Murphy and Harrison,853Markel,854and Hurd,855regarding the asymmetry 
and incompatibility of justice and mercy, and the deterring role judges must play 
in prohibiting the mixture. The following statements by two other judges could 
also be analysed along the same lines: 
Judges must above all respect the victims of criminals not the criminals. This is 
justice.856 
 
I do not feel that I could be so merciful and tell a killer or a robber, because you 
are sick I am not going to give you the sentence that fits your offence and your 
circumstances and I am going to give you far less. I see mercy as a mine bomb. A 
lot has to do with the type of the offence and the circumstances of the offence. If 
the offence is a very serious one involving for example the loss of life particularly 
after careful planning there is no way on this earth that I could be merciful to the 
offender even if he was dying the next day.857 
 
Another judge said (along Dolinko’s line of thinking),858that: 
If I decide in favour of mercy then that would mean imposing a sentence less than 
the most lenient sentence I could impose on the basis of the facts. This balancing is 
not at all easy. I only had to do it once in my fifteen years on the Bench.859 
 
This statement is also consistent, to some degree, with Smart’s position that 
true mercy occurs when there is a deduction in the level of punishment to mitigate 
the suffering of an offender when he at the time of the commutation is a changed 
person comparatively with whom he was when he committed the offence.  
Another judge (in addition to judge 33),860said that mercy is a dangerous 
concept that can lead to conveying the wrong messages to the public: 
                                                
852K D Moore, Pardons (n 462) 169-178. 
853Murphy and Harrison, ‘The Equality of Mercy’ (n 464) 107. 
854Markel, ‘Against Mercy’ (n 463) 1480. 
855Hurd, ‘The Morality of Mercy’ (n 464) 389. 
856Judge 10. 
857Judge 43. 
858Dolinko suggests that a judge exercises mercy when he imposes a sentence that is more lenient 
than normally expected in a case of the sort, but nonetheless just, based on the evaluation of a range 
of mitigating factors broader than what would be standard in sentencing an offender in a similar 




One has to weigh thinks carefully. Mercy is a complex issue. It can be 
misinterpreted for favouritism and the like.861 
 
Incidental to these comment, a reminder is due regarding what emanates 
from the discussion in Chapter 6, that mercy and mercying may not always 
promote or be seen to promote the demands of justice, by allowing tolerance, 
which (for some), neither corrects the offender nor restores the original condition 
that existed prior to the offence.  
Another judge said: 
If you show mercy it means that there will be no deterrence in the punishment. A 
potential offender or any body else can say ‘do the crime and then cry for mercy-
and-you-will-get-it’ situation, and I do not discuss whether in theory and all these 
mercy could be justified. I am just talking of the repercussions. The negative 
impacts on society might be more than the benefit to be conferred to the 
defendant.862 
 
This utilitarianist perspective is in conformity with that of Beccaria who 
thought punishment deters specifically and generally hence any decision not to 
effect the justified punishment is unjustifiable, and in that regard a penal system 
cannot tolerate exceptions. Benn built on this to elucidate the more general 
utilitarian perspective that to identify mercy as a general ground for waiving 
punishment would not involve an otherwise avoidable mischief to society greater 
than the mischief of punishing the offender.863It was furthermore argued in 
Chapter 6, how a judge does not possess the moral agency of deciding on merciful 
grounds once deciding on the appropriate sentence following the proper balancing 
of the appropriate considerations. Provided of course, in all reality, that one is able 
to know for certain that the required balancing of the pertinent factors was not 
                                                                                                                                  
860See (n 846). 
861Judge 13. 
862Judge 2. 
863Benn, ‘An Approach to the Problems of Punishment’ (n 469) 339. 
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tainted by elements of hidden and undisclosed mercy as implied by the position of 
judge 33, and his claim that he decides, in essence, differently to the reasoning he 
gives to support his decision.  
A different judge thought: 
Mercy is a big thing. It is a dangerous concept. It is discretion to the fullest, so one 
must be very careful and extremely stingy in employing it. It is a big power than 
the judge has and must be careful in not popularising it. The circumstances of the 
offence and of the offender must be indeed exceptional. It is one thing to have 
discretion in choosing between two relatively similar sentences or even between 
dissimilar ones like imprisonment and a fine and another thing to say that 
although you deserve to go to jail for a long time you will not. It is not the offender 
I worry about really but the message you are communicating to the rest. Equal 
treatment plays its role. That is why discretion is so dangerous in such cases. The 
balancing is extremely fine, and the feeling, the realisation of that authority 
immense.864 
 
The above observations, in addition to bringing up once more the dangers 
of conveying to the public the wrong message as regards the utilisation of mercy in 
criminal sentencing, touches upon another feature of the debate on mercy theory 
and practice;865 that which correlates it to justice and connects it with the power of 
its administration. So, in essence, what the judge says is that, given his power to 
reduce the suffering of the offender whom he has at his mercy, his act is also a just 
one, and by analogy, a realisation of ‘… an awesome, and ultimate power over the 
lives of others.’866 
Three judges discussed mercy with a definitional tenor by providing a 
merely descriptive elaboration of what mercy (or mercying) is in their opinion: 
Mercy begins where the law reaches its limits.867 
                                                
864Judge 48. 
865 See, for example, the pertinent comments of Judge 33 (n 846) and Judge 13 (n 861). 
866E (Pat) Brown and D Adler, Public Justice, Private Mercy: A Governor’s Education on Death 
Row (Weidenfeld & Nicolson, New York 1989) 163. 
867Judge 12. 
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Mercy is a process whereby the judge acts beyond the law but within justice, if you 
know what I mean.868 
 
When I impose a merciful sentence, I do so on the authority I have to expand the 
outer limits of the law.869 
 
These comments have their own importance for three reasons. Firstly, they 
are indicative of the judges’ perception, that when they act mercifully, they do so 
in a structured and legitimised manner. Secondly, they bear a surprising relevance 
to similar remarks made by the House of Lords in De Freitas v Benny870(the case 
was not explicitly mentioned by the judges, something which does not necessarily 
mean that they did not know about it, although that was the impression they 
conveyed), where Diplock, LJ, said that mercy is not the subject of legal rights, 
and that it begins where legal rights end.871Thirdly, they show that disagreement as 
to the classification and parameters of mercy exists not only in the field of 
academe but to judiciaries as prominent as the English, and less prominent as the 
Cypriot. 
 
9.2.4 Mercy, Leniency and Equity 
Contrary to certain remarks in the Supreme Court’s case law, apocalyptic 
of an apparent phraseological confusion regarding the meaning of leniency and 
mercy,872the judges were clear in distinguishing mercying from the mere exercise 
                                                
868Judge 34. 
869Judge 35. 
870[1976] AC 239, 274G.   
871Slynn, LJ, contradicted this dictum a few decades later in Lewis v AG of Jamaica [2001] 2 AC 
50, 70A, where he said that: ‘Although on the merits there is no legal right to mercy, there is not 
the clear-cut distinction as to procedural matters between mercy and legal rights which Lord 
Diplock’s aphorism…might indicate.’ 
872For example, in Kyprianou v The Republic [1963] 2 CLR 78, 79, the Supreme Court referred to 
the defendant’s mitigation speech as ‘a strong plea for mercy,’ clearly denoting leniency, and not 
an act of mercy in the sense of imposing a sentence below the minimum justified under the 
circumstances. Similarly, in Pilatos v The Republic [1988] 2 CLR 92, 94, the Supreme Court 
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of leniency. They essentially classify the latter along Walker’s categorisation of 
leniency (that is as required by justice and therefore not amounting to 
mercy).873They also differentiated between mercy, leniency, and equity, akin to 
Tudor’s approach by describing mercy as abstaining from imposing the minimally 
just suffering as opposed to imposing that minimum possible sentence or a more 
severe one:874  
For me mercy and justice go together. Mercy is compassion. Is that extra step 
beyond leniency and sympathy for the offender, but his personal circumstances 
must be really and truly very, very exceptional. I exercise mercy only when the 
personal or family circumstances of the offender deserve such a course.875 
 
Justice and forgiveness go hand in hand. Judges have the discretion to be merciful 
and forgive in the sense of imposing a sentence, which is much lower than the 
norm but this must be an exceptional course to take.876 
 
 
9.2.5. Mercy and Emotion 
Two judges wedged into the discussion of mercy a relatively distinct 
parameter, which could be taken as having a wider applicability in the realm of 
judicial sentencing behaviour - that of emotion, and the impact which it could have 
in distorting judicial reason:  
Showing mercy to an offender is not necessarily reproachable, I do know of course 
of our case law but let as forget that for a moment. The point is how would you 
know that the judge’s decision to show mercy is indeed the result of proper 
balancing, that is, objective balancing, and purely subjective disguised as 
objective and based on the judge’s emotion or even personal sympathy to the 
                                                                                                                                  
clearly implying leniency rather than mercy as defined in its case-law, stressed with reference to 
narcotics, that ‘…courts should show no mercy to those who trade and supply our youth with such 
kind of disastrous materials.’ Likewise in Police v Ioannou [1989] 2 CLR 61, 68, the Supreme 
Court noted (again obviously denoting leniency rather than mercy), that: ‘anyone who takes a knife 
to another person in the course of a robbery would get no mercy, whether he was drunk at the time 
or not.’ 
873See (n 484). 




offender? I don’t know the answer that is why I feel that one must be extremely 
careful with these concepts.877  
 
The judge must have the power to be merciful, but caution is needed. Emotional 
reactions sometimes blur proper judgment.878 
 
What these judges have said is indeed sound and logical, showing that the 
judicial qualification over mercy may have nothing to do with strictly normative 
interpretations but with the realisation that, simply, the existence of operative 
emotions about litigants, and issues before them, is unacceptable and must be 
suppressed. Thus reflecting an untested (though judicially noted as the above 
comments designate), commonsense wisdom that emotion distorts judicial 
reasoning demanded by the judicial role. Contrary to this presumption, recent 
neuroscience research has demonstrated that emotion is likely to play a key 
facilitative role in legal decision-making via participation of the ventromedial 
cortex in particular areas of law where personal, social, and moral circumstances 
are considered areas that include criminal law and sentencing, in a manner 
securing objectivity and control.879However, no matter how one views judicial 
decision-making on mercy or generally on sentencing, that is, through legal theory, 
neurobiology, or any other field or perspective for that matter (without implying 
that they be necessarily unconnected and incapable of synergistic overlapping), the 
fact remains that even if we show that it was rational for a judge to espouse a 
certain belief, the explanation of why he espoused it may always be independent of 
                                                
877Judge 16. 
878Judge 3. 
879H Bennett and G A Broe, ‘Judicial Decision-Making and Neurobiology: The Role of Emotion 
and the Ventromedial Cortex in Deliberation and Reasoning’ (2010) 42(1) Aust J For Sci 11. See 
also by the same authors, ‘Judicial Neurobiology, Markarian Synthesis and Emotion’ (2007) 31 
Crim L J 75. 
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that fact. And with reference to judicial hermeneutics,880the attribution (to the 
degree possible) of logic and reason to judges who adopt and utilise the beliefs and 
concepts, form part of the attempt to describe and explain their decision-making 
processes.881 
If nothing else (as one more area of science is striving to go into the 
neurobiological, this time, depths of the judicial mind), this attempt, that is, to 
rationalize and explain judicial decision-making, is indicative of the importance 
placed by researchers from a variety of fields, on the judicial function. One could 
also stress in this regard the hyperbolical ascription of distinctiveness and 
inimitability in the judicial mental facilities, irrespective of course of how 
important the judicial role is, or is perceived to be, in the administration of justice. 
 
9.2.6 The Just Sentence 
One of the interview questions related to the definition of the just sentence 
(for which there was further analysis in Chapter 6.2.1). Only 4 judges gave a 
specific answer. The rest of those who expanded on the issue of mercy referred to 
the ‘substance’ of their argumentation on other issues concerning mercy, justice 
and sentencing as fully encompassing their views.  From the answers they gave 
one deduces that for them, the justness of the sentence depends on the perception 
of the judge of what the right sentence is, according to the surrounding 
circumstances as he sees and interprets them:  
                                                
880See (n 91). 
881M Hollis, ‘The limits of Irrationality’ in B R Wilson (ed), Rationality  (Blackwell, Oxford 1970) 
219. 
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A just sentence is every sentence imposed by a judge after a procedurally and 
substantively correct and fair hearing. Unless and until that decision is reversed 
or altered on appeal it is the just sentence of the court.882  
 
 The just sentence is that imposed by the Supreme Court.883 
 
A just sentence is every sentence reached by a judge after due consideration of all 
pertinent issues provided that all the actors of the sentencing process including of 
course the judge and the defence advocate, perform their function to the greatest 
possible extent.884 
 
There is no such a thing. If somebody tells me what ‘justice’ is, I might be able to 
give a definition. I do not know what justice is. What I know is that my job is to 
administer the effective application of the law to the extent the constitution permits 
based on the law. If you want to call that justice, you can call it. There is no 
correct answer.885 
 
The first three comments attempt a procedural definition of justice, 
classifying as a just sentence every sentence a judge imposes after due and fair 
deliberation, with the sentences approved, altered or imposed by the Supreme 
Court considered to be the just sentence, imposed or approved by the highest 
judicial authority, along the lines of a similar proposition expressed by 
Kapardis.886The fourth comment relates to an overall feeling during the interviews 
(not only in the subject of mercy) that the judges when asked to give definitions on 
abstract concepts or discuss issues at a normative level, they would in truth react 
dismissively rather than constructively.  
 
9.3 Conclusions 
The chapter examined the way Cypriot judges mercy in Cyprus. There was 
a presentation and analysis of the pertinent case law and an analysis of the judges’ 
                                                




886Kapardis, Psychology and Law (n 437) 178. 
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comments on a variety of related issues ranging from the way they see mercy and 
mercying as a practical tool in effecting justice, to their views on the justification 
of the practice and the definition of justice, and its relation to mercy and mercying. 
Although most judges from those who commented on the matter were far more 
philosophical in their approaches, compared to other aspects of the interview 
thematology, the inference is that most of them act according to their own 
perceptions in an inconsistent and unjustified manner, even, against the ratio of 
related decisions of the Supreme Court. No judge referred to these decisions 
during the interviews. This is a matter of some concern. One would have 
reasonably expected that in a subject so rare in actual practice, these very few 
judgments of the Supreme Court, or at least the most important ones, would have 
been known or be cited by the judges. Unless of course this rarity constitutes the 
explanation per se in that as a result the said case law might not have been in their 
knowledge or that it simply slipped their mind. Unless again, it did not, and was 
simply not uttered because that would have been thought to be unnecessary. 
The analysis also indicated that there are variations between judges as to 
the role of mercy in criminal sentencing and its relation to justice and mercying, as 
a practical tool of discretion in their punishtecture functions.  
The next and last chapter summarises and concludes on the issues covered 






CHAPTER 10: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
The thesis set out to unveil how judges decide sentences in Cyprus, and 
how they employ mercy to contour their sentencing judgments as well as 
determine, in parallel, whether these judgments are reached within or on the basis 
of a consistent legitimising framework founded in or derived from moral legal 
theory. In full awareness that no study can ask all the questions and provide all the 
answers, the thesis endeavoured to portray and describe the Cypriot judges’ views 
on sentencing and the relationship between those views and their actual conduct, in 
terms of the convergence of two sets of influence on practice. The first of these 
was labelled as the architecture of sentencing (or punishtecture), that is, the 
judges’ manner of reaching, formulating, and justifying their sentencing decisions 
in substance and in form. The second, mercying, was considered as that aspect of 
punishtecture that frames real decisions in certain kinds of hard cases, concerning 
their considerations and ponderings in deciding to utilise and exercise mercy in 
determining the punishment of a defendant at the sentencing stage, for the crime 
he has committed. On this ground, that the practice of mercying arises within and 
is constrained by the punishtecture framework that encloses it, the thesis examined 
the judges’ views on the nature of the sentencing process, and the conceptions, 
design, structuring, and utterance of their resultant judgments within the Cypriot 
criminal justice context. It presented what they have said about the choice of 
punishment and mercy, and attempted to reconstruct what they may be taken to 
have meant by saying it.  With these concepts in mind, and viewing punishtecture 
as a construct formed from a structured process of thought combining the 
application of law and legal sentencing principles on the one hand and the Cypriot 
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cultural realities as perceived by the judges on the other hand, the study reflected 
upon a number of aspects of the judges’ orientations towards passing sentence.  
These included the general justifying aims and purposes in sentencing, the 
constraints under which they operate, the way they make their penal selections and 
the use (or dismissal) of mercy as an etiological foundation (express, implied, 
disguised, or hidden) of sentencing rationales and mercying. 
It was beyond the purposes of the study to pursue, in addition, a 
prescriptive analysis of how Cypriot judges should or ought to optimally punish 
and mercy according to some equivalent normative theory, at least in depth. Such a 
mission though could perhaps form the subject matter of future doctoral or 
postdoctoral research that could conceivably be developed from the present work.  
The approach utilised for the purposes of the study was primarily 
descriptive and qualitative but at the same time inexorably permeated with 
prescriptive and quantitative elements due to the nature and scopes of the project. 
On this prospect, the thesis examined the extent to which perspectives derived 
from moral legal theory made sense for the Cypriot criminal judges and the degree 
to which abstract theoretical concepts formed in reality part of their punishtecture 
and mercying rationale. On this basis, one could ponder at a more speculative and 
normative level at this conclusory stage on the wider ramifications and 
implications certain issues and findings could have for the future. Whether 
acknowledged or not, theory forms part of any practice. Practice is not the 
offspring of parthenogenesis. To paraphrase French philosopher Antonin 
Sertillanges, we never think entirely alone; we think in company, in a vast 
collaboration; we work with the workers of the past and of the present. In the 
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whole intellectual world each one finds in those about him the initiation, help, 
verification, information, encouragement, that he needs,887like for example from 
the wisdom of writers of law and penology in order to give essence and purpose to 
the practice, and position it in the wider picture of justice and fairness. In essence, 
then, the study dealt with the association between the theoretical justifications and 
goals of legal punishment, by trying to exhibit (through an immanent critique 
perspective) the significance of such justifications for the actual practice of 
punishment and mercy in Cyprus and their correlation to justice. The theoretical 
perspectives employed were tactically narrowed down to those of retributivism, 
utilitarianism, and hybridism, as these were thought to be, and rightly so in the 
end, of significance and bearing to the chosen venture.  
It was discussed with reference to earlier (and scarce) research on judicial 
sentencing decision-making in other continental and common law jurisdictions, 
that such efforts are usually met with deep admonition on the part of the judiciary. 
As demonstrated in the thesis, to this state of affairs Cyprus forms no exception. 
On this actuality, the intention was to show that the thesis possessed a degree of 
uniqueness by proving that it diverged to an appreciable extent from earlier similar 
projects as it dealt with an academically virgin ground such as that of the Cypriot 
sentencing reality, and investigated the role of mercy in Cypriot punishment 
practice based on significant and novel information obtained from the judges.  
The research showed that the Cypriot criminal sentencing system, as 
historically originated and developed, is not as nonconforming or atypical so as to 
                                                
887M Ryan (tr), A D Sertillanges, The Intellectual Life: Its Spirits, Conditions and Methods 
(Mercier Press, Dublin 1978) 145. 
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be considered unique and thus unfit to become the midpoint of research work on 
sentencing like the one at hand, and thus contributing to the better understanding 
of judicial sentencing and mercying thinking process from a wider and more 
encompassing spectrum, beyond territorial confines.  
It was also established that although Cyprus has never been a noteworthy 
participant (at least quantitatively) in the international discussion on punishment 
justification and practice (most certainly not at the judicial level), the insights 
offered in the present study could not be easily ignored or cancelled as a result. On 
the contrary, they could add to the better understanding of the centrality of 
sentencing judges’ decision-making processes, with potentially international 
ramifications. As discussed in the thesis, Cyprus, like many other international 
jurisdictions, has proven unable to formulate and establish a consensus on a single 
punishment theory or on a set of sentencing rationales so as to make sentencing 
more coherent and rational, if nothing more, in the eyes of the academe. A reason 
for this, as the study has shown, has been the fact that the judges (or at least most 
of them) do not appreciate or do not appear to appreciate the theoretical 
dimensions of the penological debate and its impact (or the absence of it) in 
sentencing practice.  
The attainment of the thesis’s objectives was pursued on the basis of first-
hand information obtained from a series of one-to-one semi-structured interviews 
contacted through the use of open questions with the majority of the Cypriot 
criminal judges. The primary undertaking of this was to attempt the recovery of a 
very precise context of presuppositions and other beliefs for use as background for 
exhibiting the respective comments as rational for those particular judges, in 
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circumstances held to be true. No feature of their comments was dismissed as 
irrelevant or trivial as such a course could have proven detrimental to the 
understandings pursued. The comments were presented in the thesis verbatim in an 
effort to retain their originality and candour, and in this sense it was probably 
successful. Not all judges expressed an opinion or commented on every aspect of 
the questionnaire. Naturally, some of them were more talkative and bold in their 
opinions than others while a few were particularly cautious in what they divulged 
about their behind-the-scenes judicial sentencing deliberations. All comments were 
assessed both individually and synergistically in a way roughly analogous to 
testimonial and evidential evaluation for extracting findings pertinent to the issues 
under consideration, having of course constantly in mind the research objectives 
and its non judicial nature. On this premise, all interview comments or any part of 
them on any aspect considered directly or indirectly relevant to the issues at hand, 
were deemed to offer adequate and reliable foundation for reaching a more general 
corresponding finding, being treated as a form of a quasi judicial ratio decidenti on 
the aspect dealt with.  
The aims and purposes of sentencing was a theme on which the judges had 
strong views, yet a lot of their observations appeared to be individual opinions and 
were not automatically linked to the sentencing aims and purposes as set out in the 
case law of the Supreme Court, or the abounding criminological and other 
pertinent literature, a small fraction of which was dealt with in the dissertation. It 
was not an objective of the research to test the judges’ criminological or other 
theoretical knowledge. It was not easy to know if the judges had any genuine and 
thorough acquaintance with the criminological literature, as such knowledge was 
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only apparent from the observations of a small number of them. The general 
feeling, however, has been that the overwhelming majority of judges were not 
criminologically conversant, and they almost never elevated any part of their 
discussion to a theoretical dimension. In referring to concepts such as justice, law, 
punishment, mercy, retribution, deterrence, denunciation, incapacitation, social 
protection, and so on, the judges simply projected their own ideas and 
understandings as to their meaning, without referring to any scholarly sources or 
reflections.  
 At a basic level, the judges’ views on the espousal of the sentencing aims 
and purposes could be said to have been eclectic and assorted in an unprincipled 
manner, with by and large, utilitarian tendencies. 
Deterrence would appear to be the one most regularly used in practice, if 
the interviews in this study could be relied upon to provide an indication of 
popularity in Cypriot sentencing practice, together with the supporting data 
derived from the analysis of the Supreme Court case law. This inference is in 
harmony with the finding in that chapter, that between 1960-2008, the Supreme 
Court referred to deterrence (of all forms) as a purpose in sentencing in 27.9% of 
the overall number of appeals against sentence. In a number of cases where the 
judges listed instances in which they had considered general deterrence as suitable, 
it seemed that what they were in fact referring to was just deserts (without 
appearing to be realising it, at least expressly). The lack of publicity in many cases 
was thought to be a chief reason for hindering general deterrence. Many of the 
judges disagreed with deterrence as a sentencing aim, especially general 
deterrence; yet oddly enough they gave examples of cases where they considered 
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deterrence as appropriate. The reason for this inconsistency cannot be determined 
from the information collected. Public expectations, common practice, and 
Supreme Court statements are probable causes. There are also indications that the 
use of deterrence by the judges may have reflected the utilisation of retributive 
goals in the guise of deterrence. Few conclusions beyond such speculation could 
be drawn. However, the judges’ personal distaste for deterrence in their comments, 
and to a lesser extent retribution, was one of the most unexpected findings of this 
study, as it appears to contradict pertinent case law of the Supreme Court, to which 
the judges expressed general adherence. 
Rehabilitation was a popular sentencing purpose among the judges, mainly 
for young offenders for whom there was anticipation of salvation. This aim was 
referred to by the Supreme Court in 4.76% of the overall number of appeals 
against sentence decided in the aforementioned period. Imprisonment was not 
generally seen as a rehabilitative sentence, with uncertainty being articulated by 
some judges as to the usefulness of programmes offered within the corrective 
services system.  
Incapacitation and social protection were seen as an essential purpose of 
the sentencing course for use in restricted circumstances, although the Supreme 
Court had referred to the former in 1.51% of the overall number of appeals against 
sentence decided, whereas the latter was extensively adopted in 19.9% of the 
overall number of appeals.  
 Retribution did not find particular support with the judges. This accords 
with the frequency with which the Supreme Court referred to this sentencing aim, 
that is, in 3.83% of the overall number of appeals against sentence decided 
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between 1960-2008. While many of the judges said they felt the burden of 
retributive pressure from the politicians and the community, still their judicial 
independence and sense of responsibility allowed them, as they claimed, to 
sentence in a way that they saw fit.  
Denunciation was generally perceived as a useful sentencing purpose. 
Some judges though, thought that it was meaningless despite its recognition by the 
Supreme Court in 5.69% of the overall number of appeals against sentence decided 
during the aforementioned period. Links with other purposes, mainly retribution, 
were also noted. An important conclusion derived from all these is that there is a 
notable divergence between the diachronic stance of the Supreme Court on what it 
considers to be the recognised punishment aims in Cyprus, and that of individual 
judges. This unexpected discovery of judicial insubordination within the ranks of 
the Cypriot judiciary is alarming as it could potentially cause inconsistencies in 
treatment and disparities in sentencing, as well as reel the credibility of the system 
of administration of justice in the eyes of the public, something that could 
potentially form the basis for future research. Furthermore, the continued reliance 
by judges in their sentencing decisions on deterrence and rehabilitation appears to 
endorse the view that sentencing has a determinant role to play in crime 
prevention. This could produce a boomerang effect. If Cypriot judges were to 
continue emphasising purposes such as deterrence and rehabilitation in their 
sentences, that could encourage belief on the part of the public that sentencing has 
a major role to play in crime prevention, and therefore harsher sentences would be 
called for in order to prevent crime. If the sentence fails to deter or rehabilitate, as 
will often be the case, it is easy for the public and politicians to lose faith in the 
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system. This may be an inevitable outcome in a system where there is little 
understanding of what actually occurs in the courtroom. If, however, there were 
less emphasis placed by sentencing judges on deterrence and rehabilitation, and 
more placed on communication of the limits and purpose of sentencing, which 
could at least have the potential of assisting the public to understand what the 
sentencing system is hoping to achieve. 
 The study has discussed to some extent the impact of the media in 
sentencing. The judges were cautious of this involvement, but not dismissive. 
Some judges saw a positive role for the media in sentencing as a means by which 
critical information could be circulated to the public, and a way in which the 
people could be better informed about the sentencing process.  
The study has additionally demonstrated that if the criminological literature 
on theories of punishment and mercy were to have a constructive influence on the 
judicial system, and as a result on the judges’ punishtecture and mercying, it is 
important that they be informed on how these theories are being utilised by 
sentencers and the reverse. If, for example, studies show that deterrence is only 
effective in certain limited circumstances, then continued enthusiastic use of 
deterrence by sentencers is almost pointless. It is likewise important that 
sentencers be more aware of developments and trends in sentencing theory. The 
judges in this study appeared to almost unanimously disapprove of retribution, but 
yet the said aim is still one of the most enduring themes in the sentencing 
literature. This of course cannot lead to conclusive inferences; nonetheless the 
point is there to be made. Similarly, the study showed that despite the decline in 
popularity of rehabilitation since the 1970s, this has apparently gone largely 
 310 
unnoticed by the Cypriot judiciary. It is probably for all these reasons that perhaps 
not unpredictably, some judges discussed the desire for training or further training 
in criminology and related fields.  
Another finding of the study is that for Cypriot judges, sentencing is, in 
essence, a balancing exercise between various duly scaled judicial factors within a 
system of competing interests, with such balancing constituting a central element 
in the exercise of their cherished sentencing discretion.  
The judges viewed sentencing as a rational process, though at times, of a 
particularly hard and tense nature. According to some of the judges, sentencing is 
not only a hectic but also a disturbing undertaking, while for others nothing more 
than a necessary and rather uncomplicated routine function. From all of the tasks 
of judging, imprisonment emerged as the one to which the judges were most likely 
to show their humane self, as sending a person to jail was seen widely as a 
complex and daunting task, except in those very rare cases where the particularly 
serious nature and extent of the criminal behaviour superseded any such feelings.  
The study has also demonstrated that judges occupy a central and powerful 
role in the sentencing process. They consider each sentencing case as distinct, and 
all sentencing aims relevant, using their personal experience on the bench and 
applying them to the particular facts of the case, by employing their intuition and 
common sense, without as a rule, ever having a feedback from their previous 
sentences on offenders. Rather than looking for more direction on the employ of 
the sentencing purposes by perhaps specifying a superseding aim or seeking 
additional direction as to the use of these purposes, the judges appear to be 
approving of less regulation instead of considering the issue as mostly entwined 
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with the ‘hands off’ issue of judicial discretion. They also appear not to feel 
controlled by notional incompatibilities and confines, and not to have a stable 
approach, or method in dealing and expressing their views on the justification and 
goals of punishment in their sentencing practice, let alone share a common idea in 
relation to these goals. This has been an essential part of judicial punishtecture and 
mercying as presented in the thesis. Instead, the judges considered specific 
qualities of the offence and the offender as actually more probable determinants of 
the worth to be attached to precise objectives and justifications of punishment in 
every case, hence demonstrating a prominent desire to individualise sentences by 
fitting them into the distinctive aspects and conditions of specific cases and 
individual offenders. Associated to this conclusion is also another resulting finding 
to the effect that preferences for goals of punishment are in any event not 
especially germane for choosing a particular sanction, nor are sentencing decisions 
consistently rationalised by goals of punishment.  
The thesis shows in addition that Cypriot judges have, in general, a fear of 
being reversed by the Supreme Court in their sentencing judgments, with that fear 
constituting probably the most effective internal constraint on their discretionary 
sentencing powers. It has also been demonstrated that Cypriot judges are deeply 
concerned with the manner in which the inefficiency of the practice affects their 
judicial image, and restrains their ability to effect and administer penal justice 
properly and suitably on the basis of their standards and their conception of 
equality and fairness. Evidence of this is the particular antipathy of the judges to 
insincere apologies in mitigation and the weighing of pseudo-remorse and 
repentance as mitigating factors; their great concern on the negative impact of 
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sentencing delay on the credibility of the judicial system and the execution of 
judicial duty; their considerable pressure in trying to perform effectively under 
their mounting workloads which give them no time for reflection and in depth 
legal analyses, and perhaps normative expeditions in the fields of moral/penal 
theory; and their respect for the critical role of defence advocates in the sentencing 
process in moulding judicial sentencing discretion. However, it was also stressed 
by the judges, that the incompetency of some of these advocates has a negative 
impact, not only on the defendants, but also on the criminal justice system in 
general. 
The judges likewise saw the giving of detailed and comprehensive 
reasoning for their sentencing and mercying decisions as imperative. However, the 
research has also found that there has been discord between what some judges 
genuinely and legally thought about a case and how they would deliberately decide 
differently in the end. This judicial illusionism (as called and explained) cannot but 
become the cause of trepidation to the reasonable observer as regards the politesse 
and guilelessness of the Cypriot judicial system in general.888One should not, 
however, easily become a callous critic. And that because the moral and 
justificatory prism through which positive observers and faultfinders alike (usually 
academics and politicians) normally judge judges’ judging on sentencing and 
mercying, is in itself in (great) need of both consistency and justification. In fact, 
theorists themselves have not hitherto been able to reach equilibrium let alone a 
                                                
888Generalisations are of course, usually dangerous (Alexander Dumas thought that they always 
are): See, E Knowles (ed), The Oxford Dictionary of Quotations (OUP, New York 2009) 299. On 
the other hand, Hegel observed, that a generalization is a property of thinking and therefore to 
generalize means to think: See, C Dingle, Memorable Quotations: Philosophers of Western 
Civilisation (IUniverse, Nevada 2000) 96. 
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resolution, on how and why judges think and act as they do. Surely though, the 
academics’ and politicians’ idiosyncrasy (as that of judges) plays its own role in 
the formation and expression of critique (of whatever nature) towards judges. 
Truly then, everything is relative when it has to do with human judgment.889 
The assessment of mercy and its relationship with punishment, sentencing, 
and justice, has illustrated that there are differences among approaches to mercy 
and their justification among retributivism and utilitarianism. It also signified that 
there are variations between conceptions of mercy that deny it any peculiarity in 
relation to justice affirming that it is just a form of sensibility to criteria of justice, 
that there are theories of mercy that see it as refusing to apply principles of justice, 
and theories of justice that operate a division of labour between them in which 
justice gives general limits for the decision, but mercy allows the judge to navigate 
on the area of discretion. It also explained that, at least on a theoretical level, 
within a system of conflicting values and justifications like the Cypriot one, 
mercying plays a legitimate role in criminal sentencing. This role takes part both 
within the parameters of traditional penal theory, and independently of it, as a self-
determining axiom accountable only to justice, and as a purposive ingredient of 
judicial discretion in the determination of sentence and hence a component 
element of justice. 
There was a critical hypothesis made for the purposes of the study in that 
the sheer existence of the practice does not without more entail that it is or can be 
consistently justified in its particular form. The practice of punishment, it was 
                                                
889T Mussweiler, ‘“Everything is Relative”: Comparison Processes in Social Judgment’ (2003) 33 
Eur J Soc Psychol 719, 720. 
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argued, is a morally problematic practice and hence in need of a consistent (moral) 
justification because it involves actions that would be considered wrong and evil in 
other contents. On this premise, the study went looking for an obvious and 
dependable connection between justifications and goals of punishment derived 
from moral theory on the one hand and the practice of punishment on the other 
within the boundaries of a more general attempt to determine the moral 
legitimisation of the sentencing decisions of the Cypriot judges. Such a link could 
not be established. What was established is that judicial sentencing decision - 
making (with or without the implementation of mercy) cannot and should not be 
reached in a moral limbo, and that Cypriot criminal judges need not and do not on 
the whole reach judgments concerning the moral value and justifiability of 
punishment as a prerequisite of effectively and legitimately performing their 
sentencing and mercying functions. Conceivably, there are other mechanisms or 
processes separate from those emanating from moral legal perspectives that may 
offer adequate justification and direction for judicial punishtecture and mercying. 
From the viewpoint adopted in this study, however, it seems secure to conclude 
that there is no consistent legitimising and guiding moral framework underlying 
the existing practice of punishment and mercying in Cyprus on the premises 
covered by the research. This may be attributed to a number of causes. One 
argument may be that the theories of retributivism and utilitarianism are inherently 
gauche for practical purposes and thus unable to offer a clear and practically 
relevant legitimising and guiding framework for the contemporary practice of 
punishment, therefore retaining the gap between punishment theories, sentencing 
and mercying. As it has been argued, hybrid theories (to which none of the Cypriot 
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judges expressly referred to during the interviews) could not offer a feasible option 
as they typically camouflage eclecticism in sentencing practice. Another argument 
could be that sentencing is not a morally problematic practice but rather a practice 
in which a sound vision on the moral foundations of punishment and the goals at 
sentencing are not present. Finally, and on a more radical tone, one could also 
argue that morality does not constitute an important and distinctive domain with a 
distinctive set of overriding norms or a privileged mode of reasoning, and that 
morality is in any event everywhere and nowhere in particular.890Again, the final 
stance depends on the angle of observation, having always in mind Bertrand 
Russell’s cautions on the value of such philosophical endeavours to the effect that 
philosophy is to be studied, not for the sake of any definite answers to its 
questions, since no definite answers can as a rule, be known to be true, but rather 
for the sake of the questions themselves; because these questions enlarge our 
conception of what is possible, enrich our intellectual imagination and diminish 
the dogmatic assurance which closes the mind against speculation.891 
While individual judges may have their own distinctive models of the 
relationship between goals of punishment and specific sanctions, such a 
relationship is hard to discern at the aggregate level. These arguments are not 
mutually exclusive but in either way there still subsists apparently a tenuous tie 
between moral theory and sentencing, and obviously punishtecture. Therefore, a 
commonly shared vision of the justification and goals of punishment between 
                                                
890A Rorty, ‘Questioning Moral Theories’ (2010) 85 Philosophy 29. 
891B Russell, The Problems of Philosophy (Lulu Enterprises, North Carolina 1912) 131. 
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judges and theorists could be aimed at, provided the two are eager to understand 
each other’s perceptions and responsibilities.  
The study will hopefully assist in enhancing the understanding of judicial 
thinking relating to the sentencing decision and the rational mechanics surrounding 
it, giving at the same time the opportunity to the Cypriot judiciary in particular to 
have their views heard in an otherwise conservative and slothful surrounding (as 
opposed to most of its judges), and to gain greater understanding of their role in 
the process.  
Although it is not the purpose of this thesis to make recommendations for 
change, a number of findings have emerged from the analysis, and it is useful to 
note these so as to inform further debate on sentencing practices, and in particular 
highlight the interplay between theory, law, and practice. Some of these matters 
are issues for legislative change, and others for judicial consideration, either 
formally or informally: 
• The establishment of a Judicial Studies Board for the education and research in 
sentencing matters. This would be of notable assistance to the judges, to the 
development of policy (both legislative and otherwise), and to sentencing 
researchers and commentators. It would also generally enhance the standing of 
the courts, by allowing the judges to perhaps having to deal with decreased 
workloads, and as a result have some more time to reflect and probe on issues 
of sentencing theory and practice. 
• Legislative codification in a clear and unambiguous way of sentencing aims 
and purposes, principles, and dispositions to be followed without hindering in 
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any way judicial discretion in accordance to the prevailing societal 
circumstances and needs. 
• While the thesis argues that judicial discretion should remain in the hands of 
the judges, sufficient issues in relation to fairness and consistency arise with 
such a system that call for further internal structuring of judicial discretion. 
The Supreme Court should give serious consideration to the introduction of 
sentencing guideline judgments. This, by presumption, would give important 
and appropriate guidance to the sentencing judges, and allow greater flexibility 
in sentencing within the guidelines introduced. These guidelines should be 
comprehensive, although not binding in the formal sense, so that they would 
not hinder judicial discretion. 
• Realisation on the part of the Supreme Court that its function on sentencing 
appeals should strictly and honestly be confined to the provisions of Criminal 
Procedure Law, Cap. 155, and not to the substitution of the trial sentence on 
the premise of pure disagreement with it under the pretext of manifest 
excessiveness or inadequacy. This would assist in the quest of attaining (to the 
degree possible and desirable) greater consistency in sentencing. 
• Initial and continuing education of judges in sentencing, or follow-ups in 
sentencing theory, policy, and practices in Cyprus and other jurisdictions. 
• Awareness on the part of sentencing scholars of the issues in the practice of 
sentencing, so that this, in turn, could inform sentencing research. 
• Education of the media in the field of procedural and substantive sentencing 
issues. This could assist journalists in bettering their understanding of 
sentences and their rationales, and hitherto being able to convey them to the 
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public accurately and appropriately, and even criticise these sentences 
constructively in a more convincing and momentous manner. 
• Involvement of the University of Cyprus Law School and the rest of private 
law schools in Cyprus in a constructive debate and criticism of sentencing 
judicial policy and decision-making. This approach, virtually absent today 
from Cypriot reality, would assist in the exchange of ideas and establish a 
channel of communication between the academe and the judiciary, and create 
an additional constrain on capriciously exercised sentencing discretion.  
• Establishment of procedural and substantive mechanisms for the blunting of 
case workloads and the giving of more time to judges to reflect on various 
sentencing issues, their sentences, and their role within the criminal justice 
system in general.  
At long last, the epilogue; the Cypriot judges play a fundamental role in the 
country’s criminal justice system with all of its conflicting values and 
rationalisations. It is for this reason that the legitimacy of their decisions is crucial, 
and not because their robes convert them into some kind of divine and enlightened 
androids but precisely because their robes empower them with divine powers and 
responsibilities, though human. The manner in which Cypriot judges see the 
sentencing process and their accountability within that perspective is connected to 
their consequential conduct inside the system of punishment practice, and the way 
they apply their punishtecture and mercying in designing and schematising what 
they deem as the right and proper sentence in each case. Cypriot judges (as the 
writer livingly proves) are not giants of intellect, prophets, oracles, or 
mouthpieces, nor are they appointed for their competence as moral philosophers or 
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social commentators. In fact, like Lord Chancellor Eldon once said referring to the 
English judges (with applicability to the Cypriot judges as proved by the present 
study) they take as much interest in ‘abstract metaphysical calculations’ as does 
‘the ox that stands staring at the corner of the street.’892They are instead all-too-
human employees, responding as other employees do, to the conditions of the 
labour market in which they labour. They are not pure formalists, legalists, 
pragmatists and the like. They are, merely judges, free from inelastic 
denominations and categorisations, knowing too well evidently, in accord to their 
English counterparts, that law is too serious a matter to be left exclusively to 
them.893Judges want to regard themselves and be regarded by others, especially by 
their peers and advocates, as good judges, and to achieve that, they feel they must 
conform to the accepted norms of judging. They know that one cannot be 
considered as a good judge if he takes bribes, decides cases by flipping a coin, falls 
asleep in the courtroom, ignores legal doctrine, cannot make up his mind, bases 
decisions on the personal attractiveness or unattractiveness of the litigants or their 
lawyers, or decides cases on the basis of ‘politics’ (still, though, some Cypriot 
judges apparently subscribe to judicial illusionism). They modestly derive 
satisfaction from being judges and in a position to influence over the development 
of law with the ambition of a better and fairer society. They exercise discretion, 
which they cherish as the most important power they have in their mission to 
administer justice and punish justly and mercifully, rarely acknowledging the risks 
of extraneous influences that escort formless or poorly monitored discretion. They 
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usually look outside conventional texts for guidance in deciding difficult 
sentencing decisions without accepting law as an autonomous domain of 
knowledge and technique, trying hard not to become prisoners of their 
experiences. They are flexible and adaptive to the sentencing needs of the society 
in which they live and function as citizens and judges. They act occasionally on 
constructive and self-regulated intuition based on their feedback on legal principle. 
A few (very few) wish to keep in close rapport with punishment theory so that they 
are reminded of the dangers of unreflective and mechanised sentencing. Most do 
not. Instead they are possessed by a profound antipathy towards legal academics 
and theorists, considering them as incapable if not incompetent to capturing the 
essence of the real problems scourging the sentencing practice, and offer feasible 
and down to earth solutions, being at the same time virtually oblivious of the 
wealth and depth of the academic literature on punishment and mercy theory, and 
indeed one of the reasons for the surfeit of footnote references in the thesis to legal 
and academic literature aimed exactly towards highlighting the disparity between 
the judicial and academic cosmos.  
Cypriot judges should be seen and evaluated within the context of a 
process in which many others participate (such as the prosecution, defence 
advocates, and the police as the investigative authority), and whose decisions may 
predetermine to a very large extent the nature and extent of their own judicial 
decisions and actions. They strive for the best knowing full well that they are not 
and cannot be a panacea for any of the pragmatic or normative problems that 
scourge the practice of legal punishment and society at large, no matter how small, 
large or influential that society might be. They are merely the persons chosen to 
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perform a particular social duty, and there is no awe about that but simply perhaps 
a touch of old fashioned idealism or romanticism depending on the perception of 
each and every one of us.894  
The punishtecture and mercying of the Cypriot judges exemplifies the 
ways in which they act or not within the island’s criminal justice system, in pursuit 
of the elusive ends of justice and fairness. Their punishtecture and mercying 
embodies an overall systemic mechanism, but also an attitude, a social and 
philosophical stance, a state of mind as to how they perceive their role and duty 
within the parameters in which they have to operate. Though possibly prosaic, this 
is the modest, and one can only hope at least partially new, original and significant 
contribution of the present dissertation to the advancement of legal knowledge in 
the field of judicial sentencing decision-making; and the way criminal judges, 
sentence and mercy in the small and obscure Republic of Cyprus, for whatever that 









                                                
894Or even, on a more cynical diathesis, on an equally old fashioned financial cost-benefit approach 
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